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Purpose – Rural–urban divides characterize many violent internecine conflicts. The lack of rural development is often cited as an underlying structural cause of this phenomenon, and thus strengthening rural–urban linkages is often touted as a way of dismantling the structural conditions for internecine violence. This chapter attempts to identify how both the strength and the form of rural–urban linkages influence the intensity of insurgent violence.

Methodology – Using geographic information systems, this chapter analyzes the intensity of specific violent attacks by rural insurgent groups in Maoist India as a function of rural–urban linkages and transportation network redundancy.

Findings – It finds that the degree of interconnectivity in transportation networks is a more robust determinant of restraint among violent actors than the sheer strength of rural–urban linkages. Production networks characterized by highly networked road systems are more likely to incent restrained behavior among rebel groups, which may be dependent on taxation or extortion through obstruction.

Limitations/implications – The chapter quantitatively analyzes a phenomenon, but does not identify causal mechanisms driving it. The policy implication is that providing transportation infrastructure within rural areas may be a more effective guard against insurgent violence than connecting urban and rural areas.

Originality – The chapter makes a methodologically unique link between the large existing literature on rural–urban linkages, and the growing literature on trade networks in violent conflict.

This chapter focuses on the Maoist insurgency in the 75 districts of Nepal and tries to analyze the insurgency in a comparative perspective. We compare the 75 districts with the aim to address the following questions: Why does an insurgency emerge in certain areas? How is it linked to economic, social, or political factors? Why does an insurgency show a robust presence in some districts but fail to do likewise in others? We attempt to answer these questions by conducting multivariate regressions using longitudinal data to test our primary hypothesis that the onset of an insurgency and the continuation are functions of the same factors. We examine insurgency within one country, Nepal, and test our model in Nepal's 75 districts, in a single country context, using available data on the 10-year-long insurgency. We break down the Nepalese insurgency into two parts: the onset and the continuation. Our findings indicate that regions predominantly polarized by caste are more prone to the onset of insurgency than any other factor. Higher literacy rate, a proxy for government efficacy, renders insurgency less feasible, and difficult terrain has no impact whatsoever. However, after the onset, many of the explanatory variables are no longer significant for the continuation of the insurgency and grievances alone tend to be meaningless.

Conflict resolution and peace building has acquired much significance in the last few years (Siddiqi, 2003).

This study aims to explore the conditions that lead to the occurrence of third-party interveners’ coordination in conflict resolution efforts.

The studied theme is elaborated by means of an analysis of two case studies: the Maoist armed conflict of Nepal and the Moro conflict of the Philippines. Importantly, this study solicits the views of third-party practitioners and other relevant stakeholders in the field and attempts to demonstrate how they perceive key issues in third-party coordination.

Third-party coordination is a contingent process, with varying needs and relevance in different phases and types of conflict. The escalation of violence, issues of international concern such as human rights and the homogeneity of interveners are other core elements that have often played a key role in third-party coordination.

In the existing literature, there are no such indicator-based explanations regarding the occurrence of third-party coordination; thus, the findings of this research on this particular theme are well-developed and better conceptualized than what has been discussed in the literature to date.

The analysis undertaken in this study can contribute to the design of better policies and strategies for third-party coordination.

This study is based on in-depth interviews and interactions with a diverse range of third-party practitioners and other stakeholders working in real-world conflicts, who have perhaps the best understanding of various dimensions of third-party coordination. No previous research has been conducted on this particular theme by incorporating direct interaction with a wide range of interveners from two distinct conflict contexts.

The student revolt of 1967 to 1974, which finally expired about 1978, retains its fascination and much of its significance in the twenty‐first century. But the seven or so years which preceded it are often passed over as simply a precursor, the incubation of a subsequent explosion; they deserve a higher status. The concentration of interest on the late 1960s and early 1970s arises from the driving role of students in the cultural revolution whose traumatic impact still echoes with us. As late as 2005 some commentators saw federal legislation introducing Voluntary Student Unionism as the culmination of struggles in the 1970s when Deputy Prime Minister Costello and Health Minister Abbott battled their radical enemies. Interest in these turbulent years at a popular, non‐academic level has produced a succession of nostalgic reminiscences. In the Sydney Morning Herald’s ‘Good Weekend’ for 13 December 2003 Mark Dapin pondered whether the Melbourne Maoists had changed their world views (‘Living by the Little Red book’.) In the Sydney University Gazette of October 1995 Andrew West asserted that the campus radicals of the 1960s and ‘70s had remained true to their basic beliefs (‘Not finished fighting’.) Some years later, in April 2003, the editor of that journal invited me to discuss ‘Where have all the rebels gone?’ My answer treated this as a twofold question: What has happened to the former rebels? Why have the students of today abandoned radicalism?

The purpose of this paper is to examine the economic development strategies of Nepal and Bhutan to understand the economic factors that have contributed to economic growth.

After a brief discussion of each country's modern history, their economies are examined together with their development strategies during the past half century. Standard economic growth models for Nepal and Bhutan are developed and estimated. To ensure the stationarity of the data series, tests of unit root are conducted. Further, a cointegration test is conducted and an appropriate error‐correction model is developed.

The results of the estimations reveal that domestic capital has been a significant source of economic growth in Nepal whereas foreign aid has not had any appreciable effect on growth. In the case of Bhutan, foreign assistance has been a significant source of growth while domestic capital has not.

Bhutan and Nepal also differ in terms of non‐economic factors such as culture, language, politics, and religion. These factors may also help to explain the difference in economic performance of these countries. While important, these issues are beyond the scope this paper and indicate directions for further research.

It is one of the first attempts to compare the economic growth strategies of Nepal and Bhutan. It may provide useful insight to policymakers and others interested in economic growth in Nepal, Bhutan and other developing countries.