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The purpose of this paper is to develop an integrated theoretical framework for energy security concept and to shed light on the policies and strategies applied by the European Union countries to confront the challenges that faces them.

The research paper uses Regional Security complexes theory, which mainly developed in Copenhagen school for security studies, that founded by Barry Buzan. This school tried to clarify the untraditional security aspects, through expanding its scope by adding new dimensions than military perspective.

Despite the consolidated efforts exerted by the European Union to assure safe levels of energy security, and their continuous pursuit to be liberated from Russian energy over dependence, but the results are still limited.

The value of this research paper stems from the fact that it encompass the theoretical aspect by shedding light on all the developments occurred to energy security concept, in addition to the Empirical side, by analyzing various European energy security challenges and their confrontation strategies.

This article presents an analysis of some particular aspects of European public opinion with respect to defence and security issues under the threat of international terrorism after September 11, 2001.

It is based on secondary data analysis from standard EUROBAROMETER surveys, Candidate Countries EUROBAROMETER surveys and Flash EUROBAROMETER surveys carried out in 2000–2006.

The analysis shows that there is an increase in the level of anxiety across European public opinion in the ‘Age of the War on Terror’ related to international terrorism and proliferation of nuclear, bacteriological or chemical weapons of mass destruction.

The existing divergence in the threat perception in Western and Eastern parts of Europe in the first years following the end of the Cold War significantly diminished after September 11, 2001, is based on the common perception of the threat from international terrorism.

The European Union (EU) is one of the most notable examples of economic cooperation and integration in international politics. However, it is difficult to argue that a similar stance prevails in politics and security. Although the EU made various advances and took institutional steps, particularly in the fields of defense and security during the Cold War, it acted on North Atlantic Treaty Organization's axis/with North Atlantic Treaty Organization throughout this period. During the post-Cold War period, the EU made concerted efforts to develop more independent defense and security policies. A similar determination, however, was not seen in terms of the reflections of these activities in practice. The diversity of the EU's issues, on the one hand, and the periodic divergence of interests between Atlanticist and Europeanist countries, on the other hand, posed barriers to acting on a single platform. At the same time, the United Kingdom's exit from the EU has resulted in the establishment of new defense and security balances. Nonetheless, the EU's efforts to develop an autonomous security policy persist. Among these initiatives is Permanent Structured Cooperation, which has recently been noted. Although debates on the effects of North Atlantic Treaty Organization's existence in the twenty-first century in their own context reflect a separate dimension, it does not appear plausible to foresee that the EU will have a wholly separate security perspective from North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the near future. Taking into account the relevant general framework, this study discusses the historical backdrop of the EU's security and defense strategy, new developments in the post-Cold War period, and projections for the future of transatlantic relations.

This chapter aims to analyze whether European security shapes future American grand strategy or not. For restrainers, the present American grand strategy has to be revisited due to the fact that there is no balance of power logic for further American presence in Europe. Moreover, China is a great power to be balanced in Asia. The chapter problematizes the assumptions provided by restrainers. It will argue that the United States has been acting in Europe as the pacifier, and it has a deep-seated interest in European peace. European security has been built upon the American preponderance of power, and a potential imbalance of power is a threat to the United States. While Russia is a revisionist power in Europe intended to change the status quo in Europe, China is a great power in Asia. However, the United States has both sufficient material power and allies to balance Russia and China simultaneously, and pivoting to Asia requires no American pullback in Europe.

The purpose of this paper is to enhance the understanding about how energy supply chains work to build resilience against exogenous security threats and thereafter what support mechanisms should be introduced or improved by the European Union.

Five case studies and data collection from multiple sources is used to understand what exogenous security threats could lead to the disruption of oil and gas flows to Europe, how energy companies, from a supply chain perspective, are working to manage these threats and finally, how the EU may coordinate the security of the energy sector in collaboration with supply chain companies.

Results show that today, oil and gas supply chains have in place a good combination of disruption strategies, including portfolio diversification, flexible contracts, transport capacity planning and safety stocks. The most relevant security threats the companies fear, include hijacking of vessels (sea piracy), but also terrorism, and wars. Finally, the study highlights that the European Union has built a comprehensive portfolio of strategies to deal with scarcity of oil and gas resources. However, these approaches are not often synchronized with supply chain strategies.

The paper provides guidance for supply chain managers dealing with critical suppliers located in conflict environments. The paper recommends that supply chain managers fine tune their strategies in coordination with governmental actions in foreign politics, dependence reduction and crisis management. This may be achieved by closer communication with governments and potentially through the creation of a pan-European sector alliance.

Previous research discusses the topic of supply chain resilience and supply chain risk management. However, none of these studies report on exogenous security threats and disruption strategies of oil and gas supply chains. At the same time, previous research lacks detailed studies describing the interaction between governments and energy supply chains.

The European Union (EU) is commonly, and vaguely, labelled as a sui generis foreign policy actor. The European Security Strategy (2003) advances, in an imprecise manner, the possible use of ‘robust’ responses to international challenges, when needed. The military dimension of the EU has to be found in its evolving but still incipient Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Since the launch of ESDP and its first missions in 2003, the EU has been able to conduct a noticeable progress on two fronts. On the one hand, it enhances internal capabilities for crisis management; on the other hand, it favours the principle of participation of third countries in missions. The present analysis considers EU international military cooperation in a strategic neighbourhood: Eastern Europe. We take into account the EU necessity to rely on relevant non-EU players to launch missions. We argue that ESDP missions' success depends not only on these external actors, namely on the consideration of power gaps, but also on domestic EU constraints. We explore the causes of poor cooperation with Russia on ESDP and the perspectives for crisis management in Europe. Considering ESDP activities in Eastern Europe, we conclude that the balance between civilian and military tools is not adequate to engage more seriously with Russia towards the stabilisation of the ‘common’ neighbourhood.

The position of France – President Nicolas Sarkozy reiterated the French nuclear doctrine in a speech in Cherbourg. For the first time, a French president dealt at length with the problems of disarmament. He also clarified the French position: Paris has always been doubtful about the “Global Zero” level advocated by some other countries.

Under President Jacques Chirac another element was added: the force de frappe could be used against the leadership of states that use terrorism against France as well as those that envisage using weapons of mass destruction. In addition to the vital interests of the French nation, “the interests of nations allied to France” consacrated a first step toward a common European policy in nuclear matters.

From the beginning of the Fifth Republic (1958) till today, there has been a wide consensus on defense issues, particularly on the force de frappe. Even the Socialists under Mitterrand rallied to the necessity of a policy of deterrence; the Communists, though proponents of total nuclear disarmament, did not oppose it.

The position of European Union – However, the European Union has worked on strategy policies on subjects such as the Union action plan on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear security; nuclear nonproliferation; European security strategy; etc.

The European Union consists of two nuclear states and 25 nonnuclear states. It makes it difficult to find a unified approach toward disarmament. Despite the Treaty of Lisbon and the creation of post of a high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, the European Union struggles to define a common foreign policy.

This paper aims to provide a meta-analysis of the main themes emerging from public domain foresight studies on the defence and security environment undertaken in the decade since the 9/11 attacks on the USA. The authors focus mainly on foresight studies undertaken in Europe.

The paper is based on a content analysis of public domain foresight studies.

Foresight studies on the defence and security environment reflect a shift in security thinking away from a focus on state-centric threats towards a much broader view of security risks that includes risks presented by the vulnerability of European society to the failure of critical infrastructure, to pandemics, environmental change and resource based conflicts. The authors place a particular emphasis on the treatment of technological change in these defence and security foresight studies and argue that the growing importance of dual-use technologies is likely to mean that defence will play a declining role as a sponsor and lead-user of advanced technologies in the future.

Foresight studies on the defence and security environment have grown in number since 9/11 not least in Europe. However, they have been the subject of little systematic analysis. This paper makes a contribution to such an analysis.

The Lamfalussy process was implemented from early 2001, following the report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets, chaired by Alexandre Lamfalussy. Four years on, this paper concludes that, while it is too early to assess progress in areas such as implementation and enforcement (Levels 3 and 4 of the Lamfalussy process), significant progress has been made in implementing the proposals contained in the original Lamfalussy Report. Preparation of EU legislation affecting securities markets is now more transparent, with better involvement of external stakeholders and enhanced political cooperation between all the institutions (Commission, Council and European Parliament). This has resulted in an improvement in the quality of legislation and an acceleration of the legislative process. The use of implementing measures will make it easier and faster to adapt Community legislation in the future. The process is also encouraging regulatory and supervisory convergence. Nevertheless, this paper suggests further improvements that could be made in areas such as consultation, including better involvement of consumers; timetables for transposing measures into national law; focusing more on general rules and principles in framework legislation (Level 1) and avoiding over‐prescription in implementing measures (Level 2); achieving more consistent implementation across member states (Level 3); further strengthening political accountability; and strengthening efforts to foster greater understanding of the Lamfalussy process.