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It is now generally accepted that, since organised crime has become increasingly sophisticated, globalised and well resourced, law enforcement must consequently shift from its traditionally reactive approach to investigating crime to a more proactive one. While this has happened in a range of fields, particularly drug trafficking, it does not appear that money‐laundering investigations have developed in accordance with this trend, with the exception of in the USA. This paper examines the features of money‐laundering sting operations carried out in the USA, the jurisdiction with the greatest experience in conducting this type of operation, and considers the current potential for money‐laundering stings in the UK.

Interviews over 120 sellers and low‐level distributors of the drug “crack” in New York City. Documents seller strategies to counter police tactics. Finds that crack sellers and distributors have developed several important strategies to limit vulnerability to arrest, but that success in avoiding arrest diminishes considerably once they are detected by police. Suggests that problem‐oriented approaches are better than crackdowns, since they permanently disrupt the environmental conditions that foster drug market sites.

The purpose of this article is to explore the issue of drug use among police officers and police recruits. Data from two large police agencies were used in this analysis. Results of the two most popular drug screens (urinalysis and hair analysis) in the identification of drug‐involved individuals, who are either currently employed in or applying for law enforcement positions, are presented and discussed. It is found that there is an identifiable group of people in policing which appears to be drug‐involved. It also appears that, at least in some situations, and for rapidly excreted drugs like cocaine, the use of urine may be producing underestimates of these groups. The data support the idea that policing agencies may want to consider using multiple drug‐testing modalities in order to maximize the identification of different drugs, whose characteristics can be an important consideration in interpreting drug test results.

Comparisons between New York Police Department (NYPD) drug‐allegation data and data from users' and sellers' self‐reports about crack, powder cocaine and heroin provided useful insights about the allocation of police resources via drug‐allegation data.

Central Harlem was divided into 45 primary sampling units (PSUs) with two years of NYPD data organized in three strata, high, mid or low allegations/capita. In nine randomly selected PSUs (three/stratum), interviewers employed chain referral sampling, steered with a nomination technique.

NYPD drug‐allegation data concurred more often with self‐report data concerning crack use/sales, but underestimated use/sales of powder cocaine and heroin. Mid‐level PSUs had proportions of crack users/sellers similar to high‐level PSUs. Mid‐ and low‐level PSUs often had high proportions of powder cocaine and heroin users/sellers.

The enumeration of crack users/sellers produced results similar to NYPD data because crack use/sales may be more easily detected and willingly reported by citizens, police informants and police officers. Powder cocaine and heroin use/sellers enumerated were less noted in the NYPD drug allegations.

Provides insights into a question not addressed in previous research – how much and what kinds of drug activity are indicated by NYPD drug‐allegation data.

This paper adds to a growing body of research which explores the relationship between aggressive police strategies and serious crime. For one month, police enforced disorder crime in a small section of one community. An interrupted time series analysis was utilized to evaluate the effects of this intervention on robbery and aggravated burglary in a target area and a control area. The strategy was found to be unrelated to levels of aggravated burglary and robbery in the target area. There was no spatial displacement of crime. Explanations for the findings are offered.

As the war on terrorism escalates, police agencies are using technologies that electronically scan individuals, structures, and vehicles to identify things hidden from public scrutiny. These machines create new socio‐technical systems for police and citizens. Public policy gaps evolve when new systems give police sensory capabilities that fall outside existing procedural standards such as probable cause and reasonable suspicion. Mobile digital terminals are now common, but are also abused by police officers who run queries on vehicles without articulate suspicions. New technologies such as passive millimeter imaging that permit “X‐ray”‐like examination of individuals and structures create more potential for abuse. As these new technologies diffuse among police agencies, policies should be guided by questions about whether technologies work as designed, whether they are effective, and whether they accomplish anti‐terrorist and crime control objectives. Traditional rules for wiretapping can offer models for operating policies for the new scanning and imaging technologies.

The purpose of this paper is to test theories of organizational justice in the context of a police agency.

Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) was used to analyze data from a survey of officers in a police force in England.

The SEM showed that organizational justice was associated with positive attitudes towards serving members of the public. This relationship was mediated by commitment to elements of community policing and, for community police officers, by general satisfaction with the organization.

The findings suggest that police managers committed to implementing process‐based policing policies may need to ensure their organizations also implement internal policies and practices that are procedurally fair.

This study is one of the first to apply the well established literature on organizational justice to the context of policing, and the first to examine the impact of organizational justice on alignment with community policing and the service model.

This chapter focusses on the ethical issues raised by different types of surveillance and the varied ways in which surveillance can be covert. Three case studies are presented which highlight different types of surveillance and different ethical concerns. The first case concerns the use of undercover police to infiltrate political activist groups over a 40-year period in the UK. The second case study examines a joint operation by US and Australian law enforcement agencies: the FBI’s operation Trojan Shield and the AFP’s Operation Ironside. This involved distributing encrypted phone handsets to serious criminal organisations which included a ‘backdoor’ secretly sending encrypted copies of all messages to law enforcement. The third case study analyses the use of emotional artificial intelligence systems in educational digital learning platforms for children where technology companies collect, store and use intrusive personal data in an opaque manner. The authors discuss similarities and differences in the ethical questions raised by these cases, for example, the involvement of the state versus private corporations, the kinds of information gathered and how it is used.

Undercover policing operations are on the increase in the UK and the USA and questions surrounding the judicial and administrative controls of such operations in the field of white collar crime investigations need to be addressed. This paper considers recent case examples involving such methods, looking in particular at recent developments in the law relating to entrapment and agents provocateurs and also at the differing regimes of administrative control in the UK and USA. While some US developments point to a restriction on the scope of undercover operations, the UK courts and European Court of Human Rights have been providing judicial backing to such police methods.