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The aim of this paper is to discuss the business and operational considerations and controls involved when derivatives, specifically swap contracts, are used as investment vehicles. Overall, the paper attempts to provide the baseline for understanding swap processing requirements and guidance to professionals who have compliance and oversight responsibility for these investment products.

The approach focuses on the core understanding of the swap investment vehicle and the procedures, controls, and operating environment required to process them correctly.

Historically, firms have addressed the procedures and controls surrounding swap investment vehicles as a reaction to processing errors. Financial services companies and their service providers need to proactively review their portfolios, procedures, and controls in an effort to mitigate and manage the risks associated with the processing of swap contracts.

Based on first‐hand experience working at and/or with asset managers and service providers, the paper has endeavored to present current and thought provoking information for management consideration on this hot‐button issue.

The purpose of this paper is to explain the rule recently published by the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission that establishes a timetable for the mandatory clearing of interest rate and credit default swaps through a clearinghouse.

The paper discusses the structure of cleared trades in swaps, the classes of interest rate and credit default swaps that are subject to mandatory clearing under the CFTC's new rule and the affirmative and negative specifications for each class, the phased approach adopted by the CFTC for the mandatory clearing compliance schedule, and the end‐user and inter‐affiliate exemptions from the mandatory clearing requirement.

“Centralized clearing,” a process in which bilaterally negotiated trades of derivatives have to be given up to a centralized clearinghouse, is a cornerstone of the new global regulatory system for derivatives. Its proponents argue that centralized clearing will help to mitigate systemic risk by helping counterparties identify and net positions. The paper outlines the clearing rules in the USA for interest rate and credit default swaps.

The paper provides expert guidance from experienced financial services lawyers.

Liquidity risk, i.e., the likelihood that a swap can be “sold” (i.e., assigned) may affect swap prices. This article addresses the importance of liquidity risk as a factor in the valuation of swaps, which are subject to default risk. The author presents a model for pricing these swaps by incorporating a proxy for liquidity risk. Using the model, the author finds that the effects of liquidity risk may partially offset the effects of default risk.

The aim of the paper is to explain the joint final rules adopted on April 18, 2012 by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) further defining the major categories of swap and security‐based swap market participants, “swap dealer“, “security‐based swap dealer”, “major swap participant”, “major security‐based swap participant” and “eligible contract participant” and to explain the process of evaluating a party's status under the rules.

The paper provides the statutory definition of a dealer, and explains the CFTC's and the SEC's interpretive guidance, including four tests and a discussion of the CFTC and SEC dealer trader distinctions, swaps not considered in determining dealer status, and a de minimis exception. It provides the statutory definition of a major participant, along with the four major categories of swaps and an explanation of the “substantial position”, “substantial counterparty exposure” and “highly leveraged” criteria, along with the exclusion of positions held for hedging or mitigating commercial risk from the substantial position analysis. A Dodd‐Frank amended definition of an eligible contract participant (ECP) along with the final ECP rules is provided.

All swap market participants will need to know whether they qualify as one of these entities because each type of entity figures prominently in the new swap market requirements imposed by the Dodd‐Frank Act.

The paper provides practical guidance from experienced financial services lawyers.

The five-, 10-, and 20-year yields of Japanese government bonds (JGBs) co-move with the six- and 12-month basis swap rates under the quantitative and qualitative easing policy regime introduced by the Bank of Japan (BOJ). The 10- and 20-year JGB yields are in a one-to-one relationship with the six- and 12-month basis swap rates. A cheaper yen gives foreign investors strong incentives to buy 10- and 20-year JGBs under the quantitative and qualitative easing policy regime. A cheaper yen also gives foreign investors some incentives to buy five-year JGBs under the same regime. However, JGB yield does not co-move with basis swap rate under the negative interest rate policy regime. After the BOJ introduced the negative interest rate policy, the trend observed under the quantitative and qualitative easing policy regime changed.

This study examines the response of Australian interest rate swap spreads to the arrival of macroeconomic news information during the economic expansion and contraction periods. We find that the impact of news announcements on swap spread change differs and largely depends on the state of the economy. The unexpected inflation rate is the only news released that has significant impact on swap spreads across all maturities during contractions and remains the important news announcement throughout the business cycles, while the unanticipated unemployment rate tends to be more relevant to 10-year swap and the unanticipated change in money supply tends to be more relevant to 4- and 7-year swaps during expansions. We also find shocks from these news surprises appear to have significant impact on the conditional volatility of the swap spread change during both economic phases. The macroeconomic shocks in general are negatively related to the conditional volatility of the swap spread change, suggesting that the newsworthy announcements tend to reduce uncertainty on the news announcement days in the swap market during expansion and contraction periods.

The dynamics between five-year US Treasury bonds and interest rate swaps are examined using bivariate threshold autoregressive (BTAR) models to determine the drivers of spread changes and the nature of the lead–lag relation between the two instruments. This model is able to identify the economic – or threshold – value that market participants consider significant before realigning their portfolios. Specifically, three different regimes are identified: when the swap spread in the previous week is either high or low, the Treasury bond market leads the swap market. However, when the swap spread is low, none of the markets leads each other. Thus, yield movements are shown to be governed by the direction and magnitude of the change in the swap spread, which in turn provides an economic insight into the rebalancing between swap and bond portfolios.

A cheaper yen gives foreign investors strong incentives to buy Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) of 5 and 10 years under the comprehensive easing policy regime. The purchase of JGBs by foreign investors using a cheaper yen funded on a negative basis in the long-term basis swap market contributes to the declining yield of JGBs under the comprehensive easing policy regime. When the Bank of Japan introduced a quantitative and qualitative easing policy, and then a negative interest rate policy, the trend observed under the comprehensive easing policy changed. This was because long-term basis swap rate tended not to decline under the quantitative and qualitative easing policy and negative interest rate policy regimes in comparison with under the comprehensive easing policy regime.

This case study examines the controversial practice by the Commonwealth of Australia during the period 1988–2002 of using currency swaps as part of its debt management strategy. Although the strategy provided a positive return overall, the impact of currency swap usage created significant year-by-year variations in returns, which posed a risk to debt interest and financing requirements. This suggests that the risk limits imposed on this strategy were both inappropriate and insufficient. Nonetheless, these findings provide insights into how such a policy could best be implemented given recent proposals (OECD, 2007) for derivatives use by public debt managers.