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In theorizing the dynamics of social processes, dialectical thinking informs Marx's historical materialist inquiries and both – dialectics and historical materialist principles – inform his political–economic analysis. In conceptualizing empirical observations during this work, Marx (1973b, p. 101) assumes that the “concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse” and that “With the varying degree of development of productive power, social conditions and the laws governing them vary too” (Marx, 1992, p. 28). This methodological tack strives for the flexibility needed for analyzing patterns in long-term social development (the structure of history) as well as the logic of specific systems in their totality and flux (the history of structures).

This paper is a translation of the third and most important chapter of Keizaigaku shi (History of Political Economy) by the Japanese Marxist economist Samezō Kuruma (1893–1982), first published in 1948. Kuruma discusses in detail the achievements and limitations of the Classical school of political economy. He examines the fundamental ideas of Adam Smith and David Ricardo regarding the determination of commodity value and the source of surplus-value, and then looks at how these ideas are connected to production price and profit. Kuruma notes that Smith and Ricardo managed to arrive at the essential labor theory of value, but that neither could correctly apply this theory to adequately explain phenomena in the realm of competition – either abandoning the labor theory of value altogether to embrace a composition theory of value (Smith) or directly applying the theory to explain phenomena without grasping the intermediary processes of development (Ricardo). Kuruma's critique of Smith and Ricardo highlights the achievement of Marx in overcoming the limitations that ultimately led to the breakdown of the Classical school of political economy.

Different from Marx's analysis of the dialectical relationship between the production and realization of surplus value, the Okishio theorem only shows one aspect of the contradictory movement of the total social capital, that is, the reverse effect of the realization of surplus value on the production of surplus value.

The production of surplus value and the realization of surplus value are simplified into one process. This simplification eliminates the contradiction between the production and realization of surplus value, and the antagonistic contradiction between accumulation and consumption and the antagonistic production-distribution relationship in capitalist society are naturally covered up.

Therefore, it cannot explain the actual expansion way of the falling general rate of profit as the historical development law of capitalism. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Okishio theorem places the analysis of the general rate of profit back into the social reproduction model with department equilibrium, which points out the significance of wage income to the realization of surplus value and outlines the macro mechanism of the realization of surplus value reacting to the production of surplus value. It also strongly promotes the research progress of the law that the profit rate tends to decline.

The mistake of the Okishio theorem is that the exchange process in the labor market forms the real wage rate. It determines the production price of wage goods, which thereby determines that the production price of capital goods and general rate of profit, the production of surplus value and realization of surplus value are simplified into the same process, and only the value that can be realized is the real value.

In Volume I of Capital, Marx offers actual data from a Manchester spinning factory describing that business. In Volume II, he offers schemes of reproduction to help understand accumulation of capital while mentioning numbers that actually suggest correlation to the spinning factory data. Nevertheless, Marx seems to slide over the costs of new machinery when analyzing accumulation, instead focusing on wear and tear (depreciation). In this chapter, we offer a modeling of accumulation that takes account of modern estimates of the composition of capital, that is, the relation of labor time invested in constant capital compared to the labor time employed with that constant capital, relying principally upon U.S. and Canadian estimates.

We find empirically that the composition of capital fluctuates but does not show much trend. We also consider levels of the rate of exploitation and of utilization of surplus value required for achieving actual historical levels of accumulation of capital, and include consideration of the turnover of capital. We find that only a small portion of surplus value, perhaps 10%, is required for actually achieved accumulation. This suggests that a focus on the utilization of surplus value for the accumulation of capital misses vast other terrains for the utilization of surplus value.

Our result is suggestive of an overemphasis within Marxist political economy on accumulation of capital.

Whilst demands for benefit cost analysis (BCA) to be applied to a wide variety of policy decisions are growing, there remains a degree of dissatisfaction amongst policy makers, non‐economist specialists and some economists with its use. Part of that dissatisfaction arises because of a degree of confusion relating to what is meant by the term value as it is used in BCA. Furthermore, proponents of other techniques that have been suggested as substitutes for BCA are keen to cast doubts on the ability of BCA to perform its role in consolidating the disparate information relating to the outcomes of alternative policies. An attempt is made to clarify the notion of value as it is used in a variety of guises. These alternative notions are assessed in terms of their abilities to assist in policy formulation. Second, some of the alternative techniques are critiqued, with particular attention being paid to the use of the value concept. Concludes that clarity in the specification of the goals to which a specific concept of value is to be applied is vital. Different concepts relate to different goals and the application of the wrong concept to a goal could be costly. In a final section, the confusion that has arisen within the discipline regarding the concept of value that underpins some non‐market valuation techniques is explored.

The purpose of this paper is to test whether Indian firms follow the pecking order theory under situations of deficiency as well as surplus.

The study examines Indian firms included in the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) 500 index, covering a time span of ten years (2003-2012). An extended model of pecking order theory is tested for deficit and surplus firms separately. The authors use ordinary least square regressions to test the results.

The findings indicate that the pecking order theory is an excellent descriptor for deficit firms, but a poor one for surplus firms. Deficit firms frequently issue debt to fill up deficiency requirements but keep their debt ratios in limit. In marked contrast, surplus firms have low debt to equity ratios and only occasionally redeem debt. They tend to retain funds for future expansion and other operational needs.

The study is limited to firms included in the BSE 500 index, but could be extended to others. Future research work could also focus on debt sub-components.

The present study is useful for firms that are considering capital structure decisions and supports finding that deficit and surplus firms behave differently.

This is the first study separately testing the pecking order between deficit and surplus firms in an emerging market.

This chapter addresses the two important themes that we believe characterise how the platform-based gig economy operates. The first of the two themes explores the shifting boundaries of the triangular business model and its place within the wider, evolving capitalist structure. The triangular business model is the foundation of the platform-based gig economy and consists of the digital platform, the producer/worker and the end consumer. The digital platform acts as the intermediary and provides a market for exchange of goods and services between the workers and the end consumers. The fluidity of the triangular relationship has left the platform-based gig economy beyond the reach of the traditional neo-liberal regulatory system leading to the blurring of employee and employer relations. The second theme is based on the exploration and application of the Marxist concept of surplus value creation and its appropriation within the gig structure. Here, the authors seek to show the exploitation of the worker as a participant in the triangular business model. Given that the worker bears the majority of the entrepreneurial risk and provides capital they ought to receive a proportion of the surplus value created from the transaction. The authors have established the increasing dominance of platforms within the triangular business model and the enhanced scope for exploitation of workers in form of poor remuneration standards due to employee status ambiguity and the appropriation of a disproportionate amount of surplus value flowing to the platform owners.