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The paper aims to expand and extend previous work on the role of employees who act in non‐violent ways to achieve their personal ends through inducing fear in others in organizations.

The literature surrounding internal terrorists is reviewed and preliminary survey results are presented to support the conclusions derived from that literature.

A model is developed that more carefully identifies how the role of internal terrorists comes about and why they are more likely to engage in non‐violent as opposed to violent behavior.

Research is needed to identify those aspects of organizations that seem to foster or “bring out” violent and non‐violent internal terrorists. Given the differences between internal terrorists and other terrorists, more careful study of those two groups is clearly needed. Since most terrorists express feelings of injustice, stronger links should be attempted between the research on organizational justice and internal terrorism. Just as employee theft has been linked to perceived injustice, so, too, internal terrorism may be linked to higher levels of such perceived injustice.

Research is needed to indicate how terrorism evolves over time as well as what measures seem to be most effective in countering such developments within organizations. Of particular interest to practitioners would be determining the extent to which profit‐seeking versus non‐profit organizations accommodate internal terrorists and the extent to which gender matches between the internal terrorist and the target person are common.

This paper fills a gap in the literature about the role of internal terrorists by delineating more fully the dysfunctional role those individuals play in organizations.

This article seeks to examine approaches to combating the “scourge of international terrorism” by targeting the financial resources of terrorist organizations and their supporters.

The article begins with the disputed issue of how to define a “terrorist”, “terrorism”, “terrorist organizations” and “acts of terrorism”. In a global financial system, differences between the definitions of those terms could have significant implications because terrorists have the means and will to operate their financing infrastructure from the least effectively regulated jurisdictions. There are many methods by which terrorists finance both their organizations and specific attacks. By concentrating on three examples of recent terrorist activity, namely the 9/11 attacks in New York, the 7/7 bombings in London, and the transfer of funds from the “Union of Good” to Hamas to fund terrorist attacks in Israel by means of a certain charitable association, the article illustrates the problems facing legal regimes seeking to limit terrorist funding.

The article notes a broad convergence in the methods of those jurisdictions when combating the financing of terrorism.

The paper provides a discussion of financial resources of terrorism from a legal professional in an area where terrorism is a real danger.

The purpose of this chapter is to investigate on the relationship between terrorism, criminal organisations, and the so-called ‘new wars’.

Review of the existing literature on the ‘new wars’ and on the terrorism–crime nexus; estimate of the financial revenues gained by terrorist groups engaged in illicit activities.

Terrorist and criminal groups can develop several forms of collaboration. Whether terrorists convert to criminal activities or not depends on a variety of factors, both internal and external. In some cases these links are occasional and opportunistic, associated with the possibility of exploiting the availability of specialised competences in a stateless environment, in other cases the warring parties are directly involved and create stable relationships as a way to finance their war activities.

Lack of reliable data limits a comprehensive analysis. Nevertheless, the study has important consequences for designing and adopting more effective policies regarding terrorism, organised crime, as well as conflict resolution.

The study presents an overview of different strands of the literature on terrorism; a discussion is articulated on the interplay between ‘new wars’ and the terror–crime connection. Potentially fruitful avenues of investigation are suggested for future research.

This study aims to examine how important the countering terrorism financing is in the fight against terrorism and to what extent does financial intelligence contribute into this field.

To this end, to collect data, semi-structured interview method was conducted for 15 experts, including academicians, judges, security and intelligence officers who have specialised and been practising in the field of terrorism. Then, the data were analysed with the descriptive and systematic method.

The findings highlight that countering terrorism financing is indispensable in the scope of the combating terrorism; however, there are still much to be done in practice to achieve more success in this field. The results also suggest that the process requires more flexible and proactive approach with the help of an autonomous financial intelligence unit to be more efficient. Moreover, there must be better cooperation and coordination at both national and international levels. Furthermore, training more professionals from multidisciplinary backgrounds and raising awareness among the public and private sectors are found to be other key factors for effective combating of the system.

The research has been conducted on participants who mostly have been in fight against terrorism over 20 years who are aware of the early methods, as well as the recent ones both in theory and in practice. Their view is significant to understand the situation in combating financing of terrorism.

The purpose of this paper is to give a current overview of the threats that terrorist and subversive organisations pose to the stability and integrity of financial institutions and markets and to put forward new measures to efficiently and effectively fight terrorists and terrorist organisations.

The paper starts from the statement by several experts that criminal and terrorist organisations have managed to organise themselves and have accumulated significant financial resources to integrate them into the financial system. The author uses the own experience as Deputy Director of the Belgium Financial Intelligence Processing Unit, the FATP experience and the practical experience of the Belgium Financial Intelligence Processing Unit (the paper includes practical case studies) to identify these threats and new measures.

The paper concludes that the traditional approach of fighting money laundering and terrorism financing has its limits and must be complemented in order to be efficient and defeat terrorists or at least decrease their ability to act. The paper proposes a new approach to complement the traditional approach of fighting money laundering and terrorism financing.

Convictions for terrorism or terrorism financing, as well as seizures and confiscations of dirty money remain very limited. Criminal and terrorist organisations are always very active all over the world. This paper is not only consequently very important to identify threats but also to identify and propose new measures to efficiently and effectively fight terrorists and terrorist organisations.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of USA Executive Order 13224, one of the most important US counter‐terrorist finance measures, on corporations operating in countries with designated terrorist organizations.

The effects of Executive Order 13224 are focused on the case of Chiquita Brands International, a major US banana‐exporting corporation that operated in Uraba, Colombia until 2004. The US Government prosecuted Chiquita for “engaging in transactions” with an illicit, Colombian paramilitary group considered by the US a Foreign Terrorist Organization and as a specially‐designated global terrorist. This paper presents the duress defense that Chiquita could have raised at trial under US federal law.

Executive Order 13224 was drafted hastily and under pressure leading to over‐inclusive language and over‐broad implementation. Chiquita's case suggests that Executive Order 13224, drafted with the intention of reducing terrorist funding, has made it possible for an extortion victim to be prosecuted for payments it has not chosen to make. This paper will suggest narrowly tailoring the language of Executive Order 13224 or providing an exculpatory provision.

Counter‐terrorist finance measure Executive Order 13224 has not been sufficiently examined by scholars. Research on this topic should go hand in hand with enquiry into possible defenses for corporations operating in countries with designated terrorist organizations and having to make extortion payments.

Suggestions are put forward for corporations operating in countries with designated terrorist organizations as well as for drafters of counter‐finance terrorist measures.

Although the designation of terrorist organizations under the executive order has been discussed, few scholars have addressed cases of over‐broad application of the executive order. The unexamined case of Chiquita is a unique case in that the extortion victim, and not the extortion perpetrator, is prosecuted. Also, Chiquita was prosecuted for an activity (making extortion payments to the Autodefensas Unidas Campesinas that became a crime after Chiquita began its engagement with such an activity. Furthermore, examining this case thoroughly is important because it has repercussions on at least two public policy levels: the US' War on terrorism and the rights and remedies of corporations investing in countries with designated terrorist organizations.

Terrorism finance (TF) has been aptly termed as the lifeblood of terrorism. TF provides funds for terrorist activities. Terrorists mobilize funds by using the formal banking system, informal value-transfer systems, hawalas, Hundis, and the oldest method of asset transfer. They may raise funds from legitimate sources, such as personal donations and profits from businesses and charitable organizations, as well as from criminal sources, like the drug trade, the smuggling of weapons and other goods, fraud, kidnapping, and extortion. Countering the financing of terrorism is a far greater challenge throughout the world. The objectives of the chapter are as follows: (1) to identify the different sources of terrorism financing, (2) to analyze various ways of moving terrorism funds globally, and (3) to examine the initiatives taken to counter terrorism financing.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether there is a meaningful difference, viewed from a financial perspective, in distinguishing between organised crime and terrorist organisations, with regard to the control and mitigation of the threats that they pose to society.

The paper uses conceptual models obtained from enterprise theory and economics, as well as criminology, and makes use of case studies through the application of these models.

The paper finds that when viewed from a financial perspective, there is no meaningful difference in distinguishing between the groups because many have undergone processes of convergence and transformation, such that they assume each other’s operational and motivational characteristics. However, the answer also depends on how precisely one defines each type of illicit group as well as the transitions they undergo.

The value of this paper is that it applies two separate models on interactions between organised crime and terrorist organisations, the terror–crime continuum and interaction spectrum, to real life situations. After assessing their validity for more recent examples of such illicit groups, it then provides a balanced argument as to distinguishing between organised crime and terrorism. One limitation towards the paper’s originality, however, is that it draws mainly from pre-existing literature.

This paper aims to explore complexities of compliance with international and customary law when faced with terrorist threats. The paper's thesis asserts that terrorism cannot be successfully repelled unless the legitimacy of international and domestic law is adhered to by states out of a sense of reciprocal obligation in accordance with the principle of pacta sunt servanda (pacts shall be respected).

This paper examines US pronouncements in order to assess strategic validity.

While the Middle East, particularly Iraq, has been the focus of the US “War on terrorism,” the paper suggests two questions: what has been the US response to terrorist threats in the Americas? Have US national security priorities post‐9/11 been unnecessarily diverted from the Americas where much needed support is promised but lacking, and instead have resources been concentrated far beyond domestic and international norms?

The paper examines the US national security priorities, concluding that they have been unproductively diverted from the Americas to the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular. The US fixation upon Middle East “regime‐change”, while neglecting to recognize the dangerous nexus and presence of organized crime and terrorist organizations in the Americas, is illustrative of how the present administration has diverted its post.

The paper is meant to analyse the debate over the revival of a comprehensive convention on international terrorism. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that a United Nations (UN) Convention on international terrorism is still necessary – provided that it is updated considering the new challenges that have recently emerged – and could be complemented by an annex containing the list of terrorist organisations, the determination of which is of common concern of the entire international community.

The analysis is conducted from an international law perspective. The paper uses a comparative perspective – counter-terrorism, Antarctic and ICAO system - to support the main argument.

The paper proposes an annex to the convention including a list of terrorist organisations. Some terrorist organisations are unanimously labelled as terrorist and therefore this list will be useful in developing cooperation among States. A system of revision is also presented; a system which emphasises the role of the UN Ombudsperson.

The proposal presented does not delve into the content of the convention which should be based on the draft prepared by the UN General Assembly ad hoc Committee and should take into account the most recent forms of terrorism. The paper does not provide an answer to all the questions, and it does not linger over the tragedy of civilians living in Syria and Iraq who have been deprived – starting long before the rise of the Islamic State – of their land and lives.

Revival of the debate on the draft convention – proposal for a renewed role of the Ombudsperson – legal implications of a list annexed to a convention on international terrorism – importance of multilateral cooperation in the field.

The paper is innovative in changing the perspective of the problem. The point of view regarding the definition of international terrorism has usually been the following: to find a common definition of international terrorism trying to overcome all the differences regarding general exceptions. The proposed perspective is to find the lowest common denominator for the definition and to identify organisations on which States cannot but agree on their condemnation.