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We survey several of the theoretical models that have been applied to the analysis of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement process. These include repeated game models, which emphasize the punishment aspect of dispute settlement, and incomplete contracting models, which emphasize the “gap-filling” aspect. Our analysis emphasizes the implications of these models for the strengthening of the dispute settlement process under the WTO and for its application to the TRIPS agreement. We also discuss how models of settlement bargaining can be applied to obtain empirical predictions about which cases will actually proceed to an actual finding by the dispute panel.

We first discuss what fairness may mean in the context of the dispute settlement process, noting the crucial relation between fairness in dispute settlement and the functioning of the trading system as a whole. We explore this relation further through an analysis of three main groups of dispute settlement cases. These are cases that turn around the question of defining fair competition; cases that arise from the use of contingency measures; and cases that draw the boundaries between domestic regulatory measures and the trade-related norms and rules of the WTO. There follows an analysis of experience with compliance and with the use of countermeasures in various cases. Finally, taking together the rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body and the procedures for compliance and the use of countermeasures, we conclude that while the present dispute settlement process serves to protect the fairness of the trading system as a whole, there are some aspects of dispute settlement that remain problematic from the standpoint of fairness.

The paper is prompted by the US–China trade war and its implications for the sustenance of the multilateral trading system. The two rivals resorted to “self-help” without recourse to the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system, flouting the WTO as an adjudicator in trade disputes. This paper aims to analyze the drawbacks in the settlement system and examines the urgent need for a retroactive remedy.

This paper adopts desk-review and jurisprudential analysis of the relevant rulings of the WTO dispute settlement body. Using desk-review, primary sources such as the relevant domestic legislations invoked by the USA and China to trigger the trade war were discussed and critically analyzed.

This paper finds that the unilateral and protectionist actions that characterize the trade war can be linked to the loss of confidence in WTO remedies to redress members’ retroactive economic losses. This finding is useful in arguing for the incorporation of a retrospective monetary remedy to forestall the reoccurrence of a similar trade war and save the WTO from being dysfunctional.

Although, whether there should be retroactive remedies in the settlement system has been long debated, this paper makes a significant contribution by highlighting why the drawbacks in the settlement system have become so prominent in the context of this trade war. This paper strengthens the urgent need for WTO dispute settlement reform to prevent a reoccurrence of another global distortion of trade.

The appropriateness of retaliatory trade measures in the World Trade Organization dispute settlement process have increasingly come under scrutiny in recent years. Several Members and commentators alike have recommended large-scale amendments to the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) to provide alternatives to retaliatory measures, with the most notable including compensation, collective retaliation, and increased special and differential treatment for developing countries and/or widespread loss of privileges for non-conforming respondents.

Unfortunately, many of the proposals failed to first identify the aims and objectives of the retaliatory phase, or even of dispute settlement more generally. This chapter takes a more holistic approach in its analysis of whether any of the current proposals will improve (or harm) the system. In doing so, this chapter will first assess the effectiveness and appropriateness of retaliatory trade measures by evaluating the goals and objectives in which it is designed to achieve. It will then evaluate some of the more prominent proposals for amending the DSU under the same framework. Taking such an approach will allow for a more comprehensive review and will reveal not only the problems with retaliatory trade measures, but also its positive aspects, and not only the positive aspects of the suggested alternatives but also where they may be detrimental to the system.

The purpose of this paper is to show that, instead of replacing trade retaliation with alternatives that are equally problematic, such as monetary damages, mandatory trade compensation, or formal membership sanctions, the World Trade Organization (WTO) might gain from relying exclusively on informal remedies.

The paper critically reviews the main proposals brought forward in the literature and by WTO members on how to reform WTO remedies. It takes a fresh look at whether any viable, both economically and legally sensitive, alternatives exist.

First, the fact that WTO dispute settlement does not rely on monetary damages and on reparation for past losses is economically justified. Second, switching to an alternative remedy of mandatory trade compensation is not a viable alternative to proportional countermeasures. Third, introducing formal membership sanctions into the WTO would either remain ineffective or turn out to be counterproductive for progressive trade liberalization. Fourth, in order not to provoke an excessive increase of the total cost for WTO members to breach their obligations, any strengthening of the WTO's informal remedies should not be undertaken on top of existing remedies, but as part of a major paradigm shift built on the abrogation of trade retaliation.

The article contributes to the ongoing debate on how to reform the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism.

This article joins an already vast body of literature dealing with potential reforms of the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism. It provides a holistic review of the main existing reform proposals under both legal and economic aspects and adds original insights in discussing the replacement of trade remedies by strengthened informal remedies.

World Trade Organisation grants rights to its members, and WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) provides a rule-oriented consultative and judicial mechanism to protect these rights in cases of WTO-incompatible trade infringements. However, the DSU participation benefits come at a cost. These costs are acutely formidable for least developing countries (LDCs) which have small market size and trading stakes. No LDC has ever filed a WTO compliant, with the only exception of India-Battery dispute filed by Bangladesh against India. This paper aims to look at the experience of how Bangladesh – so far the only LDC member that has filed a formal WTO complaint – persuaded India to withdraw anti-dumping duties India had imposed on the import of acid battery from Bangladesh.

The investigation is grounded on practically informed findings gathered through authors’ work experience and several semi-structured interviews and discussions which the authors have conducted with government representatives from Bangladesh, government and industry representatives from other developing countries, trade lawyers and officials based in Geneva and Brussels, and civil society organisations.

The discussion provides a sound indication of the participation impediments that LDCs can face at WTO DSU and the ways in which such challenges can be overcome with the help of resources available at the domestic level. It also exemplifies how domestic laws and practices can respond to international legal instruments and impact the performance of an LDC at an international adjudicatory forum.

Except one book chapter and a working paper, there is no literature available on this matter. This investigation is grounded on practically informed findings gathered with the help of original empirical research conducted by the authors.

Previous research on the success of the WTO dispute-settlement system may miscalculate the true benefits of the dispute process due to the nature of the datasets used. Approximately 33 percent of all disputes filed at the WTO are classified as pending or inactive and thus omitted from most studies. Further investigation reveals that many of these inactive cases were actually settled by the countries involved or considered in a similar WTO dispute, and, as a result, no further WTO action was taken. This suggests that the WTO dispute settlement process may be more effective in resolving disputes than otherwise thought. For those disputes not successfully resolved, I empirically estimate why countries may choose to initiate WTO dispute settlement action but fail to follow through, thus allowing the offending party to continue with the alleged WTO illegal activities. The results suggest that developing countries are less likely to resolve their complaints in the WTO dispute settlement system, a troubling implication for the equity of the system.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the critical issue of legal interpretation on the “development question” as they arise before WTO panels and Appellate Body, in view of the benefits inherent in a more‐rounded consideration of the development needs and concerns of WTO developing country Member States.

The introduction sets out the background to the challenges of developing countries in utilising the dispute settlement process effectively and using existing support. By analysing relevant cases, Section 2 analyses the “development question” and how it has been so far considered in legal interpretation. Section 3 addresses WTO jurisprudence on development, examining situations wherein “development” arises in the course of WTO dispute settlement. An examination as to how this aspect of WTO jurisprudence may be revisited including the potential aid of trade policy review mechanisms, and procedures for enforcement is then undertaken. It concludes on the position that the WTO judicial review process can work better by providing the much‐needed balance between binding global trade rules and the domestic progress of its developing country membership at the level of dispute settlement.

This paper establishes the importance of recognising and addressing the fact that core challenges and concerns facing developing countries can and should be factored into the legal interpretation of issues in dispute settlement.

A decisive enquiry into WTO development jurisprudence, this paper addresses developing country capacity to pursue the legal opportunities promised by the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, and how this can be redressed.

A somewhat underappreciated aspect of the burgeoning rush to regional trade agreements (RTAs) is a discrepancy between the dispute settlement procedure (DSP) embodied in the original World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and that found in the language of many RTAs. This chapter explores the issue in the context of a dynamic repeated game of trade agreements. As is well known, the institutional alternatives available in negotiating multilateral freer trade agreements – regional agreements, side agreements, trade dispute settlement punishments, and so on – can proscribe the limits and shape the nature of self-enforcing trade agreements. Here, we suggest the extent to which deviations from the WTO DSP embodied in RTAs – for example, “private interest access,” “third party procedures,” and “choice of forum” – can not only work against the interests of “weaker parties” but furthermore undermine multilateral agreements closer to free trade.

This chapter examines the barriers posed for smaller and poorer World Trade Organization (WTO) members to challenge trade barriers under the WTO's dispute settlement understanding. It first addresses the implications of the judicialization of the WTO's dispute settlement system. It next examines reasons why participation in the WTO's dispute settlement system matters. It then summarizes the results of studies of the system's use and, in light of these findings, posits explanations for smaller developing countries' lack of engagement.