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Most governments would profess either to having a model regulatory system for their markets or at least to having a proposal for a model regulatory system. The leading international grouping of securities market regulators, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), which comprises the regulatory bodies of almost 100 countries with day‐to‐day responsibility for securities regulation and the administration of securities laws, has devised a benchmark standard of regulatory best practice against which regulators around the world can reliably measure their operations' effectiveness.

The purpose of this paper, which is based on author's PhD study, is to assess the efficacy of Indonesia's credit card fraud prevention from a strategic point of view, using a model of payments fraud prevention practice developed by the author based on similar practices in the USA, the UK and Australia.

Primary and secondary data, particularly from the payments system of the USA, the UK, Australia and Indonesia were used. Such data were collected by means of literature reviews and in‐depth interviews with payments system professionals.

The author establishes that credit card fraud prevention practice in Indonesia is still at a lower level of robustness than those in the USA, the UK and Australia. Deficiencies in the credit card fraud prevention practice in Indonesia are indicated, inter alia, by a lack of reliable fraud data collection, management and distribution mechanisms as well as a lack of effective and efficient identity management practice. Deficiencies and weaknesses in the system should be identified and action taken to make it more consistent with credit card fraud prevention practices of other countries.

The paper sees credit card fraud prevention practice in Indonesia as a function of many factors which influence one another, based on which the analysis is built.

The purpose of this paper is to document and explore the perceptual motivations for voluntary and continued affiliation with a fitness industry register by its affiliates (“members”) and non-affiliates (“non-members”). The formation of fitness industry registers to impart self-regulation is a common global occurrence. Their sustainment, however, is reliant on the motivations and voluntary support of industry members. Limited work has been done in this area.

This qualitative study uses the interpretive research paradigm, involving semi-structured interviews with 12 Auckland, New Zealand, fitness centre managers, industry associations, New Zealand Register of Exercise Professionals (Reps NZ) and Fitness New Zealand. Lenox’s (2006) participation-contingent benefits framework provides the necessary lens to explore the perceptual motivations behind participation/non-participation by fitness centres with an industry self-regulatory system (i.e. Reps NZ).

Whereas participation-contingent benefits are perceived minimal, and exceeded by affiliation limitations, there is institutional congruence for industry regulation to exist, thus creating institutional pressures that encourage affiliation and retention. Whereas affiliates choose to absorb the associated inconveniences of affiliation to “support” Reps NZ, non-affiliates question the register’s regulatory form, choosing to avoid the affiliation costs and limitations.

This study lends further support that institutional development is crucial for inclusive, substantive and sustainable self-regulatory systems. Regardless of the perceived low return on participation-contingent benefits, industry self-regulation can be sustained if there is a desire by industry members to maintain the institutional notion that the regulation needs to exist.

The paper discusses the rationale for a widespread reliance on Codes of Conduct (CoC) in European crowdfunding through the lenses of economic theories of self-regulation. By analysing the institutional design of CoCs in crowdfunding, the paper illustrates the differences in their regulatory context, inclusiveness, monitoring and enforcement. It offers the first systematic overview of substantial rules of CoCs in crowdfunding.

A comparative case study of nine CoCs in Europe is used to illustrate differences in their institutional design and discern the economic purpose of the CoC.

The institutional design of different CoCs in Europe mainly supports voluntary theories of self-regulation. In particular, the theory of reputation commons has the most explanatory power. The substantial rules of CoC in different markets show the potential sources of market failure through the perspectives of platforms.

CoCs appear in various regulatory, cultural, and industry contexts of different countries. Some of the institutional design features of CoC might be a result of these characteristics.

Crowdfunding associations wishing to develop their own CoC may learn from a comparative overview of key provisions.

For governments in Europe, contemplating creating or revising bespoke crowdfunding regimes, the paper identifies areas where crowdfunding platforms perceive market failure.

This paper is the first systematic study of self-regulatory institutions in European crowdfunding. The paper employs a theoretical framework for the analysis of self-regulation in crowdfunding and provides a comparison of a regulatory context, inclusiveness, monitoring and enforcement of different CoCs in Europe.

Self-regulatory organizations (SROs) can be found in education, healthcare, and other not-for-profit sectors as well as in the accounting, financial, and legal professions. DeMarzo et al. (2005) show theoretically that SROs can create monopoly market power for their affiliated agents, but that governmental oversight, even if less efficient than oversight by the SRO, can largely offset such market power. We provide an experimental test of this conjecture. For carefully rationalized parameterizations and implementation details, we find that the predictions of DeMarzo et al. (2005) are borne out.

An analysis of two recent decisions concerning both the NASD and the NYSE involving determinations as to whether or not there are colorable claims that each SRO is acting in a “governmental” capacity.

This paper aims to outline the historic development of advertising regulation that governs food advertising to children in Australia. Through reviewing primary and secondary literature, such as government reports and research, this paper examines the influence of various regulatory policies that limit children’s exposure to food and beverage marketing on practices across television (TV), branded websites and Facebook pages.

This paper reviews studies performed by the food industry and public health researchers and reviews of the evidence by government and non-government agencies from the early 19th century until the present day. Also included are several other research studies that evaluate the effects of self-regulation on Australian TV food advertising.

The government, public health and the food industry have attempted to respond to the rapid changes within the advertising, marketing and media industries by developing and reviewing advertising codes. However, self-regulation is failing to protect Australian children from exposure to unhealthy food advertising.

The findings could aid the food and beverage industry, and the self-regulatory system, to promote comprehensive and achievable solutions to the growing obesity rates in Australia by introducing new standards that keep pace with expanded forms of marketing communication.

This study adds to the research on the history of regulation of food advertising to children in Australia by offering insights into the government, public health and food industry’s attempts to respond to the rapid changes within the advertising, marketing and media industries by developing and reviewing advertising codes.

Self-regulation skills, such as organisation, self-evaluation, personal elaboration, metacognitive attitude and strategic awareness are very important predictors of academic achievement. However, research has not studied in depth the factors that facilitate the use of good self-regulatory skills. The present research was intended to study the role of some factors that could affect these self-regulation skills, in particular depressive attitude and motivational beliefs. A group of 246 adolescents, aged between 14 and 18, were administered self-report questionnaires devised to test aspects underlying self-regulation. A preliminary factor analysis confirmed the centrality of the three-hypothesised aspects: motivational beliefs, depressive attitude, and self-regulation-skills. A path analysis revealed that there are important links between motivational beliefs and self-regulation and between depressive attitude and motivational beliefs. Some educational implications are discussed.

To discuss the implications of Information Memorandum No. 05‐65, issued on September 14, 2005, in which the NYSE's Division of Enforcement explains to the Exchange community its thinking on the meaning and virtues of corporate cooperation with regulators.

Discusses cooperation in the context of Securities and Exchange Commission Seaboard Report and the Department of Justice Thompson Memorandum; describes the eight standards of “extraordinary cooperation” in the Information Memorandum; and discusses pitfalls such as the lack of any guarantee that a member organization and the exchange will agree on what behavior constitutes extraordinary cooperation, the need to balance prompt reporting of a problem with the need for thorough investigation, and the problem that a member firm may feel pressured to waive attorney‐client privilege to earn “cooperation points.”

The Information Memorandum is noteworthy because it attempts to fit the concept of “creditworthy” cooperation into the framework of a self‐regulatory organization by defining a new goal of “extraordinary cooperation,” and also highlights some of the dicier aspects of the “cooperative” regime under which corporate America has lived for the past four years.

Provides helpful interpretation of NYSE Information Memorandum No. 05‐65 and its implications for a member firm that faces an investigation.

On December 17, 2003 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved an overhaul of the New York Stock Exchange’s (NYSE’s) system of corporate governance. After questions arose concerning the NYSE’s ability to discharge its self‐regulatory functions following the resignation of former Chairman and CEO Richard Grasso, Interim Chairman John Reed proposed new governance architecture including a newly independent Board of Directors and a separate Board of Executives designed to represent the NYSE’s various constituencies. The new architecture reflects an effort to strike a balance between an independent board of directors and the desire for input from the industry, i.e., self‐regulation. This new structure should not be seen as the SEC’s determination of the future of self‐regulation, but simply as the most recent step in refining and improving the self‐regulatory process at the NYSE and other marketplaces as well.