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1 – 10 of over 1000Mai Dao and Hongkang Xu
In this paper the authors aim to examine whether shareholder activism is associated with accounting reporting complexity (ARC).
Abstract
Purpose
In this paper the authors aim to examine whether shareholder activism is associated with accounting reporting complexity (ARC).
Design/methodology/approach
The authors employ ordinary least squares (OLS) and a sample of 19,530 firm-year observations (representing 3,377 unique firms) over the 2010–2019 period to test the prediction.
Findings
The authors find that firms with shareholder activism provide more complex accounting reporting. Further, both types of activism (including Concern & Dispute and Control & Discussion) are positively associated with ARC. The authors also find that the association between shareholder activism and ARC is more pronounced when the firms have a higher level of litigation risk and a higher proportion of institutional ownership. Collectively, the findings suggest that firms with shareholder activism may be under more pressure to disclose more accounting items, leading to more complex accounting reporting.
Originality/value
The study may be informative to regulators considering the costs and benefits of shareholder activism in financial reporting.
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Souha Siala Bouaziz, Ines Ben Amar Fakhfakh and Anis Jarboui
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of the relationship between shareholder activism and earnings management on the market performance of French companies.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of the relationship between shareholder activism and earnings management on the market performance of French companies.
Design/methodology/approach
This study used 385 firm-year observations drawn from a sample of French companies belonging to the SBF 120 index from 2008 to 2012. Data was collected from annual reports of sample companies. To measure earnings management, this study used the model of Raman and Shahrur (2008). The relationship between shareholder activism, earnings management and market performance using the panel data regression model was empirically examined.
Findings
The results prove that shareholder activism, as indicated by shareholder proposals, has no impact on market performance. However, the existence of shareholder activism affects the market performance positively. In fact, a minimum of proposals proves that shareholder activism plays an appropriate and effective role in creating value. Thus, several activists would resort to “a private activism” which could be the best and the least expensive form. This form of activism is called “behind the scenes.” Findings also show that earnings management has a negative impact on market performance. As a matter of fact, these findings allow to conclude that the firm performance decreases whenever managers undertake to earnings management. Also, earnings management behavior is mainly opportunistic. Finally, the relationship between shareholder activism and earnings management has no impact on market performance. This result reveals that shareholder activism proves to be an ineffective mechanism that does not alter the accounting choices, particularly in relation to earnings management. This result shows the inability of active shareholders to define and implement strategies across their proposals, namely, “the lack of monitoring competence.”
Research limitations/implications
It is important in future research to evaluate the impact of behind the scenes interventions on corporate governance. Also, this paper gives a larger dimension to the effect of shareholder activism on the market performance in the specific context of earnings management, thus justifying the need to expand this study using other methodologies to deepen and better understand this relationship in this context.
Practical implications
The paper's evidence contributes to an understanding of corporate governance. The finding of this study will help in monitoring and controlling fraudulent earnings management practices that effect on market performance. Further, this study is important to investors, academics and policymakers, as it demonstrates that governance reforms that encourage firms to adopt better governance practices that reduce the likelihood of earnings management.
Originality/value
To the best of the author’s knowledge, this paper pioneers in focusing on the impact of the shareholder activism and earnings management on the market performance because previous studies put more emphasis on pair-wise relations (Shareholder activism-earnings management, earnings management-market performance and shareholder activism-market performance). This study provides empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the relationship between shareholder activism and earnings management on market performance.
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Irina Berezinets and Yulia Ilina
This paper aims to deal with the issue of shareholder activism of private equity investors in public companies. The study identifies characteristics of target firms and investors…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to deal with the issue of shareholder activism of private equity investors in public companies. The study identifies characteristics of target firms and investors related to the likelihood of private equity activism. The research also examines whether shareholder activism strategy of private equity investors is associated with the better performance in future and value creation of target firms.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper applies econometric modeling to hand-collected data on private equity investments in listed companies, in the form of private investment in public equity and open-market share purchases, from eight Continental Europe’s countries for the period 2005–2014.
Findings
The findings indicate that the probability of shareholder activism is higher if the target firm’s industry corresponds to the private equity investor’s industry specialization, if the private equity firm is older, if the target is larger and the average ownership share purchased by the investor is higher. Conversely, the probability of shareholder activism is lower where a private equity firm invests in the target for the first time. A target firm with an activist investor has poorer operational performance results one year following the investment compared to a target firm with a passive private equity investor.
Research limitations/implications
Results from the analysis of transactions in Continental Europe countries with French and German legal origin may be not generalizable to other markets with the different legal tradition and institutional environment.
Originality/value
This research provides new empirical evidence on private equity activism in listed companies of Continental Europe. By distinguishing between active and passive investments, testing rarely considered characteristics to provide valuable insights and analyzing the effect of activism on the target firm’s performance, the study contributes variously to the still-limited body of literature on private equity activism in public companies with a governance structure based on concentrated ownership. The findings emphasize the relationship between shareholder activism and both target and investor’s characteristics from perspective of mitigating agency problem and value creation in target firms. By simultaneously investigating investments in public companies from several European markets, the study complements empirical evidence mostly obtained from studies of a single national market.
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Ambareen Beebeejaun and Jushveer Koobloll
“Shareholder activism works when shareholders understand something about the characteristics of the business that the board doesn’t”. As complex the term shareholder activism may…
Abstract
Purpose
“Shareholder activism works when shareholders understand something about the characteristics of the business that the board doesn’t”. As complex the term shareholder activism may seem, it demonstrates a very simple phenomenon of how shareholder take control of a situation to turn it in their favor. The whole world has taken an activism “twist” where every person has a word to say. The same characteristic of the society is showcased in this paper where engagement of shareholder is questioned whether it helps to promote effective corporate governance. Given the fact that Mauritius has a rather low shareholder activism framework, this research aims to depict the international picture of the issue at different levels to reach a consensus with the local market. It was a major challenge as very little research has been conducted to accurately contrast shareholder activism with corporate governance. However, the international standards aim at giving a clear picture of how the shareholder activism actually functions.
Design/methodology/approach
The research has adopted a black letter approach by analyzing relevant laws and legislations governing corporate governance matters in Mauritius and the USA, Malaysia, France and South Africa. Thereafter, a comparative analysis was made between Mauritius laws and the aforementioned countries. Recommendations were then put forward on the subject matter which is shareholder activism.
Findings
Research has shown development in corporate governance alongside the increase in shareholder activism. However, these research studies fail to prove that the development is because of shareholder activism itself. In fact, it could be because of increase in corporate intellects, removal of trade barriers, sustainable corporate practices and many such changes that have affected the corporate market somehow. Hence, it is difficult to conclude, with certainty, that the driver of good corporate governance is, in particular, the phenomenon of shareholder activism. Nevertheless, many result of shareholder activism has demonstrated a rather positive impact on the ongoing of the corporate dealings and on a personal note, it can be said that shareholder activism is a domain where much research and development should be effected as it represents a promising improvement in the way corporations are governed.
Originality/value
The concept of shareholder activism is quite new to the Mauritius legislation. There has not been research done on whether shareholder activism, particularly, is the reason for corporate success or failure. In this light, this paper aims to analyze shareholder activism practices in other countries and puts forward recommendation in the Mauritius context which may be of use to stakeholders concerned.
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Ambareen Beebeejaun and Pramod Kumar Bissessur
Shareholder activism is gaining popularity across the globe especially in today’s context where the option of giving up and selling shares to exit the company has become obsolete…
Abstract
Purpose
Shareholder activism is gaining popularity across the globe especially in today’s context where the option of giving up and selling shares to exit the company has become obsolete. Hence, the purpose of this research paper is two-fold, firstly, to investigate the extent to which the minority shareholders of companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Mauritius adopt and make use of the various tools of activism; and secondly, to compare the UK laws on shareholder activism with that of Mauritius.
Design/methodology/approach
To achieve these objectives, this study adopted the qualitative research method. Primary data was collected by conducting a survey on minority shareholders of Mauritian listed companies to figure out the extent to which they resort to activism tools, while secondary data was collected through a qualitative legal, document and content analysis to scrutinise regulatory provisions and existing literature on the researched topic.
Findings
The results show a moderate implementation level of shareholder activism by the minority investors in Mauritius although it was noted that minority shareholders are more likely to resort to the internal tools of activism rather than external methods. Further to the comparative study conducted, this research recommends a more active participation of the Mauritian regulatory bodies, amendments to the Mauritius Code of Corporate Governance and Mauritius Companies Act and the establishment of a commission responsible for overseeing the exercise of shareholders’ powers and promoting derivative lawsuits among minority shareholders.
Originality/value
Few researchers like Beebeejaun and Koobloll (2018) analysed shareholder activism through the lens of corporate governance with the view of providing recommendations to bring amendments in the Mauritian corporate law landscape. However, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, no research has yet been effectuated on the extent to which shareholder activism is practised by the minority investors in developing countries, for which this existing study aims at filling in the research gap.
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Pooja Sharma and Shikha Sachdeva
The genesis of “shareholder activism” in the USA may be traced back to several decades, but it only evolved in India at the start of the 21st century. This paper aims to explore…
Abstract
Purpose
The genesis of “shareholder activism” in the USA may be traced back to several decades, but it only evolved in India at the start of the 21st century. This paper aims to explore the concept of “shareholder activism” in the Indian context, in light of the New Companies Act, 2013. The act is envisioned as a precursor to invoking the intention of shareholders to confront managers. Further, it aims to look at the possibilities of using tools of shareholder activism to make companies aware of their concerns.
Design/methodology/approach
Authors explore the concept of shareholder activism with the help of textual analysis, using R. Then, the authors study the mediating effects of “shareholder’s intention towards activism” between the “regulatory mechanisms” and “the usage of various tools of activism”, using the partial least square approach.
Findings
Regulatory mechanisms, such as the Companies Act, 2013, enhance the shareholders’ power to sensitise companies towards various corporate governance issues. It also increases their intention towards shareholder activism, eventually leading to favourable opinion on using various tools of “activism” in their investee companies.
Practical implications
This study is a unique attempt to assess the minority shareholders’ potential to become active in their investee companies induced by changes in the rules and regulations of a country.
Originality/value
Shareholder activism in India has not been thoroughly explored thus far. This paper specifically studies the opinions of retail investors, who possibly could increase companies’ accountability towards their minority shareholders, especially in light of the New Companies Act, 2013.
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This paper aims to elaborate on the extent to which the Indonesian legal framework has provided room for shareholder activism and the extent to which shareholder activism has been…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to elaborate on the extent to which the Indonesian legal framework has provided room for shareholder activism and the extent to which shareholder activism has been implemented in Indonesia.
Design/methodology/approach
This study combines normative and empirical legal research methods. Indonesian laws and regulations are analyzed aside from the analysis of empirical data and court decisions on shareholder activism implementation.
Findings
Indonesian laws and regulations have accommodated shareholders’ activism and shareholders have started to rectify mismanagement and abuse of power that causes loss to the company through derivative lawsuits. Despite this, Indonesian shareholders are still passive, shown by the number of questions asked in the general meetings of shareholders despite the high attendance percentage. Shareholders have also formed associations to gather more influence on the company’s decision-making process.
Research limitations/implications
The empirical observation in this study was limited to LQ45 companies of the February to July 2021 period. This study can be useful to improve corporate governance and corporate communication in a company to encourage higher participation of individual/minority shareholders. This study also serves as an extension to numerous studies on shareholder protection, corporate governance and corporate law in Indonesia.
Originality/value
Study on shareholder activism in Indonesia is still rare, despite the rising urgency of company supervision and monitoring to prevent mismanagement. To fill in that gap, this research hopes to initiate discussion on shareholder activism in relation to shareholder protection, corporate governance and corporate law implementation.
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Chinyere Uche, Emmanuel Adegbite and Michael John Jones
The purpose of this paper is to investigate institutional shareholder activism in Nigeria. It addresses the paucity of empirical research on institutional shareholder activism in…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate institutional shareholder activism in Nigeria. It addresses the paucity of empirical research on institutional shareholder activism in sub-Saharan Africa.
Design/methodology/approach
This study uses agency theory to understand the institutional shareholder approach to shareholder activism in Nigeria. The data are collected through qualitative interviews with expert representatives from financial institutions.
Findings
The findings indicate evidence of low-level shareholder activism in Nigeria. The study provides empirical insight into the reasons why institutional shareholders might adopt an active or passive approach to shareholder activism. The findings suggest the pension structure involving two types of pension institutions affects the ability to engage in shareholder activism.
Research limitations/implications
The research study advances our understanding of the status quo of institutional shareholder activism in an African context such as Nigeria.
Practical implications
The paper makes a practical contribution by highlighting that regulators need to consider how the financial market conditions and characteristics affect effective promotion of better governance practices and performance through shareholder activism.
Originality/value
This study draws attention to the implication for shareholder activism of complexities associated with an institutional arrangement where two types of financial institutions are expected to operate and manage the private pension funds in a country.
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Jörn Obermann and Patrick Velte
This systematic literature review analyses the determinants and consequences of executive compensation-related shareholder activism and say-on-pay (SOP) votes. The review covers…
Abstract
This systematic literature review analyses the determinants and consequences of executive compensation-related shareholder activism and say-on-pay (SOP) votes. The review covers 71 empirical articles published between January 1995 and September 2017. The studies are reviewed within an empirical research framework that separates the reasons for shareholder activism and SOP voting dissent as input factor on the one hand and the consequences of shareholder pressure as output factor on the other. This procedure identifies the five most important groups of factors in the literature: the level and structure of executive compensation, firm characteristics, corporate governance mechanisms, shareholder structure and stakeholders. Of these, executive compensation and firm characteristics are the most frequently examined. Further examination reveals that the key assumptions of neoclassical principal agent theory for both managers and shareholders are not always consistent with recent empirical evidence. First, behavioral aspects (such as the perception of fairness) influence compensation activism and SOP votes. Second, non-financial interests significantly moderate shareholder activism. Insofar, we recommend integrating behavioral and non-financial aspects into the existing research. The implications are analyzed, and new directions for further research are discussed by proposing 19 different research questions.
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Carine Girard and Stephen Gates
This paper aims to demonstrate that state shareholders are confronted with contradictory logics leading to institutional contradictions that activist shareholders can exploit. The…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to demonstrate that state shareholders are confronted with contradictory logics leading to institutional contradictions that activist shareholders can exploit. The competing logics of the state as shareholder and their impact on corporate governance and shareholder activism offer fertile grounds for research advances in Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs).
Design/methodology/approach
Through an extensive literature review of state ownership, institutional contradictions and shareholder activism, this paper analyzes two case studies involving the French State as shareholder.
Findings
In the French context, these two cases illustrate how institutional contradictions result in opportunities for shareholder activism. By focusing on the institutional contradictions of the state shareholder, this investigation suggests a need for experimental research to observe how shareholder activists adapt to each institutional change in CMEs. This experimentation can help policymakers to avoid creating additional conditions that shareholder activists can exploit.
Research limitations/implications
This focuses only on France and its state shareholdings. To generalize results, studies of other CMEs and state shareholders are needed.
Practical implications
Policymakers should consider all legislative proposals for their potential to deviate from corporate governance practice by experimenting with them in a laboratory setting. Shareholder activists can compare state shareholders’ actions against the state’s legislation to emphasize institutional contradictions that counter minority shareholders’ rights.
Originality/value
This research is the first to analyze how the state as shareholder can exploit its competing logics to resist against shareholder activism and support management or to become itself a shareholder activist.
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