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The purpose of this paper is to complement existing research of the relationship between concentrated ownership and firm performance by theoretically exploring the impact of outside blockholders on the firm, primarily from the perspective of voting power.

This paper proposes theoretical propositions based on analyses and logical extension of results of the existing theoretical and empirical studies.

This paper proposes three theoretical predictions: First, voting power provides outside blockholders a necessary condition to pursue shared and private benefits of control, and it is positively correlated with blockholders’ capability of influencing firm value. Second, everything else being equal, an outside blockholder is more (less) likely to pursue private benefits than shared benefits when the equity market is efficient and when the blockholder’s voting power is less (more) than 50 per cent. Third, controlling outside blockholders can capitalize on their voting power to appoint managerial delegates and board representatives to the invested firms for the purpose of pursuing private benefits of control.

This paper tries to make two contributions to the corporate governance literature. First, this research relies on a new perspective to explore the relationship between ownership structure and firm value. Second, this paper presents the first theoretical argument which states that controlling outside blockholders rely on their managerial delegates and board representatives to pursue their private benefits of control.

In this chapter, we assess the ownership characteristics for the companies in our sample. For this, we do not only use ownership concentration measures such as the Herfindahl–Hirschman index but also voting power measures since ownership and voting power are not necessarily equivalent. We find that, in line with previous studies, ownership concentration and voting power of large shareholders is generally higher in continental European countries, which has important implications for corporate governance.

Today Lionel Penrose is recognised as the co-author of one of the two leading indices of power in voting legislatures – a field of study that game theory in general, and cooperative game theory in particular, has been reclaiming from sociology and political science since the 1950s. The main claim of this paper is that Penrose developed his index so as to tackle questions that go vastly beyond the narrow domain of voting; namely, acute social issues during the Cold War such as the outburst and propagation of panics, the ideological susceptibility of populations, the escalation of military conflict and the successful installation of authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, by revisiting the history of the Penrose power index, the paper re-evaluates some of its key underlying assumptions: assumptions that have been heavily – and unfairly, as the paper argues – criticised over the last decade.

This chapter investigates which factors contribute to (small) shareholder attendance using a hand-collected panel data set with information about turnout rates, voting behaviour and ownership structures of companies that are listed in seven Member States. We document how ownership concentration positively affects total shareholder turnout, but has a negative effect on small shareholder turnout. Voting power also affects small shareholder turnout rates; the greater small shareholder voting power, the greater their eagerness to vote. In addition, total and small shareholder turnout is higher the more important the meeting agenda. And, small shareholders tend to free-ride on large institutional shareholders and corporate insiders, but the magnitude of the free-rider effect is larger for the latter category of blockholders. Our results provide some important insights for the debate on shareholder rights and the role of the AGM in corporate governance. The results show that, despite the criticism, the AGM still plays an important role in small shareholder monitoring. Some topics seem to clearly motivate small shareholders to attend, while others are less relevant. Policy makers can stimulate shareholder monitoring by focusing on the factors that are determined in this study, but it is important to consider possible endogeneity issues as well.

This article develops an alternative theoretical approach to the Supreme Court’s controversial electoral redistricting decisions in Shaw v. Reno (1993) and its progeny. Instead of relying on the traditional equal protection interpretation, this paper argues that controversies over electoral redistricting are at base disputes among competing visions of democracy. In the Court’s recent redistricting cases, the majority and the dissent adopted fundamentally different visions of democracy – Individualist Democracy and Democracy as Power. In addition to elaborating these rival understandings of democracy, this article develops the concept of Symbolic Democracy to explain a central paradox in the Court majority’s decision: its simultaneous denial and recognition of the relevance of racial groups in representation.

Teachers comment that there is no time in the day to cover social studies as they struggle to implement new programs designed to increase the reading levels of the students in their classrooms. Successfully adapting the project called Kids Voting USA during the fall, 2004 election helped pre-service teachers learn how to infuse civic learning goals, social studies, and voting education into the primary classroom on a daily basis. Pre-service teachers taught lessons on the voting process to students in a public school district in grades kindergarten through second, during their internship course in the fall of 2004. Students learned how their vote made a difference and discussed the issues when presented with the facts. Pre-service teachers developed a list of children’s literature to support the skills that were being taught. Data compiled at the end of the project confirmed that the students were able to use their skills across the curriculum while pre-service teachers not only increased their understanding of civic learning goal, but also increased their own knowledge of the voting process.

At the beginning of the 20th century, three intertwined ambitions drove federal legislation over wildlife and biodiversity: establishment of multiple-use federal lands, the economic development of natural resources, and the maintenance of option values. We examine this federal intervention in natural resource use by analyzing roll call votes over the past century with a Random Utility Model (Manski, 1977) and conclude that economics mattered. So did ideology, but not uniformly. After World War II, the pro-environment vote which had been conservative shifted to being liberal. All these votes involved decisions regarding public land that reallocated the returns to users by changing the asset’s physical character or its usage rights. We suggest that long-term consequences affecting current resource allocations arose from disparities between broadly dispersed benefits and locally concentrated socioeconomic and geophysical (spatial) costs. We show that a primary intent of public land management has become to preserve multiple-use option values and identify important factors in computing those option values. We do this by demonstrating how the willingness to forego current benefits for future ones depends on the community’s resource endowments. These endowments are defined not only in terms of users’ current wealth accumulation but also from their expected ability to extract utility from natural resources over time.

To use a behavioral measure of legitimacy to study how differences in negotiating style and status affect the legitimacy of persons in high-power network positions. Predictions include (1) that powerful network actors who negotiate using a pro-group style will maintain legitimacy better than will those who negotiate selfishly and (2) those higher in status will be granted more legitimacy both before and after exchange than powerful actors lower in status.

An experimental study in which participants were connected in networks to powerful partners who were portrayed as consistently high or low on several status characteristics. Both before and after exchange, participants evaluated partners on a number of dimensions and made decisions on whether to vote to join a coalition to take the partner's power away, a direct behavioral indicator of legitimacy.

High-power partners lost legitimacy over the course of exchange irrespective of whether they negotiated in pro-group or selfish ways, and irrespective of whether they were high or low in status. This effect was pronounced for partners who negotiated selfishly. Although partner status predicted legitimacy prior to exchange, legitimacy evaluations after exchange appeared entirely driven by the partner's negotiating style (how the power was used) and not by status.

The project introduces a new behavioral measure of legitimacy that correlated highly with self-report items and should be of value in future research. The study also indicates promising directions for future research that might disentangle effects of power and status on legitimacy, along with adjudicating among explanations for why this study did not find status effects on legitimacy.

This paper presents the results of a complex but challenging investigation into the global power play at the United Nations (UN) over the issue of international accounting regulation. It specifically attempts to explain why the host developing nations of most transnational corporations (TNCs), despite controlling a significant majority vote at the UN and thus possessing the necessary “political” power, conspicuously failed to impose their accounting disclosure agenda on the TNCs and on the (minority) developed nations. The political concept of power is used in examining the accounting standard setting process at the UN, in the context of regulatory reforms of the TNCs. While alternative models of power are considered, Robert Dahl’s decision‐oriented pluralistic model was adopted in the study because it proved to be the most consistent with the events, objectives and the empirical data presented. The research findings indicate that organized pressures from the TNCs, co‐ordinated under the joint forum of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the International Organisation of Employers (IOE), coupled with the economic and diplomatic manoeuvring of the developed market economy nations, had succeeded in overriding the rule of “one‐nation‐one‐vote” and securing a de facto veto over the majority view at the UN. The pioneering efforts of the UN in setting international reporting standards had been curbed and frustrated through the construction and use of such “veto” by the minority representation.