Search results

The “winner's curse” (or, more precisely, failure to account for the winner's curse) was one of the first behavioral “anomalies” to be discussed in the literature. The idea dates back to 1971, and was first applied to the bidding for oil drilling rights (See Capen, Clapp, & Campbell, 1971). The winner's curse is the phenomenon of systematically upward-biased winning bids in an auction market. That is, the winning bid in an auction tends to be much higher than some objectively defined value of the good.² The basis of the anomaly is relatively simple. In an auction with a large number of buyers, each possessing imperfect information concerning the value of the auctioned good, there will be a spread of estimated values. If buyers possess rational expectations, we will expect roughly half (assuming a symmetric distribution of estimates) of the bidders to overestimate the value of the good, and roughly half to underestimate its true value. If buyers naively bid their estimated value of the good, the winning bid will equal the most extremely over-valued estimate. Thus, the winning bid will not only be an overestimate of the good's true value, but it will be the most extreme overestimate made by any bidder. Hence, while on average an individual's bid may equal the actual value of the auctioned good, the winning bid will most likely be a severe overestimate of the good's value. For this reason, bidders who naively bid their estimated value at an auction will tend to regret winning.

This paper aims to examine the association between financial reporting quality in target companies and acquisition profitability in a sample of 280 acquisitions in South Korea between 2002 and 2011.

Using the accruals quality measure developed by McNichols (2002) as a proxy for financial reporting quality, it was found that high-quality financial reporting in target companies is associated with more profitable acquisitions for the acquirer, as measured by the acquirer’s announcement returns.

It was found that high-quality financial reporting in target companies is associated with more profitable acquisitions for the acquirer, as measured by the acquirer’s announcement returns. This finding suggests that higher-quality accounting information leads to better decision-making during acquisitions. It was also found that the importance of financial reporting quality increases when information about the target company is scarce. In addition, it was found that the financial reporting quality of target companies is less important when the agency costs of the acquirer are high.

This analysis also complements several recent papers that examine target firm accounting information and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) returns (Shalev and Martin, 2009; McNichols and Stubben, 2012). By expanding this analysis, the authors help to provide a more complete understanding of how target firm’s accounting quality relates to the valuation of the target company and future expected synergies in M&A deal practice.

This study is one of a growing body of literature on the relations between financial reporting quality and investment decisions (Bens and Monahan, 2004; Biddle and Hilary, 2006; Hope and Thomas, 2008; McNichols and Stubben, 2008; Biddle et al., 2009; Francis and Martin, 2010). These results extend and generalize the results of prior studies, in that data pertinent to acquisition profitability of M&As in South Korea are used.

The volume of acquisitions involving privately held targets has far surpassed that of publicly traded firms in recent years; yet, surprisingly little research has examined private target acquisitions. By analyzing the unique features of the market for private targets, we compare the potential for value creation and value capture in private and public target acquisitions. We argue that the corporate context of private targets does not provide the same opportunities for curbing agency costs and sharing intangible resources than the context of public targets, which reduces the value creation potential for the buyer. On the other hand, private targets have lower bargaining power vis-à-vis acquirers because of higher failures in the market for corporate control of private firms and liquidity discount, which increases the value creation potential for the buyer. The net value creation potential of acquiring private targets, therefore, depends on the relative importance of their agency costs, resource sharing opportunities, and bargaining power.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the underpricing effect in Treasury auctions.

The paper compares two winner's curse models using a dataset on multi‐unit auctions. The dataset is from Swedish Treasury auctions, which is under a discriminatory auction mechanism. One model is a single‐unit equilibrium model assuming that each bidder bids for 100 percent of the auctioned securities, which is described by Wilson and solved by Levin and Smith. The other model is a multi‐unit model calibrated by Goldreich using the US Treasury auctions data and assumes that each bidder bids for one unit of the auctioned securities.

The empirical results show that, although both models work well in predicting the bid‐shading, the multi‐unit model fits the Swedish Treasury auctions data better than the single‐unit model.

The evidence implies that bidders rationally adjust their bids due to the winner's curse/champion's plague.

This study provides close quantitative predictions of the amount of bid‐shading using both single‐unit model of Wilson and multi‐unit model of Goldreich, and indicates that winner's curse or champion's plague worries bidders in countries other than the USA.

This paper sought to determine how a major sport event can become trapped in a winner's curse, in which the fierce competition to host the event forces organisers to spend more on acquiring and hosting it than what it is worth in economic terms.

This study used a combination of document analysis and 47 in-depth interviews with 51 individuals representing various private and public organisations involved in the implementation of the UCI 2017 Road Cycling World Championship. Snowball sampling and a semi-structured interview guide were used to ensure coverage of all relevant information.

The organiser and the host municipal lacked the necessary experience with events of this size and character. Information from previous championships events was not transferred, and the municipality administration did not utilise experiences from hosting previous events. Limited financial resources prevented the organiser from hiring enough employees with the necessary competence. Lack of communication between the stakeholders who contributed in hosting the event reduced the quality of planning and preparations. A dubious culture and lack of seriousness within the Norwegian Cycling Federation, which was the owner of organising company, seemed to have been transferred to organiser.

The research identifies some of the reasons why major sports events so often turns out to be more problematic than expected in economic terms, not only for the organiser but also for actors in the public sector in the host city. The novelty is that it goes into depth on the underlying reasons and the dynamic forces behind these problems.

Much literature suggests a positive relationship between winning a quality award and subsequent firm performance. However, for the vast majority of the large Japanese manufacturing firms that have won the Deming Prize results in this study indicate a negative association. Results also show that for a minority of these firms there does appear to be a positive relationship between winning and subsequent performance. Two theories, the danger of simplicity and the winner’s curse, are utilized to explain these results. Firms that compete for quality awards have a significant risk of putting undue pressure on organizational resources or focusing too narrowly on winning and neglecting other aspects of their business, thereby leading to performance shortfalls. Significant experience in TQM/TQC prior to competing for a quality award may moderate these risks. For managers, there should be serious consideration as to whether their companies should compete for a quality award in the hope of improving performance. Instead, they may want to ask if there are any alternative methods for designing and implementing improvements in quality control.

Local public officials rely on tax and non-tax incentive packages to develop their economies. No conclusive evidence supports the economic improvement incentives afford. We investigate, with an experimental approach, the political reasons public officials use tax incentives. The experiment uses simulation gaming to model local economic development as an auction, in that way permitting us to compare the impact that motives, goals, and contexts have on outcomes. Our findings suggest that the majority of economic development competitors fall victim to the “winner’s curse”-overestimating and overbidding the potential payoff for business development.

The case offers a study of change management in the pharmaceutical industry in India.

The case is designed for undergraduate and postgraduate students to examine strategic decisionmaking in the context of mergers and acquisitions (M&As), firm capabilities and management practices. In particular, it has important pedagogical lessons for businesses eager to start operations in emerging countries. Students learn to recognize the unique nature of the pharmaceutical market and the factors affecting the demand and supply of drugs, including the economics of generics. The case can be discussed in one class session of approximately one-and-a-half to two hours duration.

In 2012, the pharmaceutical industry in India was undergoing dynamic changes. There was keen interest among MNC pharmaceutical giants to buy up Indian generic manufacturing companies since their revenues were drying up with the impending patent expirations of many blockbuster brand name drugs. Japan's Daiichi Sankyo's had taken over the largest Indian pharmaceutical company, Ranbaxy Laboratories, known for its heritage of process innovations and market leadership. However, after the acquisition, Ranbaxy slipped to third position in the domestic market and was facing multiple problems including net losses and falling share prices, cultural differences in management practices, recall of drugs from foreign markets and a US FDA ban on its manufacturing plants. Further, Ranbaxy had always been viewed as a national champion and a customer-friendly company but drug prices had increased after the merger causing problems of affordability. The new CEO of Ranbaxy was facing a dilemma: how to regain the company's position as the market leader. Students are asked to advise the CEO of Ranbaxy how to tackle the challenges arising from the integration of an Indian company with a Japanese company. More specifically, the case focuses on M&A as a strategy for growth and also touches on issues related to competition, regulation, innovation and corporate governance.

The case discusses the different motives behind the deal for Daiichi Sankyo and Ranbaxy and why it was a strategic move by both the alliance partners. The case also raises issues of corporate governance for the management of Ranbaxy and the need for a proactive corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategy. The case provides students with the opportunity to develop their analytical skills in a real-life setting and apply theoretical concepts to the consideration of the various issues raised by the acquisition deal.

Teaching notes are available; please consult your librarian for access.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the stock market reactions at the time of new construction contract winning announcements to explore whether the managements made wise bidding decisions and thus create values.

A total of 813 new contracts awarded to publicly traded US construction firms for the years 2000 through 2009 are screened and these are analyzed by applying event study methodology. This paper estimates the effect of an event on stock market’s responses, using cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), and the CAR values are estimated for four types of windows: days 0 (i.e. the day of the event announcement), (−1, +1), (−2, +2), and (−3, +3). The market responses are further subdivided according to such variables as the project type, owner type, project location, work scope, and bidder size.

The results of this study show that the stock market did not curse contract winners by positively responding to the announcements of new contract awards. The sample firms’ market value, on average, is increased by 1.168 percent during the seven-day window period, and is highly significant. In addition, the followings are observed: first, the stock market tends to favor larger contracts over smaller ones; second, small firms’ events receive better market responses than those of large ones; and third, the level of returns varies considerably across the project types. Meanwhile, no statistical differences are observed in CARs for the owner type, work scope, and project location variables.

This study has several limitations. First, potential factors that may have effects on CAR could not be incorporated in the analysis, because a contract award announcement provides only limited information. Second, the level of consistency between stock market responses and the contract’s actual outcomes could not be assessed.

Wise bidding decision has critical implication considering the impact of a new contract award on a firm; a new contract increases the backlog of a firm while it may harm/improve the operating performance or decrease/increase the stockholders’ wealth. Although the overall success level of the current sample, in terms of CARs, is positive and significant, CAR values vary significantly depending on the window period and/or variables. Therefore, managements should exercise careful discretion in selecting a target project and arriving at a bidding decision.

While event study has been widespread for assessing the effect of numerous event types, project award received scarcely any attention. Moreover, it has widely been believed that cost/pricing and contract value are the primary sources for winners’ curse argument. Accordingly, this study can be considered as a seminal work assessing stock market responses to validate winners’ curse argument. This study contributes to the body of knowledge of decision-making discipline. In addition, from a strategic management perspective, the evidence and implications drawn from the analysis results will be valuable resources for bid or no-bid decision making in the project-based industry.

History suggests that the advantages of wealth are easily frittered away if the holders of that wealth are not forced to find more efficient rather than more expensive solutions.