Search results

This chapter examines the relationship between state failure, state-building and regional security through a thick qualitative and historical analysis of a single case: the Russia–Georgia relationship. Its principal finding is that the two sides’ conceptions of state-building contained incompatible identity projects that significantly increased the potential for conflict. This potential emerged in the context of a highly asymmetrical distribution of power in the region. The balancing strategies that Georgia pursued to compensate for this asymmetry aggravated the relationship further and were significant in provoking the August 2008 war between the two states. In making this argument, the chapter begins with a discussion of the relationship between state-building and security. It then turns to an account of the near failure and recovery of the two states and a discussion of the relationship between their state-building projects. It proceeds to situate this unit-level analysis in the regional systemic context. After a discussion of the war itself, the chapter provides concluding remarks on the implications of the conflict for regional security and for the wider discussion of state-building and security. The major implication is that, although state-building is seen as a domestic endeavour, the way in which the project is defined and develops has significant external and regional implications, which may enhance the potential for inter-state conflict. As such, international engagement should take account of the regional environment in efforts to foster the re-building of states.

Charles Tilly argues that continuous wars and preparation for wars motivated early European rulers to extract resources from their subject populations, thereby expanding states’ infrastructure and establishing mechanisms to enable negotiations with societies. State capacity was thus strengthened. Tilly's argument has inspired a wave of scholarship to reconsider state building in various regions of the Third World. Analysts of the Third World employ two theoretical elements inferred from Tilly to account for the failures of many Third World states. One is that without continuous international wars (as early modern Europe had), there would be no capable and effective states. The other element is that availability of foreign aid from the global powers so unique to the Cold War Era exempted Third World states from extracting resources from their societies. I call these analyses Tillian theories of the Third World.

Tillian analysts acknowledge that the capable state in Taiwan during the Cold War stood out from its Third World counterparts. However, the Tillian generalization of the Third World does not account for Taiwan's state-building path. Taiwan's experience is situated in a perplexity between the two variables above: On the one hand, Taiwan resembles early modern European state formation with high military expenditures and a huge standing army prepared for war. In the Tillian model, this condition enhances state capacity. On the other hand, Taiwan was a huge US aid recipient in the Cold War, second only to South Korea. In the Tillian model, this degrades the state's effectiveness, contrary to Taiwan's experience. Solving this puzzle will revise Tillian logics of state building. That, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, through literature review and presentation of empirical evidences, I suggest some analytical directions for future research to enhance our understanding of Taiwan's state-building trajectory in particular and of Third World states in general.

This paper aims to explore the state-building attempts in post conflict zones. The neoliberal economic system has dominated the key international organizations such that the latter have designed their approaches for state building based on it. The framework of these approaches focuses on minimal state interventions in the economy and free markets by being as a “one size fits all”. However, several prominent financial institutions such as the United Nations, World Bank and International Monetary Fund that have implemented some of these approaches in various regions resulted in limited success.

This paper is comparing two cases of state building before statehood and sovereignty, and this comparison comes in socioeconomic practices of international players and local governments.

This model has been carried out in Palestine and Kosovo but failed in meeting the expected demands of independence and prosperity. Instead, it resulted in more failures in the markets and caused a decline in the macro and micro economic indicators.

The key reasons for such failures, specifically in Palestine and Kosovo, are believed to be related to the top-down approach of policy-making, the lack of independence and sovereignty and the absence of popular and local participation in policies and plans. In such context, this approach has to be further revised to create a more inclusive participatory and representative model.

State building in pre-colonial sub-Saharan Africa is a much-neglected subject in historical sociology. This paper, which begins to close that gap accounts for state building and transformation in pre-colonial Yorubaland and highlights slavery, slave-taking, and other distinctive features of the Yoruba states. The paper argues that slavery and slave-taking affected warfare in the Yoruba states with remarkable consequences for the Yoruba state system. Furthermore, the paper applied some aspects of existing analytical approaches in historical sociology and comparative politics to elucidate our understanding of the role and limitations of warfare, slave-taking, and slavery in state development in pre-colonial Yorubaland.

The seminal literature on state formation proposes a model of “co-opt and expand” to explain the rise of centralized nation-states in modern and early modern Europe. Building on this literature’s distinction between direct and indirect rule, other analysts have expanded the scope of this model to explain patterns of state building in the non-Western world, particularly in the construction of centralized authority in postcolonial and postimperial contexts. According to this literature, the failure of central rulers to co-opt local elites has frequently produced weak states lacking capacities of rule in their peripheries. Using archival materials to examine the Albanian state’s relatively successful penetration of the country’s highland communities during its early decades of national independence, this article suggests that state building can proceed along an alternative path called “co-opt and bind,” in which state builders “bind” peasant communal institutions to the institutional idea of the nation-state to legitimize and implement state building goals. The article identifies three mechanisms used by early Albanian state builders to generate legitimacy and institute political order in its remote communities, including disarmament, the institution of new forms of economic dependency, and the invocation of peasant cultural codes of honor.

The aim of this paper is to examine the impact of frugal innovation in the fields of livelihood provision, education, infrastructure, and distribution networks on state-building in countries where a significant proportion of the population lives at the base of the pyramid (BoP).

The paper reviews the literature on frugal innovation, democratization and state-building, offers practical examples in support of the conceptual arguments, and provides research propositions for empirical assessment.

The paper provides support for the notion that the creation of more inclusive markets through frugal innovation contributes to socio-economic development, which in turn strengthens democratization and state-building.

Multinational corporations can have a positive impact on democratization by offering for-profit products and services to serve BoP markets.

The paper provides novel insights into the role that frugal innovation plays in state-building and democratization.

Informed by the literature on regional security and fragile states, ‘new regionalisms’, and natural resources and violent conflict, this essay investigates the challenges of state-building in West Africa. These range from the influence of diasporas and subregional strongmen to flows of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) and lootable natural resources. The analytical framework that links patron–client networks and lootable natural resources is applied to the cases of Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. In recent years, strategies by African leaders to co-opt subregional strongmen as part of patronage networks have failed. The essay finds that an ossified state presence and the erosion of a leader's influence enables subregional strongmen to gain control over valuable natural resources, such as diamonds. The essay then assesses the impact of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) on state-building, concluding that although international regimes like the KPCS can increase state capacity and thereby counter the deleterious effects of state failure, they are not sufficient state-building tools. Hence, the KPCS must be supplemented through a combination of more explicit state-building initiatives under the auspices of bilateral government donors, aid agencies, diasporas and transnational and local NGOs.

In the periods, following the First and Second World Wars, colonial states across the British empire underwent waves of reforms that were geared toward improving human well-being, from enhancing social conditions, such as health and education, to expanding opportunities for economic and political engagement. The literature on the colonial state typically traces these state-building efforts to the agency of European colonial officials. However, evidence from a historical analysis of Trinidad and Tobago reveals a different agent driving state reform: the colonized. A local labor movement during colonialism forced the colonial state to construct a number of state agencies to ameliorate the economic, political, and social conditions in the colony, thereby resulting in an increase in state capacity. This study, therefore, provides critical intervention into the colonial state literature by showing that the agency of the colonized, as opposed to just the colonizers, is key to state-building, and specifying the mechanisms by which the subaltern constrained colonial officials and forced them to enact policies that improved colonial state capacity.

Race has played a central role in state-building in Latin America. This chapter foregrounds the role of transnational racialization politics in bureaucratic development in the region in the late nineteenth century. Analyzing the transformation of the Bolivian diplomatic bureaucracy following the War of the Pacific (1879–1884), I argue that the circulation in Europe and the Americas of racial discourses on Bolivia that cast doubt on its place among the concert of civilized nations motivated its reform and expansion. This study suggests that, given the potential costs of transnational racialization threats, states across the region developed agencies and practices that expanded their capacity to manage their racialized national images among international audiences. Against the threat of racialized imperialism and colonialism, Bolivian liberal reformers envisioned a diplomatic bureaucracy capable of negotiating Bolivia's place in the global racial imaginary abroad. This study emphasizes the central role of the diplomatic bureaucracy as a condition of possibility in these projects and directs attention to the role of race in the development of state agencies less commonly associated with race, such as diplomacy.