Search results

This chapter reviews the literature to contextualize the intervention in the post–cold war era characterized by the momentum of globalization dominated by informal actors beside the legal authority of the state. It indicates how these actors deviate the primary purpose of the humanitarian intervention and create an ungovernable environment of the state particularly when interventions are operated in countries endowed with natural resources. The case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) serves as a model to ascertain such phenomenon in which actors such as states involved in intervention come in collusion with shadow elites, lobbyists and multinational companies to establish clandestine networks of illegal exploitation and smuggling of natural resources. The chapter winds up by suggesting the redefinition of policies of interventions to keep humanitarian intervention in its primary mission while holding actors involved in illegal and smuggling of natural resources accountable.

Building on the first cross-national study that had demystified various assumptions about the worldwide use of shadow education two decades ago, we analyze data from the 2012 Programme for International Student Assessment to examine the cross-national pattern of the use of shadow education by families in 64 nations and use improved statistical estimation methods. Focusing on fee-paying out-of-school classes, we find a continued, and likely an intensified pattern of the cross-national use of shadow education in the contemporary world. Approximately about one-third of all 15-year-old students from 64 countries/economies across the world use this form of shadow education. Students of higher socioeconomic status, females, and students in urban areas and general programs are more likely to use fee-paying services, while families and students turn to these services to address academic deficiencies in general. In addition, students from poorer countries more extensively rely on shadow education than students from wealthier countries after controlling for other variables. Students in South-Eastern and Eastern Asian countries are more likely to pursue shadow education than their counterparts in many other regions. Implications of these findings for theories of education and society as well as for educational policy in relation to shadow education are discussed.

The Westminster Parliament is multifaceted, lacks cohesion and collective direction, appearing at times to challenge the very notion of a structured public institution itself. Within an environment with little collective identity, understanding who leads in the UK Parliament is challenging; there are multiple, contestable sites of leadership and governance. The purpose of this article is to explore the understudied concept of legislative leadership, to better understand what goes on inside the legislature. The author presents a decentred and nuanced disaggregation of “leadership as practice” in parliament, examining three faces of legislative leadership.

Interpretive approaches to studying legislatures have presented new impetus to research in this area and the author utilises such anti-foundationalism. The article draws on ethnographic research into “everyday practices”, conducted during an academic fellowship in the UK Parliament from 2016 to 2019, which involved privileged access to the parliamentary estate. The data used include observations, shadowing and elite interviews collected during the fellowship.

By looking at the legislature from the inside, the author can better understand elite behaviour. This helps to explain motives, daily pressures and performative skills deployed in displays of autonomous, decentred leadership. The legislative leadership the author observed was atomised and could be stretched to accommodate the incumbent office holder. There were multiple relationships both formally constituted and informally constructed, but little collaborative or consensus leadership.

This article fulfils an identified need to study leadership in legislatures – and in particular key elites – from the inside.

We argue that the United States has experienced a decline of economic, political, and military power since the 1970s, and that this decline can be attributed in part to the fragmentation of the American corporate elite. In the mid-twentieth century, this elite – constrained by a highly legitimate state, a relatively powerful labor movement, and an active financial community – adopted a moderate and pragmatic strategy for dealing with the political issues of the day. The “enlightened self-interest” of corporate leaders contributed to a strong economy with a relatively low level of inequality and an expanding middle class. This arrangement broke down in the 1970s, however, as increasing foreign competition and two energy crises led to spiraling inflation and lower profits. In response, the corporate elite waged an aggressive (and ultimately successful) assault on government regulation and organized labor. This success had the paradoxical effect of undermining the elite’s own sources of cohesion, however. Having won the war against government and labor, the group no longer needed to be organized. The marginalization of the commercial banks and the acquisition wave of the 1980s exacerbated the fragmentation of the corporate elite. No longer able to act collectively by the 1990s, the corporate elite was now incapable of addressing issues of business and societal-wide concern. Although increasingly able to gain individual favors from the state, the elite’s collective weakness has contributed to the political gridlock and social decay that plague American society in the twenty-first century.

Post 9/11 events not only exposed the visible and invisible aspects of the often intertwined self‐interest of political, economic and especially religious elites, but also presented a practical and ideological vacuum susceptible to “once and for all” opportunistic fantasies of ultra and Neo‐conservative, cum religious, fanatics. The purpose of this paper is to counter balance the constant flow of Neo‐liberal and religious‐fundamentalist propaganda that is having a destructive effect on hard‐won civil ideals and democratic freedoms.

This paper presents a study of the relationship between visible and invisible power in the context of a historical study of the great age of tolerance and co‐existence between Jews, Muslims and Christians. The paper uses Benvenisti's “double history” methodology to recover what is visible on the surface and the “buried history” of what is invisible to discern the implications the Spanish Convivencia has for contemporary debates over political and religious “purity”.

This paper discovers dangerous signs of a continuing ahistorical hubris amongst elites and others that denies the historical evidence for the possibility of mutual accommodations between political and religious communities. This paper locates the need to recover lost, or discounted, multiple histories and (in)visible portents of a future other than the triumphalism of Western, especially “exceptionalist” US interests.

This paper demonstrates the need for more research into the use/misuse of historical evidence within (in)visible power mechanisms designed to serve ideological and hegemonic interests.

In our uncertain age, this paper is notable for developing a historically grounded vision of a real‐politic new world order based on mutual accommodation and respect.

The relationship between changing geographies and the notion of citizenship is outlined. As well as focussing on the transformation of the nation-state, it is argued, it is necessary to concentrate on other kinds of geographical transformation. These include changing regimes of mobility, the privatisation of public space and the salience of belonging at the local level. The paper insists on the importance of geography (both material and imaginative) to the process of making up the citizen and this is illustrated through considerations of the ‘denizen’ and the ‘shadow citizen’ in relation to their various geographies. In each case issues of place and mobility lie at the heart of the process by which citizens and their other come to be defined and lived. Recognizing the geographical constitution of the citizen means thinking about the citizen not as a self-sufficient individual body but as a ‘prosthetic citizen’ who is a product of the assemblage of the body and the world.

This paper aims to examine how the globally mobile elite (GME) uses its capital and networks to create a perception that market-driven solutions to social problems are superior to the efforts of government and civil society.

Drawing on a number of emerging literatures, the authors introduce and develop the concept of the “perceived mobility of impact” and use the case of the “Bono effect” to illustrate how this phenomenon is enacted. The authors then employ a critical lens to challenge the consequences of this perceived mobility of impact.

Global elites use their mobility to generate network capital, which in conjunction with celebrity affinity for global humanitarian causes builds a self-reinforcing consensus and legitimizes market-driven solutions to social problems. While this approach may make the GME feel generous about their contribution, it raises questions about accountability and representation in shaping global social policy.

This paper contributes to the burgeoning literature on the GME, offering a unique critical perspective on their motives and actions, and introduces the concept of ‘perceived mobility of impact’.