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In this paper we assess the management costs of delivering services under alternative institutional arrangements. We develop an analytic framework based on transaction cost and public sector network theories to identify management costs public managers face in delivering services directly and via contract. Results from a survey of refuse collection managers in Ohio indicate that direct service provision carries higher management costs, though when combined with vendors’ activities, contracting carries more monitoring costs. These results suggest two important contributions to knowledge and contract management practice. First, we develop an innovative approach to assessing management costs. Second, we use our framework to determine whether there are differences in management costs under alternative institutional arrangements that managers should take into account as they approach the “make or buy” decision.

In recent years, there is a steady increase of studies documenting the emergence of “contracting back-in” in many countries around the world, that is, governments bringing previously contracted services back in-house and once again relying on public employees to deliver these services. Through a survey of the academic discourse on contracting back-in, this manuscript describes the phenomenon of contracting back-in and discusses its implications for “bringing the state back in”.

The manuscript conducts a systematic review of existing literature on contracting back-in with a focus on the scope and rationale of contracting back-in.

The existing literature demonstrates that contracting back-in is often as common as contracting out and can be found in a variety of countries and across different service areas. Existing studies also suggest that contracting back-in is driven by a mix of managerial, political, and environmental factors. The rise of contracting back-in could imply a revival of the administrative state in public governance and a more dynamic, potentially more complicated, system of public service delivery.

The manuscript contributes to the special issue on “bringing the state back in” through the lens of government contracting. It adds a number of implications to the discussion on the emergence of the “new” administrative state and strategies to reinvent it.

Private provision of public services has always been a factor in local government. In 1736 Benjamin Franklin and a group of civic leaders founded a fire company in Philadelphia because such a service was needed and the city could not provide it. Local municipalities often cannot provide the labor, equipment, and expertise to build roads, to do data processing, or to run hospitals but rather arrange with someone else who has the expertise to perform these tasks. However, during the 1970s rapid inflation, shrinking tax bases, and “no growth” budgets made the public provision of even what is popularly perceived as essential government services seem more like a tight‐rope walk than responsible government.

The purpose of this paper is to present the results of contract management process maturity assessments in the US Navy using a process capability maturity model. The maturity model is used to benchmark an organization’s contract management process maturity and to use the assessment results to develop a road map for implementing process improvement as well as knowledge-sharing initiatives.

This is survey-based research on benchmarking contract management processes in the US Navy. A web-based assessment tool was deployed to US Navy contracting officers located at aeronautical systems, sea systems, and logistics support contracting agencies. The assessment tool consists of survey items related to the use of contracting best practices. The survey responses are then used to calculate the agency’s contract management process maturity level.

The benchmarking results reflected higher maturity levels in the pre-award contracting processes (Procurement Planning, Solicitation Planning, and Source Selection), while lower maturity levels were reflected in the post-award contracting processes (Contract Administration and Contract Closeout). The research findings related to process capability enablers also reflected higher mean scores for the pre-award processes and lower mean scores for the post-award processes. These maturity levels and process capability enabler scores reflect the extent of the implementation of contracting best practices within the Navy contracting agencies.

This research uses a purposeful sampling approach designed to acquire data on organizational contract management processes. The assessment survey was administered only to qualified Navy contracting officers. The Navy contracting agencies are responsible for procuring billions of dollars in supplies and services in support of the Navy mission. Although the assessed contracting agencies procure different types of systems, supplies, and services, the contract management processes used are common to all Navy, Army, Air Force, and other US federal government agencies. The conclusions based on the analysis of these benchmarking assessments may be applicable to Department of Defense (DoD) and other government agencies.

The findings suggest that benchmarking can be effective in measuring and improving contracting process capability within the Navy. Benchmarking contracting processes can have far-reaching effects throughout the DoD. The Under Secretary of Defense’s has mandated initiatives related to improving both pre- and post-award contracting processes. The use of these benchmarking assessments can be instrumental in tracking the achievements of these process improvement initiatives. Additionally, the US Congress is leading the push for auditability in procurement operations. By benchmarking and improving its contracting processes, the DoD will be winning the battle toward integrity, accountability, and transparency of its financial operations.

Benchmarking contracting processes can also have far-reaching effects in society. Many governments are focussing on integrity, accountability, and transparency in public procurement. International organizations such as Transparency International (TI) have identified process capability and process integrity as key for reducing the potential for procurement-related fraud, waste, and abuse. Additionally, NATO member countries and partner nations are focussing on the value of assessing and improving procurement processes for strengthening transparency and accountability. The value of benchmarking and improving contracting processes is gaining much attention in global public procurement agencies as they strive for accountability, integrity, and transparency in their governance processes.

There are multiple reports on deficiencies in DoD’s contract management processes, identifying poor contract planning, and Contract Administration as just some of the critically deficient areas. In response, the DoD is increasing its emphasis on developing its workforce competence through education initiatives. However, very little attention is being paid to benchmarking contract management processes. This research reflects the value of benchmarking DoD’s contract management process maturity and using the results for implementing process improvement initiatives. Using process benchmarking data, agencies can identify process improvement initiatives that will ensure government tax dollars are spent in the most effective and efficient ways.

Emergency contracting has risen to the fore in both interest and importance in the US since September 11, 2001 (9/11). Most recently, the US government's response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita piqued the interest of both the Executive and Legislative branches of the US government and their respective oversight bodies. This paper briefly reviews the literature of emergency contracting with special focus on the statutory and regulatory framework for emergency contracting, identifies some contracting solutions established by the US government to deal more effectively with emergency contracting, and pinpoints some problems faced by emergency contracting agencies and anomalies of their emergency contracting practices.

This paper evaluates an Air Force performance-based service contract against the contracts that were prescriptive in the past. Department of Defense mandated that all service contracts be performance-based by 2005. The goal of the paper is to determine whether this contract, after becoming performance-based, is achieving greater cost savings and better outcomes for government, contractor, and taxpayers. The paper assesses the contract performance standards and how they are measured. The authors analyze the language of the Statement of Work (SOW) before and after it became performance-based. The contractor’s performance is evaluated. Positive incentives are identified and described. Finally, the paper addresses risk assessment issues.

There exists a tremendous number of studies in strategy and management journals concerning contracting issues between private firms. Those studies are usually grounded in competing theoretical frameworks such as transaction cost economics, the resource-based view of the firm, incentive and agency theories and few others. However, very few studies, especially in those reviews (this is also true to a lesser extent in economic journals), are concerned with the issue of contracting between private firm and government. This is particularly surprising since existing theoretical frameworks qualified to tackle contracting strategies between private firms can also provide insights into issues related to contracting with government.

Public agencies contract out to pursue a variety of goals. But, these goals cannot be realized if the performance of contractors is not assessed and monitored. This study examines the state of performance measurement and contract monitoring in the U.S. transit agencies. We focus on three research questions: (1) What monitoring capacity exists within transit agencies? (2) What monitoring methods are used by transit agencies? (3) What performance measures are tracked by transit agencies? We find monitoring units are common in a third of agencies in the study. Service and customer complaints are the most common performance measures, while penalties and liquidated damages are the most frequent form of penalties. Finally, we find that transit agencies utilize a variety of output and outcome measures to monitor contractors.

Contracting practice and theory is based upon a legal framework which impedes the attainment of value, defined as quality and cost containment. The manufacture of complex, highly technical infrastructure is especially impeded. Constraints of the legal framework are being overcome through innovative infrastructure contracting practices which maintain competitiveness and accountability, and simultaneously foster collaboration among the participants. Some of these innovations are discussed along with five projects which utilized one or more of them. A management framework for contracting based on a competitive/collaborative model is offered which emphasizes value, cooperation, long-term relationships, accountability and stewardship.

Nearly $200 billion a year is funneled through the federal procurement system to buy everything from paper clips to stealth fighters. This procurement system can be thought of as an oscillating pendulum as it swings from one extreme of unresponsiveness to mission needs to the other extreme of hypersensitivity to mission. Out of a sense that the procurement pendulum had swung too far towards overregulation, two major procurement reform laws were passed: the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 and the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996. Many observers suggest that these two laws have led to a revolution in the way the government buys. Are these reforms permanent? The view here is they are not because of various political forces.