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1 – 10 of 20Jade Wong, Andreas Ortmann, Alberto Motta and Le Zhang
Policymakers worldwide have proposed a new contract – the ‘social impact bond’ (SIB) – which they claim can allay the underperformance afflicting not-for-profits, by tying the…
Abstract
Policymakers worldwide have proposed a new contract – the ‘social impact bond’ (SIB) – which they claim can allay the underperformance afflicting not-for-profits, by tying the private returns of (social) investors to the success of social programs. We investigate experimentally how SIBs perform in a first-best world, where investors are rational and able to obtain hard information on not-for-profits’ performance. Using a principal-agent multitasking framework, we compare SIBs to inputs-based contracts (IBs) and performance-based contracts (PBs). IBs are based on a piece-rate mechanism, PBs on a non-binding bonus mechanism, and SIBs on a mechanism that, due to the presence of an investor, offers full enforceability. Although SIBs can perfectly enforce good behaviour, they also require the principal (i.e., government) to relinquish control over the agent’s (i.e., not-for-profit’s) payoff to a self-regarding investor, which prevents the principal and agent from being reciprocal. In spite of these drawbacks, in our experiment SIBs outperformed IBs and PBs. We therefore conclude that, at least in our laboratory test-bed, SIBs can allay the underperformance of not-for-profits.
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Silvester Van Koten and Andreas Ortmann
Self-regulatory organizations (SROs) can be found in education, healthcare, and other not-for-profit sectors as well as in the accounting, financial, and legal professions…
Abstract
Self-regulatory organizations (SROs) can be found in education, healthcare, and other not-for-profit sectors as well as in the accounting, financial, and legal professions. DeMarzo et al. (2005) show theoretically that SROs can create monopoly market power for their affiliated agents, but that governmental oversight, even if less efficient than oversight by the SRO, can largely offset such market power. We provide an experimental test of this conjecture. For carefully rationalized parameterizations and implementation details, we find that the predictions of DeMarzo et al. (2005) are borne out.
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The results of standard lab experiments have long been questioned because of the convenience samples of subjects they typically employ and the abstract nature of the lab settings…
Abstract
The results of standard lab experiments have long been questioned because of the convenience samples of subjects they typically employ and the abstract nature of the lab settings. These two characteristics of experimental economics, it is argued, are the key factors that endanger the external validity of experiments.
Researchers have tried to address these issues by bringing the lab to non-traditional subjects including participants in remote locations, and/or by moving the setting of experiments closer to reality by using real goods and/or settings that are not stripped of context.
While field experiments might help experimental economists to increase the external validity of their investigations, these potential benefits might come at costs that can be considerable. Specifically, going into the field can dramatically increase the demands on, and challenges to, experimental control. This is particularly true for experiments in small-scale societies in remote locations on which I focus in this article.
Jeffrey P. Carpenter, Glenn W. Harrison and John A. List
There are several ways to define words. One is to ascertain the formal definition by looking it up in the dictionary. Another is to identify what it is that you want the…
Günther Ortmann and David Seidl
The present paper takes a look at the particularities of German strategy research over the last three decades. In contrast to much of the Anglo-Saxon research, which has focused…
Abstract
The present paper takes a look at the particularities of German strategy research over the last three decades. In contrast to much of the Anglo-Saxon research, which has focused on competition as a guiding concept in theorizing about strategy, German research has typically been concerned with more fundamental questions about the general relationship between organizations and their environments and, as a result, tended to be more conceptual than empirical. Researchers have been particularly influenced by the German sociological and philosophical traditions, specifically by the critical theory of Jürgen Habermas and by the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann. Also, there are authors who draw on the economic tradition of the Austrian School in order to develop a competence-based theory of the firm. Another branch builds on Anthony Giddens's structuration theory and Jacques Derrida's philosophy of deconstruction. As we will demonstrate, much of the research has been concerned with fundamental theoretical tensions: evolution vs. planning, selection vs. compensation, cognitive–instrumental rationality vs. moral–practical rationality, etc. We note that, as a consequence, much of German strategy research shows a particular interest in paradoxa and oxymora (such as ‘planned evolution’, ‘productive misunderstandings’ or ‘unfocused monitoring’). This paper will identify and explore important strands of German strategy research and discuss its particularities compared to mainstream strategy research in the United States.
Florian Kellner, Andreas Otto and Bernhard Lienland
Tooling is a common component of an industrial product’s manufacture. Specific tooling is devised to serve the fabrication of a particular product, while generic tooling can be…
Abstract
Purpose
Tooling is a common component of an industrial product’s manufacture. Specific tooling is devised to serve the fabrication of a particular product, while generic tooling can be used in the manufacture of multiple products. In the latter case, companies are confronted with the problem of fairly allocating the indirect costs of the tooling. This article studies how to allocate costs of generic tooling to single production orders.
Methodology
Ten allocation methods (AMs) are described that are in principle suited to the distribution of generic tooling costs to production orders. Since the presented methods have for the most part been discussed in differing contexts, we apply them to a specified generic tooling problem for comparison. Evaluation of the various methods is based on 16 criteria. Reasoning is supported by a computational Monte Carlo simulation. Furthermore, we suggest using the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) to elaborate one final proposition concerning the most preferable allocation scheme.
Findings
The article reports the single allocation rules’ performances for different allocation scenarios. The described characteristics refer to fairness, efficiency, and simplicity as well as to empty-core performance. Using AHP analysis allows for the aggregation of the rules’ criteria ratings. Thus, especially suitable allocation schemes for the problem at hand are identified.
Practical implications
An allocation is required for budgeting reasons and also for the definition of projects’ bottom-up sales prices. Selecting the “right” AM is important, as a suboptimal AM can result in unfair allocation vectors, which will act as incentives to stop using the common resource, potentially leading to higher total costs.
Originality/value of the article
Research on the comparison of AMs is typically performed for certain purposes, such as enterprise networks, horizontal cooperative purchasing scenarios, or municipal service units. This article will augment the research evaluating AMs by introducing a novel set of evaluation criteria and by providing an in-depth comparison of AMs suited for the allocation of generic tooling costs.
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