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This paper tests the mimicking propositions from signalling theory as they relate to stated firm objectives and firm performance. We classify the corporate objectives of a large sample of firms and evaluate firm performance relative to these objectives. We find that poorly performing firms more frequently cite shareholder wealth maximization as their primary objective than do better performing firms. There is no evidence that firms citing a shareholder wealth maximization objective perform any better than firms with alternative objectives. Similar evidence is found for other common corporate objectives. Overall, our results are consistent with signalling theory in that non‐enforceable signals, such as proclamations of corporate objectives, are not credible signals for investors.

Corporate finance is under attack. Commentators mention that corporate managers have enriched themselves and shareholders, and in the process have failed to consider the interests of all stakeholders (Hennessy, 1989, Alkhafaji, 1989, Newton, 1989, Dunfee, 1989, Steidlmeier, 1989, Jones and Hunt, 1991). They cite the active corporate control market that produced hostile takeovers, leveraged buyouts, and corporate restructuring activity, all presumably causing a reduction in social welfare. This view is now beginning to permeate itself into the financial education debate. For example, Hawley (1991) suggests that financial educators are abdicating their responsibility of helping prepare corporate managers to recognize and deal with business ethics‐social responsibility effectively. Hawley proposes that the shareholder wealth maximization model for corporate management rationalizes the commission of unethical or socially irresponsible actions. Because of this ongoing criticism being levied against the practice of corporate finance, financial educators are now moving to incorporate ethics in the finance curricula. Although this move may be welcomed, we suggest that financial educators proceed with caution.

The purpose of this paper is to assess how investment, financing and dividend policies may affect firm value.

The paper develops a system dynamics‐based model by using “financial management approach,” “capital structure approach,” “resource‐based approach,” and “sustainable growth approach” to identify investment, financing and dividend policies that may help maximize the firm value.

Adequate investment in productive assets is the first step to achieve value maximization objective. Low debt capital structure plays a dominant role to maximize the firm value, contrary to the suggestions generally found in corporate finance literature. Rather insignificant role of firm's short‐term financing policy is observed. A consistently stable dividend policy is also a prerequisite of firm value maximization.

The limitations of this study include: the competitors' actions are not modeled; human resources and other intangible resources are not modeled; instead of market debt, debt is assumed to be bank debt. Future studies may bring in the competitors' actions, intangible assets including human resources, and may also consider to model debt as market debt.

The firms operating in favorable product market conditions should keep their operating and financial risks low which will also maximize their firm value. On the other hand, the firms facing unfavorable product market conditions have to make a trade‐off to minimize operating risk vs financial risk.

Usually the studies test one policy in isolation. However, this may probably be the first study that simultaneously tests various combinations of investment, financing and dividend policies that may help maximize the firm value.

Commentators have claimed that business schools encourage unethical behavior by using economic theory as a basis for education. We examine claims that exposure to agency theory acts as a self-fulfilling prophecy, reducing ethical behavior among business students. We experimentally test whether economics coursework or a manipulated competitive vs. cooperative frame affects measured ethical behavior in simulated decision settings. We measure ethical behavior using established tasks. We also measure ethical recognition to test whether agency theory reduces recognition of ethical issues. Exposure to agency theory in either prior classwork or the experiment increased wealth-increasing unethical behavior. We found no effect on unethical behavior that does not affect wealth. We found no effect of exposure to agency theory on ethical recognition. Usual laboratory experiment limitations apply. Future research can examine why agency theory reduces ethical behavior. Educators ought to consider unintended consequences of the language and assumptions of theories that underlie education. Students may assume descriptions of how people behave as prescriptions for how people ought to behave. This study contributes to the literature on economic education and ethics. We found no prior experimental studies of the effect of economics education on ethical behavior.

The objective traditionally attributed to firms is maximisation of profits. In more recent years this has been replaced with the financial objective of maximisation of shareholder wealth.

X = multiple interpretations

Analyzing how the post-Soviet transition interacts with the crisis of market finance exhibits a new “greed-based economic system” in the making. Asset grabbing is at its core and hinders capital accumulation. All the various privatization schemes have triggered off asset grabbing, asset stripping, and asset tunneling. A global contagion of such behavior has spread the power and cohesion of managers/shareholders (oligarchs) worldwide. Financial asset grabbing is less straightforward, though much widespread, and operates in financial markets through new financial products, securitization, firms buying their own shares, hedge funds, stock price manipulation, short selling, and the distribution of stock options.Shadow banking, and more generally a global informal economy, results from grabbing strategies in financial markets that breach the formal rules of capitalism. In alleviating and circumventing the rules, the oligarchy paves the way for economic malpractices and crime, calling capitalist laws into question.In such context, systemic greed underlies unconstrained maximization of relative wealth, for which asset grabbing is a rational means, in a winner-take-all economy. At the present stage of our research, a greed-based economy cannot yet be theoretically defined as a transition either to a new phase of capitalism or to another different system.

This paper aims to examine two important issues in corporate social responsibility (CSR) scholarship. First, the study problematises CSR as a form of self-regulation. Second, the research explores how CSR strategies can enable firms to recognise and internalise their externalities while preserving shareholder value.

This study uses a tinged shareholder model to understand the interactions between an organisation’s CSR approach and the effect of relevant externalities on its CSR outcomes. In doing this, the case study qualitative methodology is adopted, relying on data from one Fidelity Bank, Nigeria.

By articulating a tripodal thematic model – governance of externalities in the economy, governance of externalities in the social system and governance of externalities in the environment, this paper demonstrates how an effective combination of these themes triggers the emergence of a robust CSR culture in an organisation.

This research advances the understanding of the implication of internalising externalities in the CSR literature in a relatively under-researched context – Nigeria.

The data of this study allows to present a governance model that will enable managers to focus on their overarching objective of shareholder value without the challenges of pursuing multiple and sometimes conflicting goals that typically create negative impacts to non-shareholding stakeholders.