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This chapter seeks to make the case that emotions are central in organising in schools and that the way members of staff oversee their emotion processes is crucial to the legitimacy of the institution. The logic of the case is simple, as follows. There are three forms of affect: feelings, moods and emotions. Feelings and moods are affective states, the description of which depicts our inner world. Emotions are very different. They entail a process in which an event of some kind is experienced and appraised. This appraisal results in physiological responses, psychological changes and social responses, which entail actions. The emotion process creates a state of action readiness and a motivation to act. The actions are manifestations of power and they may influence those who experience them. Because actions influence, they are leadership actions and are therefore central to organising processes. Actions may have a high affective content and may be experienced as an individual ‘emoting’, which typically increases the significance of the action experienced by others. Emoting can therefore change the influencing effect of an action. We may seek to defend ourselves from actions with a high affective content by means of social defences, which can take various forms. The social actions resulting from the emotion process and emoting are subject to a whole range of ‘rules’: personal, interpersonal, institutional and cultural. How well members of the school staff understand and oversee – manage – that emotion process in relation to these rules is crucial to the legitimacy of schools as institutions.

Launched in the early 1990s in the United Kingdom, Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) induced radical changes in both the public-private boundaries and the production of state-provided services. Such ‘budgetary revolution’ impacted the biggest state spender in capital expenditures, that is, the Ministry of Defence. Today many MoDs are expected to leverage on the British experience and develop their own approach of PPPs to overcome both the ineffectiveness of their defence spending and today’s stalemate in public budgets. This chapter leverages on British experiences over the past two decades to analyse the benefits and limits of PPPs in the realm of defence. Does such contractual arrangement fit defence-related investment? This chapter explores the on-going redefinition of public and private realms in military matters and it puts into relief the key dimensions of PPPs in terms of contractual arrangement.

The economic effects of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka are multifarious. A discussion of the economic effects of ethnic conflict could encompass the opportunity cost of the war (i.e., the foregone income due to the war at micro- and macro-levels), the economic impact of the military expenditures (on both sides of the war), financing mechanisms (both national and international) of the rebel movement, and the impact of economic sanctions on rebel territory. It should be noted that the economic effects of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is a relatively under-researched area (Arunatilake, Jayasuriya, & Kelegama, 2000; Goonetileke, 1998; Grobar & Gnanaselvam, 1993; Gunatilleke et al., 2001; Kelegama, 1999; O’Sullivan, 1994, 1997, 2001; Rankaduwa & Cooray, 1999; Ravano, 2001; Richardson & de Samarasinghe, 1991; Ross & Samaranayake, 1986; Seabright, 1986).

This chapter traces the history of global crime governance from the final decades of the nineteenth century to today, with particular attention paid to the United Nations and its crime programme after World War II. It highlights significant changes to the structure and mandate of the UN crime programme over the last 70 years and how UN agencies have helped shape the international crime policy agenda and its focus on development. The chapter then illustrates how vestiges of prevailing beliefs about development and crime and the global political economy that gave rise to them continue to influence the work of the UN system and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) today. In this regard, our analysis highlights some institutional and structural challenges inherent to containing the ‘dark side of globalisation’ together with the ways in which the UN's efforts to do so privilege the interests and understandings of Northern countries. We conclude that these power asymmetries represent an obstacle to the UN's custodianship of criminological targets that feature in the SDGs, but stop short of suggesting that the governance of the crime–development nexus should be viewed as a coherent, neo-colonial project given the institutional weaknesses within the UN system, the ‘Rise of the South’ and the potential for civil society to contest its priorities and agendas.