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This study empirically demonstrates a contradiction between pillar 3 of Basel norms III and the designation of Systemically Important Banks (SIBs), also known as Too Big to Fail (TBTF). The objective of this study is threefold, which has been approached in a phased manner. The first is to determine the systemic importance of the banks under study; second, to examine if market discipline exists at different levels of systemic importance of banks and lastly, to examine if the strength of market discipline varies at different levels of systemic importance.

This study is based on all the public and private sector banks operating in the Indian banking sector. The Gaussian Mixture Model algorithm has been utilized to classify banks into distinct levels of systemic importance. Thereafter, market discipline has been observed by analyzing depositors' sentiments toward banks' risk (CAMEL indicators). The analysis has been performed by employing the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to estimate models with different dependent variables.

The findings affirm the existence of market discipline across all levels of systemic importance. However, the strength of market discipline varies with the systemic importance of the banks, with weak market discipline being a negative externality of the SIBs designation.

By employing the Gaussian Mixture Model algorithm to develop a framework for categorizing banks on the basis of their systemic importance, this study is the first to go beyond the conventional method as outlined by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI).

This study investigates the impact of bank CEOs’ inside debt on shareholder benefits in the context of bank mergers and acquisitions (M&A) before the 2008–2009 financial crisis.

Employing an event-study methodology, this analysis delves into market reactions to bank M&A announcements during 2006–2007, encompassing 105 M&As by 79 public commercial banks. This era witnessed heightened risk-taking behavior on the verge of the financial crisis. We explore the relation between relative inside debt and market abnormal returns at M&A announcements and the association between relative inside debt and cash payment preferences in M&As.

Evidence suggests that M&A announcements from banks where acquiring CEOs hold a substantial inside debt experience favorable stock market reaction, particularly for smaller banks. Additionally, banks with elevated CEO inside debt tend to favor cash as a payment mode for M&As.

One limitation of this study is the short period of data availability. The data used in this study covers only 2006 and 2007, the periods marked by notable risk-taking activities on the verge of the financial crisis. Although this period is perfectly suitable for our investigation, given the prevalence of conflicts between equity and debt holders, it is essential to acknowledge that our findings may not capture changes or trends over time. Nevertheless, the results offer valuable insights into the factors that influence the behavior of the studied population. Future research could employ a longitudinal design to address this limitation and gain a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics over extended periods.

Our study has significant implications for businesses and policymakers as it provides insights into the factors contributing to financial crises and how compensation mechanisms can be used to moderate bank risk-taking. We propose that CEO inside debt compensation presents a plausible mechanism that boards of directors can incorporate into bank executive compensation contracts. By doing so, they can promote value-enhancing investments and moderate excessive risk-taking, thereby safeguarding the financial stability of individual banks and overall financial system.

Our study sheds light on the beneficial role of bank CEO inside debt for shareholders, contributing empirical backing to the conflict resolution viewpoint in the discourse on wealth appropriation. From a regulatory stance, our findings advocate for the inclusion of bank CEO inside debt in executive remuneration agreements. Such a strategy can empower boards of directors to mitigate undue risk and enhance shareholder value in M&As, safeguarding both individual bank and broader financial system stability.

Cryptocurrency arose, and grew in popularity, following the financial crisis of 2008 built upon a promise of decentralizing money and payments. An examination of the history of money and banking in the United States demonstrates that stable money benefits from strict controls and commitments by a centralized government through chartering restrictions and a broad safety net, rather than decentralization. In addition, financial crises happen when the government allows money creation to occur outside of official channels. The US central bank is then forced into a policy of supporting a range of money-like assets in order to maintain a grip on monetary policy and some semblance of financial stability.

In addition, this chapter argues that cryptocurrency as a form of shadow money shares many of the problematic attributes of both the privately issued bank notes that created instability during the “free banking” era and the “shadow banking” activities that contributed to the 2008 crisis. In this sense, rather than being a novel and disruptive idea, cryptocurrency replicates many of the systemically destabilizing aspects of privately issued money and money-like instruments.

This chapter proposes that, rather than allowing a new, digital “free banking” era to emerge, there are better alternatives. Specifically, it argues that the Federal Reserve (Fed) should use its tools to improve public payment systems, enact robust utility-like regulations for private digital currencies and limit the likelihood of bubbles using prudential measures.

The present study assesses the commercial bank profit efficiency and its relationship to banking sector competition in a rapidly growing emerging economy, India from 2009 to 2019 using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA).

Lerner indices, conventional and efficiency-adjusted, quantify competition. Two SFA models are employed to calculate alternative profit efficiency (inefficiency) scores: the two-step time-decay approach proposed by Battese and Coelli (1992) and the recently developed single-step pairwise difference estimator (PDE) by Belotti and Ilardi (2018). In the first step of the BC92 framework, profit inefficiency is calculated, and in the second step, Tobit and Fractional Regression Model (FRM) are utilized to evaluate profit inefficiency correlates. PDE concurrently solves the frontier and inefficiency equations using the maximum likelihood process.

The results suggest that foreign banks are less profit efficient than domestic equivalents, supporting the “home-field advantage” hypothesis in India. Further, increasing competition drives bank managers to make riskier lending and investment choices, decreasing bank profit efficiency. However, this effect varies depending on bank ownership and size.

Literature on the competition bank efficiency link is conspicuously scant, with a focus on technical and cost efficiency. Less is known regarding the influence of competition on bank profit efficiency. The article is one of the first to examine commercial bank profit efficiency and its relationship to banking sector competition. Additionally, the study work represents one of the first applications of the FRM presented by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and the PDE provided by Belotti and Ilardi (2018).

This study aims to investigate window dressing as practiced by commercial banks in Kuwait, using monthly aggregate balance sheet data covering the period January 1993 to December 2017.

This study applies the structural time series model to decompose an observed time series into unobserved components based on monthly data covering January 1993 to December 2017 on the consolidated balance sheet of commercial banks in Kuwait.

The empirical results indicate that Kuwaiti commercial banks indulge in upward window dressing to boost size and liquidity. This kind of behaviour is indicated by a statistically significant rise in assets under the control of banks in December, followed by a statistically significant decline in January. The operation is funded by borrowing, leading to a December rise and a January fall in foreign and other liabilities, which are also under the control of commercial banks.

This study uses a novel methodology to detect window dressing based on the seasonal behaviour of balance sheet items. This study suggests a unified framework for the motives, targets, types and consequences of window dressing and how they are related.

This study analyzes the effects of competition and risk-taking behavior on the stability of commercial banks in Kenya.

An unbalanced panel dataset of 36 licensed commercial banks in Kenya for 2001–2020 was extracted from the published financial statements. A dynamic panel data analysis model, a two-step system generalized method of moments (GMM), was employed.

The results indicate that competition reinforces bank stability, whereas banks’ risk-taking behavior has an inverse relationship with strength.

The study confirms the competition-stability nexus, implying that measures may be implemented to foster competition among banks with reduced concentration. These measures may include, but are not limited to, reduced entry barriers and optimal capital requirements. Second, efforts should be made to ensure excessive risk-taking by banks. Employing an elaborate exposure monitoring system with clear warning signs is recommended.

This study is unique in several ways. First, it employs structural and nonstructural measures of competition and ex post standards of banks’ risk-taking behavior. Second, contrary to past studies, this study uses various firm-level measures of bank stability. Lastly, it provides essential empirical evidence from the context of a developing economy, whose institutional and macroeconomic environments differ significantly from those of a developed economy.

Academic research has intensively analyzed the relationship between market concentration or market power and banking stability but provides ambiguous results, which are summarized under the concentration-stability/fragility view. We provide empirical evidence that the mixed results are due to the difficulty of identifying reliable variables to measure concentration and market power.

Using data from 3,943 banks operating in the European Union (EU)-15 between 2013 and 2020, we employ linear regression models on panel data. Banking market concentration is measured by the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), and market power is estimated by the product-specific Lerner Indices for the loan and deposit market, respectively.

Our analysis reveals a significantly stability-decreasing impact of market concentration (HHI) and a significantly stability-increasing effect of market power (Lerner Indices). In addition, we provide evidence for a weak (or even absent) empirical relationship between the (non)structural measures, challenging the validity of the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm. Our baseline findings remain robust, especially when controlling for a likely reverse causality.

Our results suggest that the HHI may reflect other factors beyond market power that influence banking stability. Thus, banking supervisors and competition authorities should investigate market concentration and market power simultaneously while considering their joint impact on banking stability.

The study investigates the impact of competition and concentration on bank risk-taking behavior and stability in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) region.

Data from 100 banks from 2013 to 2021 was analyzed using dynamic and static measures by using dynamic system GMM.

Results showed that higher competition reduces stability, while concentration in the banking sector produces stability and reduces risk-taking behavior. The findings suggest that regulatory agencies should take different actions based on the degree of banking market concentration to enhance banking sector stability in the SAARC area.

The research helps regulators and decision-makers establish capital requirements at levels that would prevent banks from increasing their risk-taking in order to boost profits and, therefore, reduces hazardous practices that might increase the risk.

The research helps establish capital requirements to prevent banks from increasing risk-taking to boost profits and avoid hazardous practices that could increase nonperforming loans and bank failure risks.

Purpose: The study aimed to investigate the impact of corporate governance (CG), non-performing loans (NPLs), and bank size (BS) on the financial performance (FP) of banking institutions in Kosovo.

Need for the study: Despite the growth and development of the banking sector in Kosovo, there’s a dearth of comprehensive research examining the key factors influencing their FP. This study aimed to bridge this gap, with a focus on CG, NPLs, and BS.

Methodology: The research employed a multiple regression model to analyse a sample of banking institutions in Kosovo over the period 2006–2021. The key variables included various CG factors, the level of NPLs, and BS, with FP measured through return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE).

Findings: The study found a significant positive relationship between CG factors and bank performance (BP), particularly board size and board independence. Conversely, a significant negative relationship was observed between the level of NPLs and BP. Furthermore, the study revealed a non-linear relationship between BS and FP, with economies of scale contributing to improved performance up to a certain threshold, after which further increases in size led to inefficiencies and lower performance.

Practical implications: The findings of this study carry important implications for policymakers, banking practitioners, and academics. It underlines the importance of sound CG, effective risk management, and maintaining an optimal BS to enhance the FP of banks in Kosovo. It is suggested that these factors should be considered in the formulation of future banking regulations and strategies.