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This study empirically demonstrates a contradiction between pillar 3 of Basel norms III and the designation of Systemically Important Banks (SIBs), also known as Too Big to Fail (TBTF). The objective of this study is threefold, which has been approached in a phased manner. The first is to determine the systemic importance of the banks under study; second, to examine if market discipline exists at different levels of systemic importance of banks and lastly, to examine if the strength of market discipline varies at different levels of systemic importance.

This study is based on all the public and private sector banks operating in the Indian banking sector. The Gaussian Mixture Model algorithm has been utilized to classify banks into distinct levels of systemic importance. Thereafter, market discipline has been observed by analyzing depositors' sentiments toward banks' risk (CAMEL indicators). The analysis has been performed by employing the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to estimate models with different dependent variables.

The findings affirm the existence of market discipline across all levels of systemic importance. However, the strength of market discipline varies with the systemic importance of the banks, with weak market discipline being a negative externality of the SIBs designation.

By employing the Gaussian Mixture Model algorithm to develop a framework for categorizing banks on the basis of their systemic importance, this study is the first to go beyond the conventional method as outlined by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI).

Amidst the backdrop of a wide array of structural developments that have revolutionized the competitive landscape of Indian commercial banking, this paper aims to empirically examine the role of two external monitoring mechanisms – competition and concentration on financial stability and further highlights the significance of bank-level heterogeneity in the nexus.

The study uses the Lerner index, defined through a translog specification, as a measure of market power. A system generalized method of moments technique accounts for the dynamic associations among the competition-concentration-stability nexus. The study further examines the moderating effect of ownership, size and capitalization on the nexus. The study also uses the Boone indicator and comments on the competition-bank stability relationship after controlling for bank governance.

The findings indicate that banks are less stable in a more competitive and higher concentrated environment. Exploring bank-level heterogeneity, first, the authors report that as competition increases, state-owned banks have greater incentives to undertake risky activities than private and foreign banks, which point to implicit sovereign guarantees that characterize the former. Second, the authors document an adverse influence of competition on the soundness of larger banks consistent with the “too-big-to-fail” assertion. Third, results corroborate the disciplinary role of regulatory capital and lend support to stricter capital norms under Basel III in a more competitive environment.

This paper is perhaps the first to capture competition and concentration in a single model; to reconcile conflicting evidence on competition-risk nexus; to shed light on the joint effect of competition and Basel accords for Indian banks.

The learning outcomes of this study are to gain an understanding of the banking regulations and their impact on banking performance, to understand the intermediation role of banks by channelizing depositors’ savings and providing loans to borrowers, to explain an impact of a recent regulatory change in the Indian banking that directly impacts their financial performance, to critically evaluate the different financial ratios to analyze the performance of a bank and to build a DuPont analysis framework for banks.

The case serves as a primer on banking regulations in India and provides insights into banking performance. Banking regulations play an important role in maintaining financial stability, specifically in emerging economies like India. The protagonist of the case is Salil Kumar who presented his internship project to the review committee of Stock Investment Company on April 16, 2021. However, he had to rework and present his final project within seven days on the basis of the feedback received from the committee. Kumar faced the dilemma of bringing together a comparative study across two banks, namely, Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI Bank) and State Bank of India (SBI) and building a DuPont framework covering the different aspects of banking performance. The case exemplifies the intricate regulatory landscape in India within which banks operate and highlights the recent alterations introduced by the Reserve Bank of India. For instance, the framework for dealing with domestic systemically important banks (D-SIBs) was introduced in 2014 and subsequently adopted in August 2015. The D-SIB framework provides inherent guarantee to large banks such as ICICI Bank and SBI. This ensures government backup in the event of any failure, thereby securing financial stability. The case study is suitable for banking and financial accounting courses taught in postgraduate management programs. Once the case is studied, the students are expected to understand the basics of banking, regulations, impact of regulations on banking performance and financial measures.

The case provides valuable insights into the intricate dynamics of the banking industry, offering a critical perspective for analysis. A well-structured teaching note would serve as a valuable tool for instructors, allowing them to facilitate engaging classroom discussions and effectively guide students toward achieving the desired teaching objectives.

Teaching notes are available for educators only.

CSS 1: Accounting and Finance.

The purpose of this study is to examine how five different multi-level governance (MLG) models affect place branding (PB) performance in Saudi Arabia.

In hierarchical administrative systems, central governments exert control on PB, influencing its effectiveness. While PB as such is widely studied, the effect of MLG on PB performance in centralized administrative systems remains understudied. The study is approached as a multiple case study of nine cities.

The study reveals that different MLG models indeed affect PB performance differently. Direct access to central leadership and resources boosts branding performance, while privatization promotes flexibility with similarly positive effects. Study findings, furthermore, show that some cities are considered too big to fail. Cities such as Riyadh and Neom are of prime importance and receive plenty of resources and leadership attention, while others are considered peripheral, are under-resourced and branding performance suffers accordingly. Emerging differences in PB performance associated with different MLG models are thus likely to deepen the gap between urban economic winners and losers.

This paper introduces five MLG models based on the actors involved in PB, their interactions and their access to resources. For each model, this paper assesses other factors which may influence the effectiveness of PB as well, such as access to the national leadership and staff capacity. This research thereby adds to the literature by identifying specific factors within MLG models influencing PB performance in hierarchical administrative systems.

When organizations engage in misconduct, social control agents play a crucial role in sanctioning them to show the enforcement of societal norms and reduce the risk of future deviance. We study the interaction between the government and the media, two key social control agents, in the evaluation organizational misconduct. While past work has focused on the influence of the media on the government, we theorize the influence of the government on the media. The government is a social control agent with supreme formal authority to punish misconduct, and thus its actions are of particular interest to the media as they form evaluations of misbehaving organizations. However, the government, tied by conflicting demands, sometimes turns a blind eye to misconduct and supports misbehaving organizations for the greater societal good, instead of punishing them. How is the media’s perception of misbehaving organizations affected by such government actions? We explore this question by looking at the case of the 2008 government bailout of investment banks in the United States, after those were caught red-handed for their involvement in the sub-prime financial crisis. Carrying out a content analysis of newspaper reporting (2007–2011), we show that the negative perception of investment banks and their misconduct is attenuated when they receive government support. Our work contributes to the emerging literature on the social construction of organizational misconduct and illuminates the interaction between government and media in the evaluation of behavior as organizational misconduct.

This study investigates the impact of bank CEOs’ inside debt on shareholder benefits in the context of bank mergers and acquisitions (M&A) before the 2008–2009 financial crisis.

Employing an event-study methodology, this analysis delves into market reactions to bank M&A announcements during 2006–2007, encompassing 105 M&As by 79 public commercial banks. This era witnessed heightened risk-taking behavior on the verge of the financial crisis. We explore the relation between relative inside debt and market abnormal returns at M&A announcements and the association between relative inside debt and cash payment preferences in M&As.

Evidence suggests that M&A announcements from banks where acquiring CEOs hold a substantial inside debt experience favorable stock market reaction, particularly for smaller banks. Additionally, banks with elevated CEO inside debt tend to favor cash as a payment mode for M&As.

One limitation of this study is the short period of data availability. The data used in this study covers only 2006 and 2007, the periods marked by notable risk-taking activities on the verge of the financial crisis. Although this period is perfectly suitable for our investigation, given the prevalence of conflicts between equity and debt holders, it is essential to acknowledge that our findings may not capture changes or trends over time. Nevertheless, the results offer valuable insights into the factors that influence the behavior of the studied population. Future research could employ a longitudinal design to address this limitation and gain a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics over extended periods.

Our study has significant implications for businesses and policymakers as it provides insights into the factors contributing to financial crises and how compensation mechanisms can be used to moderate bank risk-taking. We propose that CEO inside debt compensation presents a plausible mechanism that boards of directors can incorporate into bank executive compensation contracts. By doing so, they can promote value-enhancing investments and moderate excessive risk-taking, thereby safeguarding the financial stability of individual banks and overall financial system.

Our study sheds light on the beneficial role of bank CEO inside debt for shareholders, contributing empirical backing to the conflict resolution viewpoint in the discourse on wealth appropriation. From a regulatory stance, our findings advocate for the inclusion of bank CEO inside debt in executive remuneration agreements. Such a strategy can empower boards of directors to mitigate undue risk and enhance shareholder value in M&As, safeguarding both individual bank and broader financial system stability.

Cryptocurrency arose, and grew in popularity, following the financial crisis of 2008 built upon a promise of decentralizing money and payments. An examination of the history of money and banking in the United States demonstrates that stable money benefits from strict controls and commitments by a centralized government through chartering restrictions and a broad safety net, rather than decentralization. In addition, financial crises happen when the government allows money creation to occur outside of official channels. The US central bank is then forced into a policy of supporting a range of money-like assets in order to maintain a grip on monetary policy and some semblance of financial stability.

In addition, this chapter argues that cryptocurrency as a form of shadow money shares many of the problematic attributes of both the privately issued bank notes that created instability during the “free banking” era and the “shadow banking” activities that contributed to the 2008 crisis. In this sense, rather than being a novel and disruptive idea, cryptocurrency replicates many of the systemically destabilizing aspects of privately issued money and money-like instruments.

This chapter proposes that, rather than allowing a new, digital “free banking” era to emerge, there are better alternatives. Specifically, it argues that the Federal Reserve (Fed) should use its tools to improve public payment systems, enact robust utility-like regulations for private digital currencies and limit the likelihood of bubbles using prudential measures.

The present study assesses the commercial bank profit efficiency and its relationship to banking sector competition in a rapidly growing emerging economy, India from 2009 to 2019 using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA).

Lerner indices, conventional and efficiency-adjusted, quantify competition. Two SFA models are employed to calculate alternative profit efficiency (inefficiency) scores: the two-step time-decay approach proposed by Battese and Coelli (1992) and the recently developed single-step pairwise difference estimator (PDE) by Belotti and Ilardi (2018). In the first step of the BC92 framework, profit inefficiency is calculated, and in the second step, Tobit and Fractional Regression Model (FRM) are utilized to evaluate profit inefficiency correlates. PDE concurrently solves the frontier and inefficiency equations using the maximum likelihood process.

The results suggest that foreign banks are less profit efficient than domestic equivalents, supporting the “home-field advantage” hypothesis in India. Further, increasing competition drives bank managers to make riskier lending and investment choices, decreasing bank profit efficiency. However, this effect varies depending on bank ownership and size.

Literature on the competition bank efficiency link is conspicuously scant, with a focus on technical and cost efficiency. Less is known regarding the influence of competition on bank profit efficiency. The article is one of the first to examine commercial bank profit efficiency and its relationship to banking sector competition. Additionally, the study work represents one of the first applications of the FRM presented by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and the PDE provided by Belotti and Ilardi (2018).

This study aims to investigate window dressing as practiced by commercial banks in Kuwait, using monthly aggregate balance sheet data covering the period January 1993 to December 2017.

This study applies the structural time series model to decompose an observed time series into unobserved components based on monthly data covering January 1993 to December 2017 on the consolidated balance sheet of commercial banks in Kuwait.

The empirical results indicate that Kuwaiti commercial banks indulge in upward window dressing to boost size and liquidity. This kind of behaviour is indicated by a statistically significant rise in assets under the control of banks in December, followed by a statistically significant decline in January. The operation is funded by borrowing, leading to a December rise and a January fall in foreign and other liabilities, which are also under the control of commercial banks.

This study uses a novel methodology to detect window dressing based on the seasonal behaviour of balance sheet items. This study suggests a unified framework for the motives, targets, types and consequences of window dressing and how they are related.

The authors estimate systemic risk in the Korean economy using the econometric measures of commonality and connectedness applied to stock returns. To assess potential systemic risk concerns arising from the high concentration of the economy in large business groups and a few export-oriented sectors, the authors perform three levels of estimation using individual stocks, business groups, and industry returns. The results show that the measures perform well over the study’s sample period by indicating heightened levels of commonality and interconnectedness during crisis periods. In out-of-sample tests, the measures can predict future losses in the stock market during the crises. The authors also provide the recent readings of their measures at the market, chaebol, and industry levels. Although the measures indicate systemic risk is not a major concern in Korea, as they tend to be at the lowest level since 1998, there is an increasing trend in commonality and connectedness since 2017. Samsung and SK exhibit increasing degrees of commonality and connectedness, perhaps because of their heavy dependence on a few major member firms. Commonality in the finance industry has not subsided since the financial crisis, suggesting that systemic risk is still a concern in the banking sector.