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This study conducts a logistic regression analysis of the ability of excess cash and short-term bank loans to substitute for each other and a multiple regression analysis of the factors influencing excess cash and short-term bank loans holdings. In addition, a questionnaire is used to survey the views of Taiwan’s corporate financial leaders on the factors influencing these two liquidity resources. The empirical results support a certain level of substitution between the two types of holdings. The regression analysis shows that for companies that would accumulate more excess cash when interest rates are low, have strong corporate performance, have low debt ratios, and whose chairman of the board and chief executive officer (CEO) are not the same person. Companies tend to have more short-term bank loans when corporate performance is poor, debt ratios are high, and the chairman of the board and CEO are the same person, as well as when the degree of the deviation of control is small. We find that factors on financial structure, operating performance, cost of capital and corporate governance have significant influence on the holdings of these two liquidity facilities in regression, whereas the influence factors exclude corporate governance in questionnaire.

The chapter investigates three channels through which private benefits are hypothesized to be extracted in dual class companies: excess executive compensation, excess capital expenditures and excess cash holdings.

With a propensity score matched sample of S&P 1500 dual class and single class companies with concentrated control, the chapter analyzes the relationship between the valuation discount of dual class companies and measures of excess executive compensation, excess capital expenditure and excess cash holdings.

Executives in dual class firms earn greater compensation relative to their counterparts in single class firms. This excess compensation is more pronounced when the executive is a family member. The value of dual class shares is discounted most when cash holdings and executive compensation of dual class are excessive. Excess compensation is highest for executives who are family members of dual class companies. The dual class discount is not related to excess capital expenditures.

The research shows that the discount in the value of dual class shares in relation to the value of closely controlled single class company shares is directly related to the channels through which controlling shareholder-managers can extract private benefits.

Prior studies document increased share repurchase activity after the temporary tax holiday under the American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) of 2004. Our study examines the moderating effect of financial statement readability on share repurchases in response to a temporary reduction in repatriation tax. Building on prior literature, we argue that firms with excess cash overseas, despite the lack of investment opportunities, produce less readable financial statements to hide bad news. We find that firms with less readable financial statements initiated higher levels of share repurchases after the AJCA. Our results contribute to the existing literature showing (1) firms hold excess cash overseas mainly for tax reasons rather than for nontax reasons such as precautionary motives or empire-building concerns and (2) firms return excess funds to investors rather than squander the funds once the tax cost of repatriation is reduced. Firms that suffer from the overinvestment problem using hard-to-read financial statements to hide the bad news of a lack of investment opportunities are more likely to benefit from the tax cut. Our study provides timely evidence of potential firm response to the 2017 Tax Cut and Jobs Act, which permanently removes the repatriation tax.

The information of pledging stocks for liquidity by controlling shareholders of publicly traded firms in Taiwan has been required to disclose since 1998. A common perception by market practitioners in Taiwan is that stock pledging by controlling shareholders is an indication of expropriation of firms. This study first examines the determinants of the tendency that controlling shareholders of firms in Taiwan pledge their stocks to financial institutions for liquidity and then evaluates how stock pledging by controlling shareholders affects their firms' accounting and financial performances. Determinants of firm attributes, market conditions, and corporate governance are identified. The tendency of stock pledging by controlling shareholders has a negative effect on accounting and financial performances. The negative effect on firm performance is reduced when the firm has a higher level of working capital. These findings indicate that stock pledging by controlling shareholders is an indication of weak corporate governance when the firm has lower liquidity. These findings may provide insights to the equity markets of the other countries in which public firms have more concentrated ownerships.

A persistent and increasing pattern in cash holdings was notable in the aggregate behaviour of Indian corporations around the period from 2007–2008 to 2012–2013. Extant literature suggests that agency conflicts and financing frictions are important determinants of cash holdings. In this chapter the author aims to shed light on the role of corporate governance (CG) in the determination of cash holdings and examined how ownership structure, board and audit-related attributes (used as proxies for the nature of CG) impact cash holdings in the context of an emerging economy, like India. The author employed four different measures of cash and liquidity and 24 structural indicators of CG. Using principal component analysis, the author offers an exploratory inquiry into the dimensions of CG. Thereafter, multiple regression was used to delve into the association between cash holdings (the dependent variable) and CG. Using a sample of 58 top-listed companies the results revealed that the quality of firm-level CG is important in deciding corporate cash holdings. The author reported that firms with stronger CG tend to reduce cash balances and have higher capital expenditures, while in firms with entrenched managers having high cash reserves invest more in current assets. Firms also hold cash for financial flexibility and to take advantage of strategic opportunities as they present themselves. Parallel to this point is the fact that larger balances help firms to avoid uncertainty and hedge themselves against the difficulty of accessing external funds.

Agency theory suggests that firms with very high cash balances (“cash hoarders”) are likely to misinvest their funds. However, if investors do not fully recognize the implications of a high cash balance, then future returns may be predictable for cash-hoarding firms. We find that cash hoarders significantly underperform over the two years following their identification as hoarding. In subsequent analysis, we find that returns are significantly negative in the year that a prior cash-hoarding firm reports a significant decrease in cash. Our results suggest that investors do not fully appreciate the implications of a high cash balance for future returns, but do recognize problems when that cash is subsequently spent.

Financial markets have experienced considerable turbulence over the past two decades. The recent subprime and sovereign debt crises in the United States and Europe, respectively, have resulted in significant new regulatory responses. They also prompted the re-evaluation of how best to manage and measure financial risk. The 20 chapters in this volume provide a number of different perspectives on financial risk in the post-crisis period where monetary easing has become a predominant monetary policy. While asset price volatility has now returned to levels experienced in the mid-2000s many lessons remain. Among the most important is the need to accurately measure and manage the complex risks that exist in financial markets. Our hope is that the chapters presented here provide a better understanding of how best to do this, while also giving insights for next suitable steps and further developments.

When presented with technical topics, undergraduate accounting students can be overwhelmed by information transmitted in a pure lecture format. Further, a lecture format does not allow for much student interaction or enable learning of higher-level skills that could be useful if the underlying content is changed by future regulations. Position paper instructional tools could be a beneficial alternative. A position paper can bring out students' soft skills of communication and critical thinking by making them take a stand, which is key for tax professionals and accountants generally. Since class meeting time is limited and face-to-face interactions are not always possible, a written position paper provides an alternative that can benefit students' understanding of technical information.

The extent to which firms repatriate indefinitely reinvested foreign earnings (IRFE) has been a major issue in the US tax system. Congress enacted provisions in the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) specifically to remove tax barriers to repatriation. However, little is known regarding the repatriation of IRFE outside of the temporary tax incentive provided by the 2004 American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA). In this chapter, I provide evidence on such repatriations by identifying a sample of 67 firms from 2009 to 2015 that reverse the indefinite reinvestment designation of foreign earnings and announce a repatriation of foreign cash. In contrast to repatriations following the 2004 AJCA, I do not find evidence that a single economic factor, such as share repurchases, motivates the repatriation. Although, in general, I do not find evidence of a significant market response to the announcements, I find evidence of a negative market reaction to announcements by low foreign effective tax rate (ETR) firms without tax offsets, suggesting that the tax may not be fully priced. Overall, I provide insight into the reasons and implications of the announced repatriation of IRFE.