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In the era of digitalization and technology, tremendous changes have taken place in the taxi industry worldwide. The traditional taxi service has transformed into the latest innovative technology-based e-hailing service. There are innumerable factors that drive the user adoption of e-hailing apps. This study aims to primarily concentrate on identifying, analyzing and ranking these factors which have an impact on the user intention toward using e-hailing apps.

The e-hailing app users in the state of Punjab and Chandigarh are the target population for the study. A fuzzy analytical hierarchy process technique has been applied to analyze and codify the determinants that influence the user intention of adopting e-hailing apps. The primary factors that have been considered for the study are social influence, perceived usefulness, facilitating conditions, perceived ease of use, self-efficacy, perceived risk, compatibility and trust.

The study revealed that “Perceived Usefulness” is the factor that influences user intention to use e-hailing apps the most, while “Perceived Risk” the least. The sub-criteria codified in the top priority was as follows: “Overall, I find the e-hailing app useful in booking a taxi (C15)”; “I do not need some people to use e-hailing apps (C52); “I believe e-hailing app is compatible with existing technology (C61).” The sub-criterion “E-hailing app service provider keeps its promise (C72)” was demonstrated to have the least impact on the user intention of adopting e-hailing apps.

The study has been confined to only eight factors selected from the extended technological acceptance model framework and some related technology acceptance theories. Some more other factors may have an impact on user adoption of e-hailing apps, which need to be added further. Also, the scope of the study should be enhanced by expanding the geographical area beyond the selected region.

The findings of the study enable the e-hailing service providers and marketers to understand the users’ intention in a better way, to make improvements in e-hailing apps and formulate strategies accordingly.

The previous literature provides the base to the present study for identifying the factors affecting user behavioral intention toward e-hailing apps and information technology. The findings and results of the present research make value addition to the existing knowledge base.

On‐line update combines a bibliography of recent on‐line articles with a search example from a data base producer showing techniques especially useful in searching its data base. In this issue, we have asked INSPEC to provide a bibliography of literature concerning on‐line retrieval. Only articles which have been added to their file since June 1976 are included. Here is their report.

Know your customer (KYC), accounting standards, issuance, clearing, and trade settlement became the major barrier to implement accounting, accountability and assurance process in supply chain finance (SCF). Blockchain technology features have the potential to solve accounting problems. This research focuses on exploring how blockchain technology provides solutions to overcome the barriers of accounting process in SCF. The benefits, opportunities, costs and risks related to blockchain adoption are also explored.

Multi-case study and qualitative methods are used with a framework based on blockchain role to overcome the accounting process barriers. Ten blockchain projects in SCF and 29 interviews of participants as a unit of analysis are considered.

The findings indicate that blockchain technology offers solutions to solve accounting, accountability and assurance problems in SCF. Validity, verification, smart contracts, automation and enduring data on trade transactions potentially solve those barriers. However, it is also necessary to consider costs such as implementation, technology, education and integration costs. Then there are possible risks such as regulatory compliance, operational, code development and scalability risk. This finding reflects the current status of blockchain technology roles in SCF.

This study unveils blockchain's SCF accounting potential, emphasizing multi-case method limitations and future research prospects. Diverse contexts challenge findings' applicability, warranting cross-industry studies for deeper insights. Addressing selection bias and integrating quantitative measures can enhance understanding of blockchain's accounting impact.

Accounting professionals can get an idea of the future direction and impact of blockchain technology on accounting, accountability and assurance processes.

This study provides initial findings on the potential, costs and risks of blockchain that is beneficial for parties involved in SCF, especially for banks and insurance underwriters. In addition, the findings also provide direction for the contribution of blockchain technology to accounting theory in the future.

This study first replicates, then perturbs, the centipede game as implemented by McKelvey and Palfrey (1992). It is thus both a replication study and an original research study. We use controlled laboratory experiments, with computer interfaces for each treatment, anonymous round-robin matching among the subjects across rounds, multiple (10) rounds within each treatment, and incremental changes between adjacent treatments allowing for an assessment of effects at the margin of different game configurations. We find unraveling to the subgame perfect equilibrium somewhat faster than did McKelvey and Palfrey (1992), when using their exact design. Perturbations to that design show that setting non-taker payoffs to zero induces earlier unraveling, as does the use of higher stakes (as in Murphy, Rapoport, and Parco (2006), and Rapoport, Stein, Parco, and Nicholas (2003), respectively). Other, subsequent perturbations show: that there is at most a subtle effect associated with using a 10-second timer with a default move, relative to untimed active moves; and that clock format versus tree format has a minimal effect in common information, unchanging payoff-parameterization environments. We verify the robustness of some key past findings in real-time games. We also explore in a common information environment, the effect of design features previously used in independent private values settings; here we find new evidence that features which might modulate information acquisition and/or processing in an independent private values setting may not restrict behavior in a common information setting.

This paper replicates and refines the finding that subsidies for charitable contributions of a rebate type are less effective than matching subsidies. A survey based field experiment with health charities was conducted among a national sample representative of the Dutch population on key demographic characteristics. The greater effectiveness of matching subsidies found in laboratory experiments is replicated. Also some evidence is provided on why matches are more effective than rebates. Matches attract a larger pool of donors, in part because donors expect more people to make donations and “join in.” Matches also increase the amount contributed among the higher educated, higher income households and larger donors. Subsidies of either type do not decrease subsequent giving in a campaign for tsunami relief. The experiment could not test whether the greater effectiveness of a matching subsidy is due to a change in the donor’s attention to the benefits of a donation to the cause. This explanation should be tested in future research. The findings imply that a given budget available to subsidize charitable contributions can be used more effectively if the subsidy is framed in the form of a match than in the form of a rebate. Nonprofit organizations can use this insight in the design of fundraising campaigns. For governments the finding suggests that the effectiveness of current subsidies for charitable contributions can be enhanced by matching them rather than providing a deduction in the income tax, which works as a rebate.

This chapter introduces a model of efficiency-wage competition along the lines put forward by Hahn (1987). Specifically, I analyze a two-firm economy in which employers screen their workforce by means of increasing wage offers competing one another for high-quality employees. The main results are the following. First, using a specification of effort such that the problem of firms is well-behaved, optimal wage offers are strategic complements. Second, the symmetric Nash equilibrium can be locally stable under the assumption that firms adjust their wage offers in the direction of increasing profits by conjecturing that any wage offer above (below) equilibrium will lead competitors to underbid (overbid) such an offer. Finally, the exploration of possible labor market equilibria reveals that effort is counter-cyclical.

To study strategic information transmission in organizations, we conduct a simplified version (with only three states) of the sender-receiver game experiment designed by Wang, Spezio, and Camerer (2010), in which an informative sender advises an uninformed receiver to take an action (to match the true state), but has incentives to exaggerate. We also have the same subjects play the original five-state game. We find similar “overcommunication” behavior with Taiwanese subjects – messages reveal more information about the true state than what equilibrium predicts – that let us classify subjects into various level-k types. However, results from the simplified version are closer to equilibrium prediction, with more senders robustly classified as level-2.

Recent experiments show that feedback transmission can mitigate opportunistic behavior in repeated social dilemmas. Two nonexcludable explanations have been investigated: strategic signaling and nonmonetary sanctioning. This literature builds on the intuition that under both partner matching (where the same groups of players interact many times) and stranger matching (where groups change continuously), feedback may work as a nonmonetary sanctioning device, but only the former also allows for strategic signaling. Empirical evidence on the two explanations is mixed. Moreover, the usual design may give rise to confounding matching protocol effects.

My experiment provides a novel empirical testbed for different channels by which feedback – costless disapproval points – may affect behavior in a repeated public goods game. In particular, it is based on a random matching scheme that neutralizes the confounding effects of different matching protocols on behavior.

The transmission of feedback is found to foster prosocial behavior. The data favor the nonmonetary sanctioning explanation rather than the signaling hypothesis.

This study provides a novel set of evidence that (i) communication may mitigate selfishness in social dilemmas and (ii) the source of this phenomenon may be linked to the emotional reaction that communication evokes in humans.

The purpose of this study is to examine the welfare effects of product standards (which fall under Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs)) on an exporting country when the country by its own choice prefers to follow the null standard for the domestic market, which is not possible due to high set up cost at two different standards. The model has used a theoretical framework to analyze the effects and has derived some important results. If the standard is not linked with a true negative externality, the exporting country, given the assumptions of the model will always prefer to be discriminated by “tariff” and the importing country will prefer to protect its market by “tariff” rather than going for NTB. The typical assumptions taken here resemble the trade between developed and developing countries when the developed country imposes some minimum standard on a product but becomes relatively “costly” for the developing country to comply with. As the importing country is not free to set tariffs, it will use NTB as a minimum standard (as it is welfare-improving than free trade). However, the minimum standard also affects the exporting country's local producers and consumers. So NTB leads to a worse situation for both countries and definitely worst for the exporting country. Using a game theoretic framework, the study shows that the imposition of standards which does not address any real externality can be an optimum response for an importing country leading to a loss in the global welfare compared to a free trade situation.

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of why people act trustworthily in anonymous non-repeated meetings where trustworthiness benefits the trustor and runs against the trustee’s material self-interest.

The paper uses a survey originally developed by Bicchieri et al. (2011). The survey makes it possible to explore whether trustworthiness has a normative element. Is there a norm of trustworthiness that inflicts punishment for disobedience?

The participants in the experiment strongly believe that most people will punish untrustworthy behavior, lending support to the idea that trustworthiness is norm driven. The data provide little evidence for a parallel norm of trust.

The theory of repeated games explains how trust can emerge among players in ongoing interactions. But why do people choose to trust others who they do not know in non-ongoing interactions? The results offer an explanation. When trustors are aware that trustworthiness is rooted in norms, they have reason to expect trustees to act trustworthily. Then, it makes sense to trust since trustors will benefit from their trusting.