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The essence of discounted cash flow valuation is simple; the asset is worth the expected cash flows it will generate, discounted to the reference date for the valuation exercise (normally, the day of the calculation). A survey article was written in Parker (1968), where it was stated that the earliest interest rate tables (use to discount value to the present) dated back to 1340. Works from Boulding (1935) and Keynes (1936) derived the IRR (Internal Rate of Return) for an investment. Samuelson (1937) compared the IRR and NPV (Net Present Value) approaches, arguing that rational investors should maximize NPV and not IRR. The previously mentioned works and the publication of Joel Dean’s reference book (Dean, 1951) on capital budgeting set the basis for the widespread use of the discounted cash flow approach into all business areas, aided by developments in portfolio theory. Nowadays, probably the model with more widespread use is the FCFE/FCFF (Free Cash Flow to Equity and Free Cash Flow to Firm) model. For simplification purposes, we will focus on the FCFE model, which basically is the FCF model’s version for the potential dividends. The focus is to value the business based on its dividends (potential or real), and thus care must be taken in order not to double count cash flows (this matter was treated in this case) and to assess what use is given to that excess cash flow – if it is invested wisely, what returns will come of them, how it is accounted for, etc. (Damodaran, 2006). The bridge to the FCFF model is straightforward; the FCFF includes FCFE and added cash that is owed to debtholders. References: Parker, R.H. (1968). “Discounted Cash Flow in Historical Perspective”, Journal of Accounting Research, v6, pp58-71. Boulding, K.E. (1935). “The Theory of a Single Investment”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, v49, pp479-494. Keynes, J. M. (1936). “The General Theory of Employment”, Macmillan, London. Samuelson, P. (1937). “Some Aspects of the Pure Theory of Capital”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, v51, pp. 469–496. Dean, Joel. (1951). “Capital Budgeting”, Columbia University Press, New York. Damodaran, A. (2006). “Damodaran on Valuation”, Second Edition, John Wiley and Sons, New York.

All information is taken from public sources and with consented company interviews.

Opportunities for value creation may be found in awkward and difficult circumstances. Good strategic thinking and ability to act swiftly are usually crucial to be able to take advantage of such tough environments. Amidst a country-wide economic crisis and general disbelief, José de Mello Group (JMG) saw one of its main assets’ (Brisa Highways) market value tumble down to unforeseen figures and was forced to act on it. Brisa’s main partners were eager in overpowering JMG’s control of the company, and outside pressure from Deutsche Bank was rising, due to the use of Brisa’s shares as collateral. JMG would have to revise its strategy and see if Brisa was worth fighting for; the market implicit assessment about the company’s prospects was very penalizing, but JMG’s predictions on Brisa’s future performance indicated that this could be an investment opportunity. Would it be wise to bet against the market?

This study is excellent for finance and strategy courses, at both undergraduate and graduate levels. Company valuation and corporate strategy are required.

After working through and discussing this case, learners should be able to:1. evaluate the financial condition of Ellerine Holdings Limited (EHL) at the time of the merger proposal and use it to make inferences about the company’s ability, at that time, to function effectively as a going concern;2. identify the conditions within EHL and in the operating environment that may have made it necessary for EHL to seek to change its business strategy;3. determine whether the acquisition price offered to EHL by African Bank Investments Limited (ABIL) was fair; and4. compute the value accretion/loss expected to be realised by the existing shareholders of ABIL and EHL under the merger proposal.

This case situates the directors of Ellerine Holdings, a furniture retail company that merged with African Bank Limited in 2007, reflecting on the events that led up to both entities being placed into business rescue in 2014 and asking whether the merger was the cause of the demise. If they had chosen an alternative partner, would the results have been different?

Masters Level students – MBA or Masters in Finance.

For instructors.The following material has been provided with the teaching note for instructors:- Teaching Note.- Johannesburg Stock Exchange News System (SENS) extract of related original filing.For students.The following supplementary material has been provided to accompany the case:- Financial information on the two companies (Excel spreadsheet).- Johannesburg SENS extract of related original filing.

CSS 1: Accounting and Finance.

Within 18 months of exiting bankruptcy, Kmart's position was sufficiently strong to launch an acquisition of Sears, once the nation's largest retailer and also a core holding of ESL. Looks at a number of compelling issues related to Kmart's bankruptcy, restructuring, and rebirth under the control of ESL, a large hedge fund. Presents some of the key metrics that Eddie Lampert, head of ESL, had available to him as he made two decisions: first, in 2002, to amass a controlling stake in Kmart's defaulted debt during the restructuring; and second, in 2004, to launch a takeover of Sears. The first deal illustrates the decision-making process for a financial buyer, including the downside protection of Kmart's real estate holdings, whereas the second deal represents a traditional strategic acquisition. Illustrates the innovative use of real estate as a “hedge” for ESL in the event that the retail combination does not produce the required financial results. Also focuses on the role of investment bankers and the increasingly important position that hedge funds and LBO funds have carved out in the M&A market.

To outline the explosive growth in assets and influence of alternative investment managers, particularly LBO funds and hedge funds, and the transition of some larger hedge funds from shorter term trading strategies to longer term plays on distressed debt, restructurings, and turnarounds.

Arvind Mills incurred a loss of Rs.316 crores in the year 1999-2000 after a period of declining profits in spite of increasing sales. In January 2001 lenders to Arvind Mills received the Information Memorandum on Debt Restructuring which offered several alternative schemes. They had to decide whether they should accept the proposal and if they accept which specific scheme they should choose.

The Beringer Wine Estates Company has been expanding its market share in the premium segment of the wine industry in the 1990's. After operating as a wholly owned subsidiary of the giant Nestlé food company for almost a quarter of a century, the firm was sold in 1996 to new owners, in a leveraged buyout. For the next year and a half, management and the new owners restructured the firm and expanded through internal growth and strategic acquisitions. With a heavy debt load from the LBO, it seemed prudent for management to consider a significant rebalancing of its capital structure. By paying off a portion of its debt and enhancing the equity account, the firm would achieve greater financial flexibility which could enhance its growth rate and business options. Finally, a publicly held common stock would provide management with another “currency” to be used for enhancing its growth rate and overall corporate valuation. With the equity markets in turmoil, significant strategic decisions had to be made quickly. Should the IPO be completed, with the district possibility of a less than successful after market price performance and these implications for pursuing external growth initiatives? A variety of alternative courses of action and their implications for the financial health of the Beringer Company and the financial wealth of Beringer stockholders are integral components of this case.

In October 2008, in the midst of a financial crisis, Anthony Keating, investment manager at the Boston private bank Billingsley, Blaylock, and Montgomery, was searching for an investment strategy to recommend to his high-net-worth clients. Traditional investments in the equity markets were being decimated, and Keating’s clients would be looking to him for ideas. Inspired by the success of Paulson and Co., Keating began to explore the possibility of entering a trade that would profit as homeowners defaulted on their mortgages. The more Keating learned about the trade, the more he realized that he needed to know about mortgage-backed securities and credit default swaps. The case provides instructors with a chance to introduce these financial instruments, while at the same time providing lessons applicable to students interested in value investing or real estate finance.

After reading and analyzing the case, students will be able to:

• Explain how home mortgages are securitized into financial instruments that are traded in public markets

• Describe how credit default swaps can be used to speculate on the value of an underlying financial instrument

• Identify potential mispricing across related financial instruments

• Understand the potential risks and rewards of various financial investment strategies that look to capitalize on defaults on subprime mortgages

Explain how home mortgages are securitized into financial instruments that are traded in public markets

Describe how credit default swaps can be used to speculate on the value of an underlying financial instrument

Identify potential mispricing across related financial instruments

Understand the potential risks and rewards of various financial investment strategies that look to capitalize on defaults on subprime mortgages

Hedge fund Magnetar Capital had returned 25 percent in 2007 with a strategy that posed significantly lower risk to investors than the S&P 500. Magnetar had made more than $1 billion in profit by noticing that the equity tranche of CDOs and CDO-derivative instruments were relatively mispriced. It took advantage of this anomaly by purchasing CDO equity and buying credit default swap (CDS) protection on tranches that were considered less risky. Now it was the job of Alec Litowitz, chairman and chief investment officer, to provide guidance to his team as they planned next year's strategy, evaluate and prioritize their ideas, and generate new ideas of his own. An ocean away, Ron Beller was contemplating some very different issues. Beller's firm, Peloton Partners LLP, had been one of the top-performing hedge funds in 2007, returning in excess of 80 percent. In late January 2008 Beller accepted two prestigious awards at a black-tie EuroHedge ceremony. A month later, his firm was bankrupt. Beller shorted the U.S. housing market before the subprime crisis hit, and was paid handsomely for his bet. After the crisis began, however, he believed that prices for highly rated mortgage securities were being unfairly punished, so he decided to go long AAA-rated securities backed by Alt-A mortgage loans (between prime and subprime), levered 9x. The trade moved against Peloton in a big way on February 14, 2008, causing $17 billion in losses and closure of the firm.

This case analyzes the strategies of the two hedge funds, focusing on how money can be made and lost during a financial crisis. The role of investment banks as lenders to hedge funds such as Peloton is explored, as well as characteristics of the CDO market and an array of both mortgage-related and credit protection-related instruments that were actively used (for better or worse) by hedge funds during the credit crisis of 2007 and 2008.

The case can be taught in an introductory corporate finance course or to more experienced students or executives to spur a discussion about share repurchases and corporate financial strategies in general. If used in an introductory course, the case is most effective if preceded by a traditional dividend class. It follows a portfolio manager of Johnson & Associates, Mark Johnson, who is reviewing his holdings, including his position in AutoZone in early 2012. A prominent shareholder, Edward Lampert, had begun liquidating his position in AutoZone, and Johnson is concerned that Lampert's reduced position could lead the company to stop using share repurchases as a method of distributing cash flows to shareholders. The case lists a number of alternative uses for the cash flows and asks students to assume Johnson's role as an analyst and assess the likely impact of those alternatives on AutoZone's stock price.

In April 2012, JPMorgan Chase & Company was struggling with large losses that had the potential to damage the reputation of the company, of its Chairman, Jamie Dimon, and of its Chief Investment Officer, Ina Drew. The losses arose from large credit derivative trades in the London office that Dimon described as “bad strategy … badly executed … poorly monitored”.

The primary teaching objective is to discuss the capital raising efforts of a firm under financial distress. It also provides supporting data to calculate cost of capital, DuPont/modified DuPont values and Altman’s Z-Score that can appropriately be incorporated into the discussion. Case-B provides information and data of the company’s recent performance and to changes in bankruptcy law in India. Overall, this case study provides ample scope to discuss, understand and provide the solution to the following key corporate finance themes as follows: 1. Analyzing accounting statements and examine potential earnings quality issue. 2. Predicting default and bankruptcy using qualitative analysis, financial ratios, traditional and modified DuPont models and Altman’s Z score model. 3. Examining the capital raising efforts of a distressed firm, which has already defaulted on borrowings. 4. To explore the impact of changes in regulation on the turnaround efforts of the firm as well as on the promoters of the firm.

Since 2005, Amtek Auto moved at a breathtaking speed with the goal of reaching $10bn in sales, from the current level of about $1.2bn. The group had acquired more than a dozen companies spending about Rs.5,000cr. ($850m) during this period primarily through borrowed funds. However, the market and business expansion was not happening as expected. The company’s capacity utilization was just about 40% (approx.) during much of this period. The mounting fixed costs of operation and debt servicing grew to the level of unsustainability, led the firm to default on its borrowing. Now the company had to quickly recapitalize itself to run its operations and retain the premier position in auto component industry. The company and its promoters were considering various methods of debt restructuring, asset sale and further equity infusion.

Introductory and elective level corporate finance.

Teaching notes are available for educators only.

CSS 1: Accounting and Finance.