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We estimate a double-hurdle (DH) model of the Hungarian wage distribution assuming censoring at the minimum wage and wage under-reporting (i.e. compensation consisting of the minimum wage, subject to taxation and an unreported cash supplement). We estimate the probability of under-reporting for minimum wage earners, simulate their genuine earnings and classify them and their employers as ‘cheaters’ and ‘non-cheaters’. In the possession of the classification, we check how cheaters and non-cheaters reacted to the introduction of a minimum social security contribution base, equal to 200 per cent of the minimum wage, in 2007. The findings suggest that cheaters were more likely to raise the wages of their minimum wage earners to 200 per cent of the minimum wage, thereby reducing the risk of tax audit. Cheating firms also experienced faster average wage growth and slower output growth. The results suggest that the DH model is able to identify the loci of wage under-reporting with some precision.

In spite of millions of quasi-formal workers in the European Union (EU), there is still limited understanding of what motivates workers to participate in these detrimental employment schemes, and why certain groups of workers exhibit higher inclination towards it. This article takes a novel approach by putting prospective envelope wage earners in the centre of this analysis.

Data from the 2019 Special Eurobarometer on undeclared work are used, and two-level random intercept cumulative logit modelling is applied.

One in seven fully declared EU workers would have nothing against receiving one part of their wages off-the-books. Manual workers and individuals whose job assumes travelling are the most willing to accept such kind of remuneration, and the same applies to workers with low tax morale and those who perceive the risk of being detected and persecuted as very small. On the other hand, women, older individuals, married persons and employees from large enterprises express the smallest inclination towards envelope wages. The environment in which an individual operates also plays a non-negligible role as the quality of the pension system and the strength of social contract were also identified as significant determinants of workers' readiness to accept envelope wages.

This article fills in the gap in the literature by analysing what workers think about wage under-reporting and what factors drive their willingness to accept envelope wages.

We study the impact of tax and minimum wage reforms on the incidence of informality. To gauge the incidence of informality, we use measures of the extent of tax evasion, the extent of minimum wage noncompliance, and the size of the informal workforce. Our approach allows us to examine (i) the distinction between determinants of firm-level reported wage distribution and actual wage distribution, (ii) the complementarity of tax and minimum wage enforcement, (iii) the impact that a minimum wage reform has on tax and minimum wage compliance, and (iv) the impact that a tax policy reform has on tax and minimum wage compliance. We conclude with the design of optimal minimum wage and tax policies (even in the complete absence of minimum wage enforcement). We do so based on two objectives derived from popular concerns associated with an unchecked expansion of informality: tax revenue maximization, and poverty alleviation among workers.

When tackling the informal economy, an emergent literature has called for the conventional rational economic actor approach (which uses deterrents to ensure that the costs of undeclared work outweigh the benefits) to be replaced or complemented by a social actor approach which focusses upon improving tax morale. The purpose of this paper is to explore the effectiveness of these two policy approaches in reducing informal sector entrepreneurship.

To evaluate this, data are reported from a 2015 representative survey involving 1,384 face-to-face interviews with owners or managers of small businesses in three South-Eastern European countries, namely, Croatia, Bulgaria and FYR Macedonia.

The findings provide support for the “social actor” approach and display that small businesses have a greater propensity to perceive competitors as operating informally when the level of tax morale is lower. Meanwhile, no support for the deterrence measures of the “rational economic actor” model is reported.

The major limitation of the study is that the paper is not able to display the reasons for the low level of tax morale and horizontal trust. Therefore, further in-depth qualitative research is necessary to explain whether and how the low levels of trust are determined by the failures of various formal institutions.

This is the first known study on small businesses which analyses simultaneously two distinct policy approaches that aim to reduce participation in informal entrepreneurship.

The purpose of this paper is to advance a new explanation for cross-country variations in the participation of small businesses in the informal economy. Drawing upon institutional theory, it proposes that the greater the asymmetry between the codified laws and regulations of formal institutions (state morality) and the unwritten socially shared rules of informal institutions (civic morality), the greater is the propensity of small businesses to participate in the informal economy. To analyse this, the extent to which small businesses evade payroll taxes by paying employees an undeclared (envelope) wage in addition to their official declared salary is analysed.

To evaluate this, data are reported from a 2013 Eurobarometer survey involving 5,174 face-to-face interviews with employees in small businesses across the 28 member states of the European Union (EU-28).

The finding is that small businesses display a greater propensity to engage in this informal wage practice in countries where there is a higher degree of asymmetry between the codified laws and regulations of formal institutions (state morality) and the unwritten socially shared rules of informal institutions (civic morality). A multi-level logistic regression analysis reveals these to be countries which have lower qualities of governance, lower levels of taxation and intervention in the labour market and less effective social transfer systems.

The major limitation of this study is that it has only examined whether employees in small businesses receive informal wages. Future cross-country surveys should analyse a wider range of ways in which small businesses participate in the informal economy such as under-reporting turnover.

This is the first known analysis of cross-country variations in the participation of small businesses in the informal economy.

The purpose of this paper is to advance a new way of explaining and tackling the illegitimate wage practice where employers pay their employees an undeclared (envelope) wage in addition to their formal salary. Drawing upon institutional theory, it is here proposed that envelope wages result from the lack of alignment of a society’s formal institutions (i.e. the codified laws and regulations) with its informal institutions (i.e. the socially shared unwritten understandings which reflect citizens’ norms, values and beliefs).

To evaluate this, data are reported from a 2013 Eurobarometer survey involving 1,738 face-to-face interviews with formal employees in four Baltic countries, namely, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.

The finding is that the greater is the asymmetry between the formal and informal institutions (i.e. the level of disagreement of citizens with the codified laws and regulations of formal institutions), the higher is the propensity to pay envelope wages. This is the case at both the individual- and country levels.

To reduce the prevalence of envelope wages, the resultant argument is that the values of employers and employees need to be aligned with the formal institutions. This requires alterations not only in the informal institutions, using measures such as tax education, awareness raising campaigns and normative appeals, but also changes in formal institutions so as to improve trust in government by fostering greater procedural justice, procedural fairness and redistributive justice.

This is the first paper to apply institutional theory to explaining and tackling envelope wages in the Baltic Sea region.

To transcend the view of employment as either formal or informal, this paper evaluates the prevalence of quasi-formal employment where formal employers pay formal employees an unreported (“envelope”) wage in addition to their formal reported salary. To explain the individual-level variations in quasi-formal employment, the “marginalisation” thesis is evaluated that this practice is more prevalent among vulnerable groups and to explain the country-level variations, and a neo-institutionalist theory is evaluated that it is more prevalent where formal institutional failures lead to an asymmetry between the formal laws and regulations and the unwritten socially shared rules of informal institutions.

To evaluate the individual- and country-level variations in the prevalence of quasi-formal employment, a multi-level logistic regression is provided of data from special 2019 Eurobarometer survey 92.1 involving 11,793 interviews with employees across 28 European countries (the 27 member states of the European Union and the United Kingdom).

Of the 3.5% of employees (1 in 28) who receive under-reported salaries, the marginalisation thesis is supported that it is largely vulnerable population groups. So too is the neo-institutionalist explanation that quasi-formal employment is more common in countries where the non-alignment of formal and informal institutions is greater, with the formal institutional failings producing this identified as lower levels of economic development, less modernised state bureaucracies and lower levels of taxation and social protection.

The policy implication is that tackling quasi-formal employment requires not only enforcement authorities to improve the risk of detection of this illegal wage practice but also governments to change wider macro-level structural conditions. These are outlined.

Contemporary new evidence is provided of the prevalence of quasi-formal employment along with how this illegal wage practice can be explained and tackled.

This paper first reviews the history of social insurance policy and coverage in urban China, documenting the evolution in the coverage of pensions, medical and unemployment insurance for both local residents and migrants, and highlighting obstacles to expanding coverage. The paper then uses two waves of the China Urban Labor Survey, conducted in 2005 and 2010, to examine the correlates of social insurance participation before and after implementation of the 2008 Labor Contract Law. A higher labor tax wedge is associated with a lower probability that local employed residents participate in social insurance programs, but is not associated with participation of wage-earning migrants, who are more likely to be dissuaded by fragmentation of the social insurance system. The existing gender gap in social insurance coverage is explained by differences in coverage across industrial sectors and firm ownership classes in which men and women work.

Equilibrium job search models allow for labor markets with homogeneous workers and firms to yield nondegenerate wage densities. However, the resulting wage densities do not accord well with empirical regularities. Accordingly, many extensions to the basic equilibrium search model have been considered (e.g., heterogeneity in productivity, heterogeneity in the value of leisure, etc.). It is increasingly common to use nonparametric forms for these extensions and, hence, researchers can obtain a perfect fit (in a kernel smoothed sense) between theoretical and empirical wage densities. This makes it difficult to carry out model comparison of different model extensions. In this paper, we first develop Bayesian parametric and nonparametric methods which are comparable to the existing non-Bayesian literature. We then show how Bayesian methods can be used to compare various nonparametric equilibrium search models in a statistically rigorous sense.