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The aim of this paper is two-fold: to describe and to consider the implications of the synthesis between terrorism, the media and strategic communication, using the Norway attacks as an example; and to describe and analyze the challenges and execution of crisis communication during and after the Norwegian attacks.

The article is based on earlier research and secondary data (an extensive assessment made by the Norwegian police authority in 2012), as well as a minor media analysis focusing on representation of the perpetrator. An interview with two high-ranking communication officials working for the crisis management coordination secretariat in Norway has served as supplementary material.

The crisis challenged the linear process of standard planning and information transmission. The terrorist attacks in Norway and how they were framed, especially before the perpetrator was identified, are linked to a global discourse on terrorists, and demonstrate the need for developing specific terrorism crisis communication theory. The news media coverage gave the perpetrator and his political messages publicity, but more as a lone disturbed individual, associated with school shootings more than with terrorism. There is a need for increased knowledge about terrorism as strategic communication or public relations. The variety among stakeholders and the increased possibilities for terrorists to control and plan their communications in have implications during all phases of a crisis. New strategies and tactics that oppose and defeat the terrorist's communication goals must be developed.

The article views terrorism from a communication perspective and develops important questions about the relationship between terrorism, media, strategic communication and crisis communication.

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the extent of the use of the internet by terrorist organisations to achieve their strategic and operational objectives.

The methodology adopted consisted of an extensive literature review on topics to include Islamic terrorism, cyber crime, globalisation, and financial crime, supported by field work to verify findings.

Al‐Qaeda has become a radical Islamic phenomenon held together through its global network of communities, both virtual and physical. One significant enabler has been the internet, which enables anonymous communication, aids recruitment, encourages the sharing of knowledge, as well as playing a significant role in the spreading of propaganda. The understanding of the use of internet‐based technologies, not only as a potential target for terrorist attack, but as a tool to achieve its ideological and operational goals, remains a neglected area of study requiring further focus.

This paper serves as a useful guide to alert and educate counter‐terrorism professionals, law enforcement and policy makers of the significance of the extent of the use of the internet for purposes such as operational planning, recruitment, psychological operations and fund raising. It is essential that these subjects should not be viewed as a peripheral issue to cyber‐terrorism, but instead, should be considered to be central to the existing counter‐terrorism effort.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the analysis of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks provided by the US National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the USA from the points of view of behavior analysis and systems analysis. The 9/11 Commission provides a detailed and provocative account of the structural flaws in the US security systems that enabled the 9/11 terrorists to completely subvert efforts to detect and prevent their attack. This paper considers the role of private‐sector organizations in prevention of future attacks.

This conceptual/theoretical paper explores how understanding verbal networks and the nature of verbal rules might contribute to understanding the issues involved in re‐engineering work cultures in the face of continued terrorist threats.

An understanding of verbal networks and ambiguous communications aids the re‐design of management systems and emergency response processes so that adaptive organizational responses to terrorist threats are enabled.

Private‐sector leaders might conduct behavioral systems analyses and probe the limitations of their operations and seek to detect weak points and create contingencies that sustain more effective security and emergency response repertoires.

This chapter examines the phenomenon of cyberterrorism, which is a form of terrorism that could be potentially devastating as terrorists could, through computer networks, wreak havoc in the critical infrastructure of an advanced country.

Review of relevant literature.

The chapter argues that there are actually two types of cyberterrorism: “Hard-Rock” and “Lite.” Both are potential “force multiplier” for terrorists. The former relies on attacking a country’s infrastructures via computer networks and blocking the working of critical functions like water and energy distribution and the like. Because of its complexity and costs, this type of cyberterrorism is far from frequent and actually almost non-existent. The latter type (Lite) is much more commonplace and is the capability by terrorist organizations to use the Web (and the Internet) to communicate with their affiliates, recruit new elements and, most importantly, publicize their deeds.

Because the use of the Web and the Internet by terrorists give intelligence agencies more opportunities to actually monitor them, this form of terrorism is much more a “double-edged sword” than regular terrorism.

The chapter tries to better classify and compare the two forms of cyberterrorism; it also shows how remote the prospect of Hard-Rock Cyberterrorism still is.

The purpose of this paper is to understand the online communication strategies used by destination management organizations (DMOs) during a terrorist attack. In particular, this study analyzes Twitter use during seven terrorism incidents in six European cities (Paris, Brussels, Nice, Berlin, London and Barcelona) between 2015 and 2017.

Twitter content was collected via NCapture, a web browser extension of NVivo, one week prior to the attacks, the day of, and two weeks following to determine the timeframe in which DMOs communicated about the crisis, the types of messages being communicated, and whether these messages are effective. This study uses Coombs’ Situational Crisis Communication Theory as a guide to analyzing the effectiveness of the crisis communication strategies.

The findings of this paper indicate that DMOs are not effectively using Twitter during a terrorist attack. Few tweets relating to the attacks provided tourists with information regarding their safety, with the remaining only communicating as victims. Many DMOs went offline in the days immediately following the attacks and each DMO’s crisis communication on Twitter only lasted up to one week following the attacks.

This study provides insight into the ways DMOs are using social media for crisis communication. These results inform DMOs on their responsibility in communicating information during a terrorist attack. Messages of support are useful in the recovery stage, but tourists need information on how to stay safe and Twitter is often the first source people go to for information (Simon et al., 2014).

Terrorism finance (TF) has been aptly termed as the lifeblood of terrorism. TF provides funds for terrorist activities. Terrorists mobilize funds by using the formal banking system, informal value-transfer systems, hawalas, Hundis, and the oldest method of asset transfer. They may raise funds from legitimate sources, such as personal donations and profits from businesses and charitable organizations, as well as from criminal sources, like the drug trade, the smuggling of weapons and other goods, fraud, kidnapping, and extortion. Countering the financing of terrorism is a far greater challenge throughout the world. The objectives of the chapter are as follows: (1) to identify the different sources of terrorism financing, (2) to analyze various ways of moving terrorism funds globally, and (3) to examine the initiatives taken to counter terrorism financing.

The purpose of this paper is to challenge the “myth” that terrorism is cheap and that terrorists are extremely efficient in how they use their money.

This paper makes a critical assessment of the “costs” involved in terrorist attacks and addresses the debate about how this affects the overall strategy against terrorist financing.

This paper argues that costs of terrorism are many and not limited to what is spent on an actual attack. Owing to military and financial counter‐measures, terrorists appear to have lost overall operational efficiency; they are no longer capable of carrying out large‐scale and complex operations like the September 2001 attacks.

Small amounts involved in carrying out a terrorist attack have led to the perception that terrorism is cheap and terrorist attacks can be inexpensively implemented. This has undermined the global and national efforts to counter the financing of terrorism (CFT). This paper is an attempt to persuade the stakeholders in the CFT community that targeting terrorist financing has been and must remain one of the most important fronts in the war against terrorism.

The prevalence of individuals with an autism spectrum disorder (ASD) being associated with terroristic threats, lone wolf terrorism or affiliating with terroristic groups is rare. This paper aims to discuss this issue.

However, several cases are presented, where individuals with autism are involved in making a naïve, empty terroristic threat or uttering serious serial terroristic threats. Other cases are also presented of individuals being at risk for an abduction or being used by a terrorist group, and finally committing an act of domestic lone wolf terrorism.

Essential to the analysis was establishing a functional connection between autism-based deficits and the terroristic threats, terrorism, and when to not criminalize naïve, empty terroristic threats or acts.

Currently, tools available to law enforcement and prosecutors exploit the vulnerabilities and liabilities which arise as a result of group interactions, a “preventive” approach to terrorism that is not applicable to the solitary, “lone wolf” terrorist. There has been relatively little research (including case studies) examining individuals with ASD who engage in terrorism. For instance, when dealing with an individual with ASD who is charged with terrorism, it is crucial to consider how the diagnosis of autism may have presented as a contextual vulnerability, and to make sure that justice, rehabilitation and management, are informed by an understanding of the person’s diagnosis of ASD.

When considering whether to adopt a network technology, how does uncertainty about whom a potential adopter might interact with affect their adoption choice? On the one hand, uncertainty about potential network partners might enhance adoption incentives, as increased uncertainty induces the potential for economies of scope across the potential network. On the other hand, uncertainty may reduce the expected value of any particular connection, and reduce adoption incentives. Since this is a theoretical puzzle, this chapter presents empirical evidence to help illuminate it. It presents evidence the destabilizing of a social network may increase the scope of network externalities, using data on sales of a video-calling system made to an investment bank’s employees and subsequent usage by these customers. The terrorist attacks of 2001 led potential customers in New York to start communicating with a new and less predictable set of people when their work teams were reorganized as a result of the physical displacement that resulted from the attacks. This did not happen in other comparable cities. These destabilized communication patterns were associated with potential adopters in New York being more likely to take into account a wider spectrum of the user base when deciding whether to adopt relative to those in other cities. Empirical analysis suggests that the aggregate effect of network externalities on adoption was doubled by this instability, and that for those with diffuse networks, this more than compensated for the negative baseline effects of the instability.