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Patent litigation consists of non-market actions that firms undertake to access intellectual property rights defined by prior legislation and enforced by the courts. Thus, patent litigation provides an interesting context in which to explore aspects of firm’s non-market strategies. In contrast with prior non-market strategy research that has largely focused on how political institutions define the rules of the game for market competition, non-market actions within patent litigation primarily seek to access and apply these broad policies to specific situations, products, or assets that matter to the firm. Furthermore, because such non-market actions are directly influenced by the firms’ market strategies, they represent a promising area for research on integrated (market and non-market) strategies as well.

The goal of this paper is to explain how generic patent strategies that firms use to support their competitive advantage in the product-market influence non-market outcomes related to the timing of patent litigation resolution. In contrast with prior research that has studied settlement in patent litigation essentially as a one-shot bargaining game, this paper seeks to explain litigation resolution as an outcome of the competing mechanisms of settlement and adjudication that operate continually during litigation. Using a large sample of patent litigations in research medicines and computers, I model the timing of patent litigation resolution in a proportional hazards framework, wherein settlement and adjudication are competing risks. The evidence found is consistent with the proposition that the speed with which patent litigation is resolved by either settlement or adjudication reflects the use of proprietary, defensive, and leveraging patent strategies by firms. These findings also help to explain unexpected and anomalous findings regarding the settlement of patent litigation reported in prior research.

Patent litigation has been rising rapidly in the United States since the mid-1980s, and particularly so in high-technology industries. The strategies pursued by firms with their patents have a significant influence on their decisions to file suit, and on the outcomes within litigation. The influence of strategic motivations on settlement outcomes is studied in two illustratively different industries – computers and research medicines. Evidence is found for two types of influences – the use of patents (as isolating mechanisms) to protect valuable strategic stakes, and their “defensive” role in obtaining access to external technologies (through mutual hold-up).

This paper studies the effects of lawsuit settlements on stockholders and bondholders. It is hypothesized that successful plaintiffs and unsuccessful defendants will gain and lose wealth respectively upon the settlement of litigation. Furthermore, the riskiness of equity returns will be altered. The equity beta of plaintiffs (defendants) is expected to decrease (increase) after the verdict. Nonetheless, the variance of stock returns for both parties is anticipated to decrease. The results support the wealth impact hypothesis for both stockholders and bondholders. However, even though the variance of returns does drop for both parties after the settlement, the drop is not statistically significant. Lastly, the beta of both plaintiffs and defendants insignificantly decreases.

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.

This chapter provides a theoretical framework of dispute settlement to explain the surge in blocking incidence of GATT panel reports during the 1980s and the variations in withdrawn incidence versus total disputes across different decades of the GATT regime. The study first suggests the role of the degree of legal controversy over a panel ruling in determining countries' incentives to block (appeal) a panel report under the GATT (WTO) regime. The study then analyzes the effects of political power on countries' incentives to use, and their interactions in using, the dispute settlement mechanism, given two-sided asymmetric information regarding panel judgement.

The purpose of this paper is to bring a new perspective on the meaning of resilience in Indonesia’s main urban settlement type, known as kampung. The paper reviews kampung in major urban centres in Indonesia, but focuses on a case study of Surabaya, Indonesia’s second largest city. Despite effectively accommodating the majority of Surabaya’s population, kampung inhabitants are stigmatised and kampung are viewed as slum-like habitats. Such a pejorative view neglects to consider the importance of kampung and ignores their inherent and potential resilience. It is important to study both the risks and resilience of kampung so that they can be developed to address social, economic and environmental vulnerabilities in Southeast Asian cities.

A comprehensive literature review was conducted to identify the risks and resilience of kampung. Key themes were mapped from the literature and used to construct a framework for understanding and enhancing resilience within this distinctive vernacular settlement type. In addition, a place-based approach constructed from remote sensing and field studies provide a deeper understanding of the structure of this urban settlement type.

Kampung play an important role in housing the majority of Surabaya’s population and are an intrinsic part of the city’s urban structure. The characteristics and conditions of kampung vary throughout Indonesia. Surabaya has a variety of kampung types which demonstrates distinctive forms of both risk and resilience. This research finds that there are many positive dimensions of kampung and that this vital form of settlement is well suited to support the growth and sustainability of Southeast Asia’s emerging megacities.

This paper evaluates the current state of knowledge on risk and resilience of kampung within Surabaya. To gain a clearer understanding of why kampung are resilient, long-term field work and deeper analysis of kampung, in particular the social and physical structures, are needed.

Planning for high-density urban development needs to integrate kampung as a part of existing and new urban settlements to accommodate diverse populations.

This paper demonstrates that knowledge on kampung resilience is relevant to the adaptation of existing urban settlements and the future development of new urban settlements. This paper contributes a clearer understanding of why kampung in Surabaya are not slums and establishes a framework that supports the development of kampung as a resilient and functional settlement type in current and future urban developments. Considering the large and rapidly growing populations who depend on kampung in the Southeast Asian region, this research is of considerable significance.

This essay investigates the role of WTO Member States’ political institutions in their decision to comply with adverse rulings. In the end, implementation of these rulings is a political act that Member States must undertake on their own. The decision to comply will thus be affected by domestic political pressures and institutions, including who wins and who loses if the decision is implemented, the locus of decision-making necessary to comply, and the overall structure of government. In this chapter, we explore the impact that domestic partisan preferences have on compliance rates among OECD countries. We construct a formal model of WTO implementation, predicting that when left-leaning parties, those who tend to favor protection for domestic labor and markets, control government, compliance rates should tend to fall. In contrast, right-leaning governments, those who weigh highly market access and returns to capital, should be more willing to comply with adverse WTO rulings. We test these hypotheses using data from WTO trade disputes involving twenty-five advanced industrialized countries and the European Union from 1970 to 2000, and find consistent support for our theory.

In transcripts obtained by the New York Times, senior executives with Texaco Inc. are recorded on tapes referring to black employees as “black jelly beans” and using racial epithets. A federal jury in Richmond, Va. found that Circuit City Stores Inc. systematically discriminated against black employees in promotions in its corporate headquarters. Employees working for an Avis Rent A Car franchise stated on the CBS news programme 60 Minutes that they were told not to rent to blacks. Several black secret service agents responsible for protecting the President agreed in 1994 to a settlement to end a class action law suit against Denny's Restaurants for being refused service and racial discrimination.

This paper aims to manage better the conflicts in labor disputes by improving the understanding of mediation dynamics from a game-theoretical perspective.

Signaling game model is adapted to a hypothetical labor dispute based on the legislative regulations on the mandatory mediation system in Turkey.

The paper determines mediation equilibria in which both players get positive payoffs. Analysis of the mediation equilibria helps to improve the understanding about the litigation and mediation dynamics depending on the variables. The variables are clearly separated from each other due to their reverse effects on strategy choices of the parties. Mediation payoff and litigation cost are characterized by their incentive effects on mediation preferences, whereas mediation fee and litigation payoff are characterized by their disincentive effect. While increasing amounts of incentive variables strengthen the mediation tendency of the employee, increasing amounts of disincentive variables reveal the opposite effect. Furthermore, the analysis also indicates that if the litigation payoff is too small to recover litigation costs, accepting the mediation becomes the optimal strategy. This prediction is contrary to that of traditional game-theoretic litigation/settlement models, in which small-claim disputes typically cannot be settled.

The assumption that the mediation fee is not a part of the litigation cost eliminates the disincentive effect of mediation fee and makes it neutral on the strategy choice of employee.

This paper first analyzes the strategic role of mediation in labor disputes by using a signaling game. Despite its mediation focus, the paper also provides practical insights for litigation.