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Revelation of controversial fundraising practices by the Clinton‐Gore reelection campaign in 1996 and continuing controversy over proposed campaign finance reform legislation has brought this subject into public focus and discussion. This article provides an overview of key recent developments in campaign finance accompanied by coverage of literature and Web sites produced by scholars, government agencies, and participants in the ongoing debate over campaign finance and its role in the American political process.

During the 2020 election cycle, 2,276 super PACs spent over $2.1 billion in federal elections. This chapter argues that changes made to the US campaign finance system brought about by the Citizens United v. FEC (2010) and SpeechNow.org v. FEC (2010) cases have destabilized the American political system by fueling tensions between right-wing and left-wing populist factions and by contributing to congressional corruption. By moving away from the political corruption standard and toward the free speech standard in Citizens United, polarizing wealthy mega-donors and dark money sources have come to play a dominant role in congressional elections. These cases also helped to contribute to a two-tiered campaign finance regulatory structure that distinguishes between campaign contributions given directly to federal candidates and political money contributed to super PACs to support or oppose federal candidates. In the 2020 congressional elections, PACs and super PACS outspent both major party candidates combined in 35 House and Senate races. Super PACs are serving as “shadow parties” by targeting competitive races for the purpose of swaying partisan control of Congress. This study also shows that an exceedingly high percentage of super PAC money is spent on negative advertising that further divides rather than unifies the nation. This chapter also highlights the corrupting influence of congressional leadership PACs and examines how super PACs have enabled foreign and dark money sources to illegally influence congressional campaigns.

There is a perception in the United States that campaign contributions equate with vote buying. Outright vote buying is illegal, but many citizens believe that loopholes in campaign contribution laws allow some to buy votes while perpetuating a façade of legitimacy. Both federal and state laws attempt to regulate campaign contributions, but many of those have been limited by the Supreme Court’s ruling that campaign spending is considered free speech (Buckley vs. Valeo, 1976). Without the ability to limit campaign spending, the amount of money it takes to run a campaign, particularly a presidential campaign, has increased substantially. This had led to an increase in the use of bundling by presidential campaigns, with the winners often rewarding their bundlers. It has also led to an increase in outside independent organizations, known as Super PACs, with an unlimited ability to raise and spend money. This creates an additional problem as a small percentage of wealthy individuals constitute the vast majority of campaign contributors, leading to the perception that politicians cater to the elite. Whether a politician is affected by these factors or not is hard to prove, but it still leaves a perception by voters that their votes are less influential than large campaign contributors and there is always a risk that a vote has been bought.

In both the academic and public policy realms, debates have gone on for decades concerning the influence of class-based interest groups on policymaking. Virtually no work in this area compares influence in the U.S. with influence in Canada despite the fact that the countries provide interesting differences in the social and political contexts within which influence may occur. In this chapter, we analyze how receiving money from the same business and labor entities (“political action committees” in the U.S.) influences similarity in voting among legislators in the 105th U.S. House of Representatives (1997–1998). We then perform the same analysis for the 36th Canadian House of Commons (1997–2000). In the U.S., we find that sharing business contributors significantly affects vote similarity among legislators, whereas sharing labor contributors does not. This supports elite-power and class-based theories and bolsters the arguments of those who feel more campaign finance reform may be necessary. In Canada, however, sharing contributors of either type has no effect on vote similarity among parliamentarians, which supports state-centered theory and lends credence to those arguing additional reforms may be unnecessary. These findings suggest that structural context matters greatly for patterns of political power.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the challenges of Japanese political leadership in combating corruption with an emphasis on the 1970s and 1980s when Tanaka Kakuei and Miki Takeo led Japan.

This paper discusses the perceived extent of corruption in Japan, the importance of Japan’s gift-giving culture, and examines the efforts of Miki Takeo and the consequences of his political reforms for Japanese politics. Comparison is made with his predecessor, Tanaka Kakuei, to highlight the differences in combating corruption between both leaders.

Compared to Tanaka Kakuei, who was highly corrupt, Miki Takeo left a mixed legacy. He managed to revise campaign finance laws but lacked the political will and support from his party. The reforms he implemented failed to reduce money in politics, but they favoured the opposition in the collection of funds.

This paper will be useful to scholars and policy-makers interested in studying the role of leaders in curbing corruption and the challenges of political reform.

Just over ten years ago, the American legislative system was rocked by a series of scandals surrounding powerful lobbyist Jack Abramoff who claimed to have “bought” influence in nearly half of the United States congressional offices. The Abramoff scandal brought public attention to three critical areas of corruption in congressional politics: loopholes in gift-giving laws, campaign finance, and the revolving door. For instance, why are lobbyists allowed to buy a meal for congressional representatives if they are both standing up but not if they are sitting down? Why is sharing a simple meal with an elected official banned but allowed so long as campaign contribution checks are exchanged (i.e., the mystery of the $5,000 hamburger)? And just how much does it cost to buy your congressman? We explore these areas of corruption that were brought to light in 2006 by “the biggest political scandal of the century,” and examine how things have, or in some instances, haven’t changed in the years since the Abramoff scandal broke. Does Congress run cleaner today? Or is it still politics as usual?

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, the authors elaborate on why American businesses are often willing to advocate and deploy corporate political resources for or against specific governmental policies, but largely reluctant to engage in more general political process reform. Second, the authors introduce a set of ideas encouraging a business-driven political process reform in the USA, which the authors refer to as Corporate Political Responsibility (CPR).

This paper reviews existing literature on why firms generally avoid advocating for political process reform to identify several firm-level impediments to such action. As an outcome of that review, a CPR governance concept – a derivative from the corporate responsibility literature – is proposed and unpacked as a proposition that if adopted by firms would encourage and support business-driven process reform advocacy.

The primary findings are that American firms lack a rationale justifying business political activity into the political process arena; a willingness to assume a high level of political risk associated with political process intervention; and an executable corporate mechanism for doing so.

A second stage build out of the paper would involve at a minimum multiple research interviews with corporate executives and trade association officials to test the viability of the CPR proposal as to whether or not the proposed governance statement would liberate firms to advocate political process reform. This paper sets the predicate for additional research.

This paper may well be the first to identify the concept of CPR as a key corporate governance proposition. It is also likely the first to conceptualize CPR as more than a theoretical rendering – it is executable. Corporations can put CPR into practice through a firm’s Board of Directors endorsing a governance statement – Corporate Political Responsibility Protocol (CPR/P) – that transforms the CPR concept into a sanctioned firm activity, giving executives significant latitude to spend corporate resources advocating political process change. This paper suggests a variety of reform possibilities – electoral, campaign finance and legislative – that could benefit from business reform advocacy.

This chapter examines the role that Citizens United v. FEC (2010) has played in shaping the current system of election spending in the United States. In Citizens United, the Court determined that individual rights to speech and expression can flow into the corporate entities they join. This chapter argues that the Court’s holding serves to redirect the focus of accountability away from those who seek to sway election outcomes through massive election spending and toward any efforts by government to regulate that type of spending. The practical result has been to allow for the creation of new organizations that can take in unlimited amounts of money while also effectively hiding the source of funds from disclosure. By muddying the waters of disclosure, these new entities – Super PACs and dark money organizations – lower the ability of citizens to maintain accountability over the electoral system. Finally, this chapter examines ways to encourage greater disclosure and accountability in government after Citizens United.