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Many neo-Weberians adopt the state’s authority-monopolizing aim as their theoretical expectation. Through a case study of the Peruvian state and Lima’s squatter settlements, I provide evidence in support of the opposite contention: that states may unintentionally produce non-state extractive-coercive organizations. During the mid- to late-twentieth century, Lima’s population grew rapidly. Since they had few economic resources, the new urban poor requisitioned public lands and set up dozens of squatter settlements in the city’s periphery. Other researchers have identified several novel political phenomena stemming from such urban conditions. I focus here on the impact of the state. Using secondary and primary data, I examine three periods during which the state applied distinct settlement policies and one in which it did not apply a settlement policy, from 1948 to 1980. I find that when it applied each of the settlement policies, the state produced non-state political authorities – neighborhood elites – who extracted resources from squatters and tried to control neighborhood turf even against state encroachment, and that the state’s non-involvement did not produce them.

This article analyzes the decline of the Amsterdam squatters’ movement, examining not why the movement declined, but how. I argue decline is a critical moment for activists, one full of creative action. Decline is a defining moment through which the present, past, and future are interpreted. Narratives are key to understanding this process. As the movement emergence narrative declined, competing narratives of decline emerged. The widening chasm between the initial story and the movement's status compelled activists to choose between saving the movement or the narrative. I identify four critical moments during the movement's response to decline: they initially deny decline; after admitting decline, they debate tactics, followed by debating identities; and finally they demand decline as the only solution for the movement's problem. The movement moves through a process of increasing exclusion, working to resolve internal contradictions defined by the original narrative and identity.

This study examines the way the government of Kazakhstan confronted informal (squatter) settlements and their property in Almaty in 2006. It argues that the way the state handled the issue as part of a broader state economic strategy was neither appropriate for the aim of creating a functioning property market nor for advancing social justice and welfare. The analysis focuses on the attempted demolition of two informal settlements, Bakay and Shanyrak, and subsequent events, including (a) militant and political responses among the residents and their supporters, (b) the legalization campaign, and (c) the effects of the global credit crunch on construction and property market in Almaty. The goal here is to refine the claim to a connection between formal economy, state practice, and squatters' experiences.

The chapter aims to discuss the social housing history and urban renewal experiences in Turkey while pointing out similarities to and variegations from the urban policy trends in the global north in the postwar era. To carry out these discussions, the chapter focuses on the Karapınar Project in Eskişehir.

The chapter is built on an anthropological case study and a self-funded video documentary research that includes insights from local inhabitants, projects’ authorities, urban experts, and planners in order to show contesting claims and views about the renewal, new housing conditions, and economic consequences.

The Karapınar Renewal Project is a Mass Housing Administration (TOKİ) project which claimed to be a ‘welfare oriented’, ‘renewal on-site’, ‘social housing project’ aiming to turn gecekondu – squatter settlements – into a healthy neighborhood. Yet, these claims fail to meet their promises and only appear to mask the actual rent-seeking motivations of the project.

The chapter shows that large economic profits of the authorities create a significant contrast with economic burdens and dispossessions of the poor residents. The locals’ fears about the payments and concerns about changing living conditions are in sharp contradiction with the welfare claims of the state institutions.

The Karapınar Project uses the concepts of ‘social housing’ and ‘welfare state’ which are normally associated with policies of social democratic ideology. Yet, when looking into the reality, it becomes clear that the Karapınar Project shifted the meanings of these concepts and utilized them to create a space for legitimacy.

This paper considers whether the term patrimonialism can be applied to one racially bifurcated aspect of Australian history: the relations between ‘squatters’ and those with competing civil and property claims. From the perspective of white settlers, the power of pastoralists who acquired use rights over vast stretches of land in late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries represented a challenge to rural settlement, economic development, the right to vote, workers’ rights and parliamentary democracy.

From the perspective of Aboriginal peoples who held traditional ownership of pastoral lands, squattocracy began with armed conflict and ended with practices aimed at detailed government of their everyday life. More generally, as white settlers consolidated property rights to land, they expropriated Indigenous peoples’ capacity to govern themselves.

The paper concludes that there have been two distinct histories of patrimonialism in Australia. The Australian colonies were among the pioneers of ‘universal’ male and later female franchise in the nineteenth century; Aborigines gained (de jure) full citizenship only in the late 1960s. While the squatter’s patrimonial rule over white settlers was short-lived, that over some groups of Aboriginal people persisted for more than a century.

This chapter examines how religion and religiosity shape economic norms in Villa Israel, an urban squatter settlement in Cochabamba, Bolivia. In Villa Israel, residents share water with others to help overcome limited access to drinking water. Using a mixed methods approach, we draw on the results of ethnographic research and economic experiments. The analyses yield three key results. First, there were strong norms of generosity and charitable giving in the community. Second, religiosity was positively associated with generosity. People who adhered to Christian conceptions of charity and frequently attended religious services were more likely to give generously. While wealth was a limiting factor on some families' ability to give water, there was no evidence that the rich and poor endorsed different norms of fair giving. Third, the norms of fair giving varied in the context of the three most common reciprocal relationships in the community (family members, coreligionists, and neighbors). Compared with neighbors, exchanges between family members and coreligionists were relatively generous and permissive of self-interest. Based on these results, we conclude that the presence of strong Christian norms of generosity and fair giving is an important institutional mechanism for facilitating water reciprocity in this community.

Consideration needs to be given to the difference [that] the diversity of cities makes to theory.Robinson (2002, p. 549)

Dhaka is one of the most populated megacities in the world with a total population of over 12 million and an area of 276sqkm (DCC, 2004). The city is situated at the center of the country and is surrounded by a river system comprising Buriganga, Balu, Turag, and Shitalakhya. The city has a long history dating from the Pre-Mughal, to the Mughal, and, finally, to the Bangladesh period. The growth of Dhaka basically started from the current extreme south and along Buriganga River and then it expanded earlier to the West (Hazaribagh) and the East (Gandaria) and later to the North (Mirpur). However, in the last few decades, the city experienced huge population growth and rapid industrial, commercial, business, residential, and infrastructure development, which have significantly expanded the physical feature of Dhaka. Still many of the development activities are taking place in an informal way within the Dhaka City Corporation (DCC) area, the main part of the megacity.

This study explores the simultaneous transitions in Palestine/Israel and South Africa at the end of the 20th century through an analysis of the shifting geography of Johannesburg and Jerusalem. After analyzing the relationship between political, economic and spatial restructuring, I examine the walled enclosures that mark the landscapes of post-apartheid Johannesburg and post-Oslo Jerusalem. I conclude by arguing that these walled enclosures reveal several interconnected aspects of the relationship between neo-liberal restructuring and the militarization of urban space. They also exemplify different configurations of sovereignty under conditions of neo-liberalism and empire.

Purpose – Turkey has undergone a major market transformation during the recent decades. This chapter seeks to explore the role of religious politics in some Turkish informal workers' pro-capitalistic change of heart as a response to that transformation.

Methodology/approach – The study is based on participant observation and interviews in a squatter district in Istanbul, Sultanbeyli. This is a two-phase ethnography, consisting of first-hand observations first during 2000–2002, and then in 2006. The fieldnotes are supplemented by 90 interviews.

Findings – Islamic mobilization eases the transformation of habitus in a liberalizing society and the transition from the predominance of social capital to the predominance of economic capital. I contend that the sub-proletariat's dispositions depend on (urban as well as national) historical context and articulation to political and religious movements.

Originality/value of paper – I discuss Bourdieu's study of the transition from subsistence-driven economies to market economies. The chapter points out that Bourdieu's approach to the problem of transition is more satisfactory in comparison to modernization theory and resistance studies. However, I will show that the problems Bourdieu identifies in Kabylia and Béarn (such as “fatalism of despair”) are less salient in Istanbul because of a sociopolitical movement (Islamism) that garners consent among the sub-proletarians by using religion as a disciplining force.