Search results

Purpose – Ascertaining the extent to which the generalized decline in union density, as well as the erosion in centralized bargaining structures and developments in other labor institutions, have contributed to rising within-country inequality.

Methodology – Econometric analysis of a newly developed dataset combining information on industrial relations and labor law, various dimensions of globalization, and controls for demand and supply of skilled labor for 51 Advanced, Central and Eastern European, Latin American, and Asian countries from the late 1980s to the early 2000s, followed by an analysis of 16 advanced countries over a longer time frame (from the late 1970s to the early 2000s).

Findings – In contrast to previous research, which finds labor institutions to be important determinants of more egalitarian wage or income distributions, the chapter finds that trade unionism and collective bargaining are no longer significantly associated with within-country inequality, except in the Central and Eastern European countries. These findings are interpreted as the result of trade unionism operating under more stringent structural constraints than in the past, partly as a result of globalization trends. In addition, despite much talk about welfare state crisis, welfare states, historically the result of labor's power and mobilization capacity, still play an important redistributive role, at least in advanced countries.

Practical implications – Union attempts at equalizing incomes by compressing market earnings seem ineffective and impractical in the current day and age. Unions should seek to increase the workers’ skill levels and promote an egalitarian transformation of the workplace. This type of “supply-side” egalitarianism is not a new strategy for unions, but is very much embedded in the unions’ DNA.

This chapter examines whether changes in return to education affect workers’ mobility between jobs. Employee panel data are used to study staff movement from the public sector to the private sector or vice versa from 1995 to 2005. It is found that in line with the situation in other advanced economies, the wage structure in the public sector in Israel is more compressed than that in the private sector, for employees with similar characteristics and in general, and that the difference widened during the period reviewed. Hence, the findings support the contention that the public sector compensates employees less for their skills than does the private sector. In addition, it is found that during that period the return to education increased in the private sector by about 1 percentage point more than in the public sector. In an analysis of those who switched from one sector to the other, our findings imply that if the return to education changed at the same rate in both sectors, the probability of highly educated workers moving from the public sector to the private sector would be 5 percent lower, and the probability of highly educated workers moving from the private sector to the public sector would be 2 percent higher.

This paper examines the effects of union change in Britain on changes in earnings dispersion 1983–1995. We investigate not only the decline in union density but also the greater wage compression among unionised workers, as well as changes in union density across skill groups. For the private sector, we find that deunionisation accounts for little of the increase in earnings dispersion. What unions have lost on the swings (lower density), they have gained on the roundabouts (greater wage compression). But for the public sector we find strong effects, because unions are increasingly organising the more skilled. This change in the character of public sector unions means that they no longer reduce earnings variation nearly as much as they once did.

This article studies the evolution of the wage differentials between graduate (skilled) and non-graduate (unskilled) workers in several European countries from the beginning of the 1990s to the beginning of this century. The starting point is that all European countries show a common increase in the relative supply of skilled workers but different evolution of wage differentials. Economics theory usually relates the evolution of wage differentials not only to relative supply but also to skill-biased technological progress. I complement this explanation providing a theoretical model of wage bargaining where wage differentials are determined also by labour market institutions. My empirical findings show that both technological progress and labour market institutions are important in the determination of wage differentials. As for the former, I find that differentials depend on the pace and intensity at which technological progress takes place. As for labour market institutions, their effect, though important, is not always straightforward. In fact, some aspects of institutions, like minimum wage and the duration of unemployment benefits, favour unskilled workers while other aspects, like bargaining power and replacement rates from unemployment benefits, may magnify the differences in outside options and actually increase wage differentials.

In this paper, we review the literature on pay variation (e.g., pay dispersion, pay compression, pay range) in organizations. Pay variation research has increased markedly in the past two decades and much progress has been made in terms of understanding its consequences for individual, team, and organizational outcomes. Our review of this research exposes several levels-related assumptions that have limited theoretical and empirical progress. We isolate the issues that deserve attention, develop an illustrative multilevel model, and offer a number of testable propositions to guide future research on pay structures.

Using an extensive data set on Finnish workers during the years 1990–2002, we analyze the relation between dispersion of wages within plants and labor productivity. We find a positive and significant relation between dispersion of wages within plant and average sales per worker. This relation is quadratic when dispersion is conditioned on workers’ observable characteristics. We also find positive and significant relation between unconditional dispersion of wages within plant and value added per hours worked, while we find a non-significant relation between conditional wage dispersion and valued added per hours worked. Results indicate that the incentive effect of wage dispersion dominates fairness or sabotage considerations.

The chapter presents a historical and economic analysis of Nordic wage formation, with a special focus on how collective agreements really work. A stereotypical interpretation of the evolution of Nordic wage bargaining systems is that a centralised setting of wages has gradually been substituted with more decentralised pay bargaining. This overlooks the fact that central organisations could never really control wage levels, even in the golden age of centralised bargaining. Instead, central pay bargains defined minimum wage changes that ensured that local conflicts would be ruled out. Moreover, the central stipulations could often be overruled or adjusted at the local level. Following insights of Teulings and Hartog, we argue that the main function of Nordic collective agreements has always been to rule out local conflicts that would otherwise be initiated to seek local rents. Thus, collective agreements combine macroeconomic flexibility with adequate investment incentives at the local level. In this crucial sense, Nordic collective agreements are a completely stable institution. The most important transformation that has taken place is that formal peak bargaining on mean pay increases has been substituted with pattern bargaining where the manufacturing industry acts as a wage leader. Economic theory suggests that this almost amounts to centralised pay setting.

Much of the recent debate on the minimum wage has focused on its employment implications. The theory of human capital suggests that minimum wages should also have important adverse effects on human capital accumulation. In the standard human capital theory, as developed by Becker (1964), Ben-Porath (1967), and Mincer (1974), a large part of human capital is accumulated on the job, and workers often finance these investments through lower wages. A binding minimum wage will therefore reduce workplace training, as it prevents low wage workers from accepting the necessary wage cuts (Rosen, 1972). The early empirical literature has confirmed this prediction. The negative impact on human capital formation has been an important argument against minimum wages in the minds of many economists and policy-makers, and an important piece of evidence in support of the standard theory of human capital.