Search results

Risk-sharing is a crucial issue in order to evaluate the performance of a monetary union. By implementing conventional econometric techniques, this paper intends to estimate the degree of risk-sharing through the cross-ownership of assets within 11 European countries in the period 1971–2014. We show that risk-sharing has been increasing after the launch of the euro due to increased cross-ownership of assets. Nevertheless, we also show that despite the extreme needs for adjustment mechanisms as a reaction to asymmetric shocks in the EMU during the crises, the estimated market risk-sharing mechanism seems to have remained marginal in this period. We also show that the degree of asymmetry (potential benefits from risk-sharing) has declined with the start of the EMU, but it has sharply increased during the crises period. This implies that EMU countries have needed good functioning risk-sharing mechanisms during the crisis, while in this period their estimated performance does not seem to have improved. We interpret these results as the evidence of a missing element of the EMU that forced governments to intervene by means of fiscal policy to tackle the imbalances deriving from the financial crisis. Therefore, we conclude that the weakness in the risk-sharing has been one of the channels that allowed the global financial crisis to mutate in a sovereign debt crisis in the EMU.

The relationship between airline and airport is complex, fascinating, and wide open for new research endeavors. In Volume 6 of the series, we conducted the analyses of risk-sharing contract between airline and airport from numerical risk balance assessment and incomplete contract theory perspectives based on an interesting real example of risk-sharing contracts, the Noto Airport Load Factor Guarantee Mechanism (LFGM) contract in Japan.

In this chapter, we further advance the analyses of risk-sharing contracts, based on the real example of Noto LFGM contract, from the perspectives of game theory and principal-agent theory. The risk-sharing arrangements, such as LFGM contract, are relevant to the rapidly changing business environment in Asia’s aviation industries.

We conduct a two-stage game analysis. The first phase is the contract negotiation phase and the second phase is the effort-making phase after signing the contract. We show that the two parties can attain a Pareto optimal utility level by bargaining a simple linear risk-sharing contract in the contract negotiation phase based on the equilibrium effort levels in the effort-making phase.

The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of risk sharing and non-risk sharing instruments on both the profitability of Islamic banks and the economic growth of the country. This study also aims to improve the profit and loss sharing-based asset growth of Islamic banks.

The data for this study are obtained from the annual reports of all Islamic banks from Bangladesh using Bank scope database and annual report for the period of 1983–2014. The research uses Autoregressive Distributive Lag approach.

The findings reveal that risk sharing instruments are positively related to profitability and the economic growth of the country. This study also finds that non-risk sharing instruments play a predominant role in the profitability of the Islamic bank but are negatively related to the economic growth of the country.

Banks and other financial institutions need to pay greater attention to systemic risk created by risk transfer and apply risk sharing methods of financing more vigorously than has hitherto been the case.

This study will also contribute to the literature as relatively few Islamic financial literatures deal with the relationship between equity financing and profitability which may make a strong contribution to the area of Islamic finance.

Building a smart city is a necessary path to achieve sustainable urban development. Smart city public–private partnership (PPP) project is a necessary measure to build a smart city. Since there are many participants in smart city PPP projects, there are problems such as uneven distribution of risks; therefore, in order to ensure the normal construction and operation of the project, the reasonable sharing of risks among the participants becomes an urgent problem to be solved. In order to make each participant clearly understand the risk sharing of smart city PPP projects, this paper aims to establish a scientific and practical risk sharing model.

This paper uses the literature review method and the Delphi method to construct a risk index system for smart city PPP projects and then calculates the objective and subjective weights of each risk index through the Entropy Weight (EW) and G1 methods, respectively, and uses the combined assignment method to find the comprehensive weights. Considering the nature of the risk sharing problem, this paper constructs a risk sharing model for smart city PPP projects by initially sharing the risks of smart city PPP projects through Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) to determine the independently borne risks and the jointly borne risks and then determines the sharing ratio of the jointly borne risks based on utility theory.

Finally, this paper verifies the applicability and feasibility of the risk-sharing model through empirical analysis, using the smart city of Suzhou Industrial Park as a research case. It is hoped that this study can provide a useful reference for the risk sharing of PPP projects in smart cities.

In this paper, the authors calculate the portfolio assignment by EW-G1 and construct a risk-sharing model by TOPSIS-Utility Theory (UT), which is applied for the first time in the study of risk sharing in smart cities.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the welfare gains from risk sharing among African countries and regional groupings in Africa that are planning to establish monetary unions either in the short or longrun.

The paper empirically tested two hypothesis; potential welfare gains and unexploited welfare gains. It uses a utility-based measure to quantify the gains that would accrue from joining a risk sharing arrangement such as a monetary union. The regional groupings considered include the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC).

The results provide support for both hypotheses. Overall, the average potential welfare for AU, EAC, ECOWAS and SADC groups under full risk sharing are found to be 1.9, 2, 3.4 and 1.6 percent, respectively, each higher than the 1 percent estimated for the OECD countries and 0.6 percent for the 14-EU countries. The average unexploited gains are, however, even bigger for AU at 3.5 percent, ECOWAS at 8.6 percent and for SADC at 2.6 percent.

The finding of enormous potential welfare gains could partly reinforce the desire of the African countries to establish monetary unions. On the other hand, the paper provides insights to policy makers in designing policies to promote risk sharing given the finding that the unexploited welfare gains are on average still too low – implying that many African countries or groups still have very low risk sharing.

Previous studies on welfare gains and risk sharing have basically left out the African regional groupings and never related the issue of gains to the monetary union projects. Besides, previous studies focus on unexploited welfare gains at the expense of total potential welfare gains. Considering the two types, however, presents a more complete picture of total gains from joining any risk sharing arrangement such as a monetary union.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a risk-sharing model to coordinate the decision-making behavior of players in a cassava-based bioethanol supply chain under random yield and demand environment, so as to mitigate the yield and demand uncertainty risk and improve the bioethanol supply chain resiliency and performance.

The decision-making behavior under three models, namely, centralized model, decentralized model and risk-sharing model, are analyzed. An empirical test of the advantages and feasibility of the proposed risk-sharing model, as well as the test of yield uncertainty risk, risk-sharing coefficients and randomly fluctuating cassava market price on the decision-making behavior and performances are provided.

Though the proposed risk-sharing model cannot achieve the supply chain performance in the centralized model, it does help to encourage the farmers and the company to increase the supply of cassava and achieve the Pareto improvement of both players compared to the decentralized model. In particular, these improvements will be enlarged as the yield uncertainty risk is higher.

The findings will help decision makers in the bioethanol supply chain to understand how to mitigate the yield uncertainty risk and improve the supply chain resiliency under yield and demand uncertainty environment. It will also be conducive to ensure the supply of feedstock and the development of the bioethanol industry.

The proposed risk-sharing model incorporates the yield uncertainty risk, the random market demand and the hierarchical decision-making behavior structure of the bioethanol supply chain in the model.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the linkage between Islamic financing principles and economic growth (EG) by taking into consideration two Islamic Financing Principles: Risk Sharing and non-risk sharing separately.

The data for this study are obtained from the annual reports of all Islamic banks from Bangladesh using Bank scope database and annual report for the period 1984-2014. The research uses an Autoregressive Distributive Lags (ARDL) approach. For robustness, this study also employs a continuous wavelet transform approach.

The empirical findings reveal that the risk sharing instruments are positively related to the EG of the country. On the other hand, non-risk sharing instruments are negatively related to the EG of the country.

The dominant use of non-risk sharing-based financing has undermined the greater possibility of Islamic banking to contribute more to the EG of the country. Banks and other financial institutions need to pay greater attention to systemic risk created by risk transfer and apply risk sharing methods of financing more vigorously to achieve greater equity, efficient allocation of resources, stability and growth of the financial system and welfare of the society as a whole.

This study has advanced the knowledge by examining the issue of Islamic financing principles and EG. This is probably one of the first attempts to find the linkage between Islamic financing principles and EG by taking into consideration two portfolios: risk sharing and non-risk sharing separately and provide significant insights for policy makers, market players and academicians.

The relationship between airports and airlines is very interesting from an economics perspective, and analysis of this relationship is wide open for new research endeavors. For instance, airport and airline interactions can be viewed as a zero-sum game of deciding, say, airport landing charges, while at the same time both entities have an incentive making a joint effort to enhance their ability to generate passenger demand and to contribute to growing regional economies. Within this theoretical framework, their relationship consists of not only a binary choice of conflict or cooperation, but also suggests the possibility of complex mixtures of conflict and cooperation. While understanding the interdependence of airports and airlines is an important issue in transportation economics, research examining the complexity of airport and airline relationships is relatively new to the field. This chapter contributes to this research area, in part, by introducing one very interesting example of an airport and airline relationship that considers an element of conflict and cooperation. Specifically, this chapter examines the economic consequences of a risk sharing contract. Analysis of the risk sharing contract recognizes the relevance of microeconomic theories, such as contract theory and principal–agent theory and reveals how these concepts can be applied to traditional transport economics. Predictions of risk sharing between airlines and airports using these theories are derived using numerical examples. Findings reveal that the risk-sharing agreement based on the Noto Airport Load Factor Guarantee Mechanism (LFGM) contract enables the airport side and the airline side not only to share the monetary consequences of demand fluctuation, but also to secure air flights from a local airport to Tokyo, to jointly enhance their various demand-inducing efforts, and to increase their utilities in order to meet the common target they set in the contract. With the LFGM contract, both sides have consistently maintained the air transport network in a relatively low demand area for more than 10 years without significant outside financial assistance. The findings from this chapter also contribute to better understanding the complex relationships among aviation entities, to the recognition of importance and potential to design properly the airport and airline contract, and to the advancement of economic and public policy analysis of this sector.

This study aims to examine the nexus between CAMELS, risk-sharing financial performance and Islamic banks' stability. It also attempts to assess the conditioning effects of institutional quality in the relationship between risk-sharing contracts and the stability of Islamic banks.

The quantitative research design was employed using secondary data from 20 Islamic banks in six countries over the period 2007–2019. The study utilized the feasible generalized least squares method for the analysis.

The results indicate that not all CAMELS variables support the stability of Islamic banks. The musharakah contract induced stability of the banks, whereas mudarabah financing reduced it. The interaction between risk-sharing finance and the quality of institutions suggested that the mudarabah contract via institutional quality raises the stability of Islamic banks. On the other hand, the quality of institutions encourages the banks to offer more musharakah, but it leads to an increase in their risk-taking. We show the impact of changes in risk-sharing variables on stability amplified by institutional quality. The results were robust when alternative measures of stability were used.

Various stakeholders in banking activities could learn from the results of this study. Islamic banks could improve their positions in terms of screening for risk-sharing financing. They could also leverage more on musharakah, as it promotes stability and could generate more returns for the banks. The mudarabah financing can be improved if there is a proper evaluation of entrepreneurs. Policymakers would learn more about the importance of institutional quality, as it provides a friendly environment for both mudarabah and musharakah businesses to thrive. This could increase the participation of Islamic banks in the real economy.

Previous studies concentrated on the effects of CAMELS on the profitability of Islamic banks. This study shows that CAMELS alone might not necessarily capture the financial performance of Islamic banks. Therefore, the risk-sharing financing variables are included alongside CAMELS to determine their effects on stability. Second, unlike the past research, this study used the quality of institutions to moderate the nexus between risk-sharing financing and the stability of Islamic banks.

Can standard business cycle methodology be applied to China? In this chapter, we address this question by examining the macroeconomic time series and identifying dimensions in which China differs from economies (such as Canada and the United States) that are typically the subject of business cycle research. We show that naively applying the standard business cycle tools to China is no more ridiculous than applying it to Canada, although the dimensions along which the model struggles is different. For China, the model cannot account for the low level of consumption (or high saving) as a proportion of income observed in the data. An examination of provincial level consumption data suggests that the absence of channels for intranational consumption risk sharing may be an important reason why the business cycle model has trouble accounting for Chinese consumption and saving behavior.