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Response to suggestion that EU-wide cash payment limits would assist in the control of terrorism finance and money laundering.

Desk review and interviews

The inception impact assessment (IIA) is ill-conceived, not grounded on firm empirical evidence and harmful to both crime control and the legitimate interests and rights of the EU citizens. The action under discussion is presented as a measure against terrorism finance, serious crime and tax evasion. The problem is that these criminal acts correspond to very different methods, volumes, perpetrators, causes and control challenges. Cash payment limitations (CPLs) are nowhere near a panacea that can address all of them and cannot make any of them go away magically. Even when each of these crime challenges are considered on their own, the empirical linkage of CPLs to effective controls is not there. The evidence from EU countries with CPLs in place shows higher levels of informal economy, corruption, tax evasion and terrorism risks than those without. There is substantial evidence of non-cash, very serious and organized crime, while the amounts needed and used by terrorists in Europe are usually very small in cash transactions, way below the thresholds under consideration. In fact, determined offenders will shift to other methods and become more sophisticated, posing new problems to controllers. Displacement and incentives for better-organized crime may well be the main products of such measures.

It counters the argument that the cash payment limits can help reduce serious crime, while pointing to several adverse consequences on legitimate interests and human rights.

This chapter analyses the Norwegian Twitter-sphere during and in the aftermath of the terrorist attack in Norway on 22 July 2011. Based on a collection of 2.2 million tweets representing the Twitter-sphere during the period 20 July–28 August 2011, the chapter seeks answers to how the micro-blogging services aided in creating situation awareness (SA) related to the emergency event, what role hashtags played in that process and who the dominant crisis communicators were. The chapter is framed by theories and previous research on SA and social media use in the context of emergency events. The findings reveal that Twitter was important in establishing SA both during and in the aftermath of the terrorist attack, that hashtags were of limited value in this process during the critical phase, and that unexpected actors became key communicators.

This chapter summarises the findings of a case study on social media activity during the 22 July 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway. Based on these findings and on theories and previous research on the role of social media in situation awareness (SA) configuration during crisis situations, the chapter offers seven recommendations for key communicators in official crisis management and response institutions, journalistic institutions, NGOs and others: (1) acknowledge social media as important and master monitoring and management of features across social media; (2) synchronise communication and establish a standard operating procedure (SOP); (3) establish and make known a joint social media emergency account; (4) participate, interact and take the lead; (5) be aware of non-hashtagged content; (6) implement verification tools and practices and (7) engage with and learn from celebrities.

The purpose of this study is twofold; first, it aims to understand the underlying dynamics of the organizations behind the terrorist attacks, and second, to investigate the dynamics of terrorist organizations in relation to one another to detect whether there exist shared patterns of terror between different organizations.

To achieve this purpose, the researcher proposes a computational algorithm that extracts data from global terrorism database (GTD); calculates similarity indices between different terrorist groups; generates a network data file from the calculated indices; and apply network analysis techniques to the extracted data. The proposed algorithm includes applying SQL database codes for data extraction, building a tailored C# computer software to calculate similarity indices and generate similarity networks and using GEPHI software to visualize the generated network and calculate network metrics and measures.

Applying the proposed algorithm to Egypt, the results reveal different shared patterns of terror among different terrorist groups. This helps us in creating a terror landscape for terrorist groups playing in Egypt.

The importance of the study lies in that it proposes a new algorithm that combines network analysis with other data-manipulation techniques to generate a network of similar terror groups.

The chapter addresses the question of how crisis and emergency communicators in the justice (police) and health sector in Norway reflect on their use – or lack of use – of social media during the terror crisis on 22 July 2011. We examine how these communicators in the years following the crisis have developed their use of social media to optimise their and the public’s awareness of similar crises. Our semi-structured interviews with key emergency managers and responders display how the terrorist-induced crisis in 2011 was a wake-up call for communicators in the police and the health sector. They reflect on the significance, strengths and weaknesses of social media in the management of crises such as this one.

This chapter analyses the Norwegian authorities’ presence on Twitter during the 22 July 2011 terrorist attacks. Twitter activity by two official institutions is analysed in particular, namely, the blood bank at Oslo University Hospital and the Norwegian Police Security Services (PST). Our findings show that the Norwegian authorities were almost completely absent on Twitter during the critical hours of the terrorist attack, and that there was no coordination and synchronisation of communication from the authorities. This official silence allowed the diffusion of speculation and misinformation to take place; these were neither corrected nor addressed, as the analysed PST case shows. In contrast, the blood bank used Twitter to mobilise blood donors to address an acute problem: a shortage of blood to treat casualties. The chapter concludes by offering recommendations to the authorities for future major incidents.

The USA has been suffering from international/transnational terrorism for decades. There is no consensus on whether this situation is a result of the international status of the USA and the principles it upholds or the policies it embraces in its interaction with the outside world.

This study adopts both the “American Primacy” theory and the “anti-Americanism” theory in its effort to reach a conclusion concerning this issue. This study aims to examine previous research that linked international terrorism to the US hegemony and the principles it abides by and showed the relevance of this perception to the “American Primacy” theory. It also examines the research that considered international/transnational terrorism as a result of the American foreign policy in its various aspects (economic, military, assistance or a whole combination of policies).

This literature on the American foreign policy and international/transnational terrorism was extensive and manifested the explanatory power of the “anti-Americanism” theory, especially in its three variants: issue-oriented, ideological and instrumental. While examining the foreign policy terrorism studies, the relevance of the “American Primacy” theory appeared at very few instances.

The study was able to prove that explaining the international/transnational terrorism is related to the foreign policy decisions taken by the American policymakers and cause harm to the outside world. The envy of “American Primacy” is of secondary importance.