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This study aims to focus on the effects of economic globalisation programme on the problems of criminal activities and on the degree of skilled–unskilled wage inequality.

A competitive general equilibrium model of a small open economy is developed. Unskilled labour moves from the production sector to the criminal sector. Those who join the criminal sector snatch a part of capitalists’ income and skilled workers’ income to finance their consumption and face positive probability of being caught and punished. The size of the criminal sector and the rental rate on capital are simultaneously determined in the short-run equilibrium of this model where factor endowments are exogenously given at a particular point of time.

An increase in the capital endowment resulting from an exogenous foreign capital inflow raises demand for labour and wage rates in both the sectors. So, it lowers the rental rate on capital and thus aggravates the problem of skilled–unskilled wage inequality because the skilled labour using sector is more capital intensive than the other production sector. However, it may lower the size of the criminal sector and thus may raise the level of the gross domestic product.

There exists substantial theoretical works on the problem of skilled–unskilled wage inequality, but none of these works focuses on the general equilibrium allocation of unskilled labour to the criminal sector. On the other hand, existing models specialised to analyse theoretical implications of crime and punishment do not focus on the interaction between crime and wage inequality.

This paper aims to understand the differing impacts of wealth distribution on human capital accumulation and skilled-unskilled labour generation under three educational paradigms as follows: private, public and a system of mixed education.

The authors use an overlapping generations model.

The wealth dynamics show that both in the private education system and public education system, there are two possible outcomes- stagnation and steady growth depending on the efficiency of the education system, skill premium and other parameters. The choice of the education system through voting is discussed. It is found that skilled workers would always vote for private education whilst unskilled workers vote for private education if public education expenditure of the economy is low.

The study is subject to several limitations. This paper considers the rate of interest and wage rate to be exogenously given, and thus ignores the general equilibrium effects. The authors do not consider the labour-leisure choice. The introduction of labour leisure choice in the model would alter many of the results. The authors do not consider heterogeneous ability across individuals. The analysis of the differential efficiency of the different education systems needs further, rigorous research. Also, this paper does not consider other occupations such as entrepreneurship and self-employment. This paper considers the labour demand function to be perfectly elastic, and hence, does not consider any demand constraint. What happens if bequests are taxed? What happens if parents are not altruistic? These questions may be addressed in future research.

If the proportion of tax paying skilled labour is low in any country, pure public education may not be able to generate sustained human capital growth. For countries with a sufficiently large proportion of skilled labour, the public education system would be successful. On the other hand, if skill premium is low or the education system is poorly managed private education system may fail too.

Whilst investigating the effects of public vs private education on growth and development in the presence of unequal wealth distribution, The authors have tried to address a few questions. First, why the public education system has been successful in skill accumulation in developed countries whilst it has failed to do so in less developed countries? Second, why do some countries with mostly privately run educational institutions perform much better in human capital production whilst others do not? Third, in an economy with unequal wealth distribution, what are the factors that result in public or private education as a voting equilibrium outcome?

The existing theoretical literature does not adequately take into consideration the existence of non-traded goods and the nature of capital mobility between the traded and the non-traded sectors in analyzing the consequences of liberalized investment policies on the relative wage inequality in the developing countries. The present chapter purports to fill in this gap by using two four-sector general equilibrium models reasonable for a developing economy. We have examined the outcome of foreign capital inflows on wage inequality when non-traded goods are intermediate inputs and final goods. Appropriate policy recommendations for improving the wage inequality have also been made.

The aim of this article is to explore the current European debate over labour market flexibility. First, it considers lessons from economic theory. The classical consensus considering unemployment to be purely voluntary, the Keynesian consensus introducing the concept of demand deficient involuntary unemployment and finally the neo‐classical consensus returning us to the classical viewpoint of the dominance of real conditions in the labour market. In order to proceed without confusion the article provides a clear working definition of the natural rate of unemployment and its three main components, voluntary unemployment, structural unemployment and involuntary unemployment. It then proceed to analyse each of these main components in detail, illustrating the difference between a free market approach and a European Commission approach to reducing each component of unemployment. The article concludes that the future is dependent on all EU citizens as electors of governments and holders of wages to moderate.

Most models attempting to give an account of trade-induced symmetric increase in wage inequality have abandoned the factor price equalization (FPE) framework. The present chapter retains the FPE framework and identifies a plausible route through which trade might increase wage inequality in all trading countries. A two-sector model with one constant returns sector producing basic goods and another increasing returns to scale sector producing fancy goods is developed. A quasi-linear utility function is used to capture the divide between basic and fancy goods. There are two types of productive factors, skilled and unskilled labour, and they differ with respect to their occupational options. Skilled labour can work both in the skill using fancy goods sector and in the unskilled labour using basic good producing sector, whereas unskilled labour is tied down to unskilled job. The model holds possibilities of multiple equilibria and under reasonable parameterization skill premium increases in all countries following trade.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and unskilled immigrants for a panel of 23 manufacturing industries in Malaysia, spanning the period 1985-2009.

The paper establishes the causal FDI-immigrant links within a multivariate model framework for the period 2000-2009, and in a univariate context for 1985-1999 and 1985-2009.

Based on heterogeneous panel cointegration tests, there is a long-run equilibrium between inward FDI, unskilled migrant share, output growth, export intensity and market concentration. The long-run cointegrating coefficient based on the fully modified least squares estimator suggests the presence of unskilled migrant workers a significant location determinant for inward FDI for the first sub-period and the overall period. The results of the panel vector error correction model further attest to causal links between unskilled migrant worker presence and inward FDI in the short- and long run. Bidirectional causality between inward capital and labour flows is present in the first sub-period and unidirectional causal links from unskilled migrants to inward FDI is evident for the overall period.

The observed FDI-immigration (unskilled) links in manufacturing support the argument that inward FDI is induced by unskilled migration. The study reveals that unskilled immigration increases FDI inflows or rather “capital chases labour” in terms of international factor mobility.

This has profound implications for public policy as the government seeks to reduce its dependence on migrant workers. Policy coordination is therefore needed between regulating inflows of foreign capital and foreign labour so that implemented policies do not pull in different directions and undermine Malaysia’s attractiveness as a destination for FDI.

The large presence of unskilled migrants, an intrinsic characteristic (based on the new trade theory that includes factor endowments) of Malaysia, seems to be largely ignored when explaining FDI inflows to manufacturing, particularly so when the siting of MNCs in this sector have traditionally been in light scale manufacturing.

This study aims to introduce an education sector which transforms a part of unskilled labour into new skilled labour, and then show how the level of output of educational service is determined in the short-run equilibrium along with the level of output of two production sectors. This study also introduces intertemporal dynamics into the model assuming that all factor endowments grow over time, and then show how a strong anti-immigration policy in the destination country affects the long-run equilibrium of the source country.

This study considers a three sector open economy model to analyse the long-run economic effects of the anti-immigration policy adopted in the destination country on the general equilibrium of the source country.

If the education sector in the source country is more skilled labour intensive than the advanced production sector, then this anti-immigration policy would raise the capital unskilled labour ratio, skilled labour–unskilled labour ratio and the balanced endogenous growth rate in the new long-run equilibrium but would lower the gross rate of creation of new skilled labour there.

The authors want to analyse the effect of anti-immigration policy adopted in the destination country on the long-run balanced growth rate in the source country. The dynamic growth effect of anti-immigration policy cannot be studied in a static short-run equilibrium model, the authors also introduce intertemporal dynamics into the model assuming that all factor endowments grow over time and then show how a strong anti-immigration policy in the destination country affects the long-run equilibrium of the source country.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate skilled labor demand determinants in Brazil, considering alternatives explanations: changes in relative wages, non-homothetic technology output growth and skill-biased technical change.

This study relies on a rich and unique matched employer-employee data set for manufacturing sector, from 1996 to 2003. The analysis considers a translog functional form labor demand system estimated using seemingly unrelated regression and instrumental variables to control for possible measurement errors and wages and output endogeneity.

The demand function estimates suggest that: labor demand underlying technology is non-homothetic, research and development investment is biased toward skilled workers, the non-homothetic technology is not skill biased so output changes contributed positively for skilled labor increase, relative wages played a significant role and international trade has little explanatory power explaining labor demand shifts.

This is the first paper that considers alternative explanations for the increase in the demand of skilled workers for manufacturing in Brazil simultaneously: changes in relative wages, output changes with non-homothetic technology, skill-biased technical change and, to a lesser extent, international trade. The study challenges current empirical evidence that considers trade and trade liberalization as the main factor explaining labor demand shifts.

The purpose of this paper is to study the spillover effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) on skilled–unskilled wage inequality in the Indian manufacturing industries.

The authors show theoretically with a model of spillover that if foreign firms (receiving FDI) have a negative spillover effect on domestic firms (not receiving FDI), then the level of capital and skilled workers in the domestic firms falls down. Consequently, the authors conduct an empirical analysis by using system GMM estimation technique on the firm-level data of the Indian organised manufacturing sector.

The authors show that wage inequality worsens when there is negative spillover effects like competition spillover or skill spillover effect of FDI in India.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first attempt to measure the various spillover effects of FDI on the wage inequality in the Indian manufacturing industries by using firm-level data.

The purpose of this paper is to test the impact of selected characteristics of jobseekers on employers’ decisions regarding potential hires (direct and probabilistic signals). The main focus of the study is to test the impact of jobseekers’ participation in selected active labour market programmes on employers’ hiring decisions for three positions: unskilled worker, skilled worker and administrative employee. Other characteristics tested include age, gender, presence of children in the household, state of health, experience of short- and long-term unemployment and indebtedness.

This study analyses data from a representative survey of employers with five or more employees in the Czech Republic. The survey was conducted in December 2020 using stratified random sampling, combining online questionnaires and personal interviews. The study includes 1,040 employers and uses the factorial survey experiment (FSE) design.

The results of the FSE suggest that the perceived positive impact of completing one of the activation programmes depends on the position for which the candidate is being recruited. While for the unskilled job category, the completion of any of the tested schemes (training, subsidised jobs or public works) had a positive effect; for the skilled job category, only the training and subsidised jobs schemes had a positive effect; and for the administrative job category, public works programme even had a negative effect.

A somewhat limiting factor in the context of this study seems to be the definitions of the positions tested (unskilled and skilled workers and administrative staff). The decision-making of the respondents was somewhat restricted by such broadly defined categories. Typically, studies with FSE designs have a focus on a specific sector of the economy, which allows for a better definition of the positions or jobs under test. The relationship between position and the impact of individual characteristics is clearly a matter for further research.

The results of the study confirm that completion of the activation programme, as well as other candidate characteristics, constitute differentiating signals for employers that influence their hiring decisions. At the same time, there is evidence that the training programme and the subsidised jobs programme are effective in terms of increasing participants’ chances of employment.

The demand side should be included in the evaluation of activation policies. The design of the FSE provides an appropriate way to test the impact of activation measures on the decision-making of employers.