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The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of the political partisanship of government in charges of returns on the European stock markets. The authors found a large body of research investigating this issue for the case of US stock market but less evidence for the European stock markets.

The authors employ a panel data model with fixed-effects and an additional dynamic panel model using the bias-corrected LSDV estimator on a data set consisting of monthly and quarterly data. The data range from 2000 to 2010 and cover 20 European Union (EU) countries. The authors test several hypotheses, and run distinct regressions using political, financial, and economic variables. The authors also divide the data set into two sub-samples in order to reveal the distinctions between advanced and emerging economies in the EU.

The authors find that stock markets perform better under right-wing administrations. The result is consistent for the advanced EU economies, but the authors found no robust evidence in that sense for emerging countries. Additionally, the authors show that European stock market preferences for right/left-wing administrations is not necessarily related to the beliefs about the size of unemployment, inflation, deficit, and/or debt, which opens the field for further research in this area.

The study contributes to existing knowledge. It examines if Wall Street folklore, asserting for many decades that stock markets perform better under right-wing governments, also holds for European stock markets given the distinctions in the political and financial systems between USA and Europe. Moreover, the authors underline the introduction in the analysis of the Central and Eastern European countries.

The 2006 General Assembly adoption of the United Nations (UN) Global Counter-terrorism strategy marked the first time all member states ratified a collective counter-terrorism (CT) agenda. Building on the 2000 Millennium Development Goals, the strategy incorporated Amartya Sen's capability-based approach to development. This promised human-oriented and holistic methods for countering terrorism and violent extremism, in contrast to the post-2001 ‘hard security’ context of the United States–led Global War on Terror (GWOT). Although the first pillar of the strategy emphasised human rights and social progress over isolated economic growth, poverty, violence and retrogression in conflict zones since 2006 have led to the deaths of millions. Combined with resource scarcity and environmental devastation, insurgency-related conflicts have resulted in 70 million people displaced worldwide in 2019, while the politically violent phenomena of extreme right-wing nationalism and neo-jihadism remain prevalent. Reflecting on the social and economic outcomes of the GWOT, this chapter evaluates development-related discourses and activity in UN-led initiatives to counter and prevent violent extremism and terrorism. In doing so, it accounts for the impacts of UN CT measures on contemporary patterns ‘in phenomena described in policy arenas as ‘violent extremism’ and ‘terrorism’, including ‘neo-jihadism’ and right-wing extremism, in Global North and Global South contexts.

This chapter examines interlocks among the governing boards of 12 leading policy-planning organizations and changes in the structure of this network between 1973 and 2000. Methods of multidimensional scaling and hierarchical clustering are used to construct topographical maps of the pattern of interlocks among policy-planning groups and their change over time. In contrast to the findings on corporate interlocking directorates, the study shows that board interlocks among policy-planning organizations are substantively meaningful and relatively stable at the dyadic level, although several changes in the topology of the network are also found. In all three decades, big-business “moderate-conservatives” like the Business Council and the Business Roundtable occupied the most central locations in the network. In the 1970s these organizations were linked with the “corporate liberals” to form the core cluster of the policy network. In the 1980s and 1990s the corporate liberals became relatively isolated from the core and their places were taken by several conservative groups. There was also a sharp rise in the cohesion of the network in the late 1970s and 1980s – a period that is widely seen as one of conservative political mobilization and heightened political unity among business elites. These changes in the structure of the policy network are consistent with and help to account for the rightward shift in U.S. state policy during this period.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse work‐family reconciliation policy during the Sarkozy presidency in France, assessing the extent to which Sarkozy's injunction on the French to “work more to earn more” has provided a new frame for policy in this area.

The paper analyses the policy debates and initiatives concerning work‐family reconciliation in France since 2007 and seeks to identify the frames of reference concerning the problems of and solutions to combining paid work and parenthood which have structured this policy process.

The change in employment policy away from work‐sharing and towards activation of previously economically‐inactive groups has influenced work‐family reconciliation policy in that both incentive measures (creation of more collective and subsidised childcare places) and coercive measures (reduction of the length of parental leave benefits) have been put in place or debated in order to increase the number of mothers of young children in the labour market. Feminist discourse has been used to justify proposals for the reduction in length of paid parental leaves representing an example of “triangulation” in which right‐wing governments invoke left‐wing ideology to defend policy.

The present analysis emphasises the importance of incorporating the influence of the frames of reference which inform employment and poverty‐reduction policy into explaining approaches to work‐family reconciliation policy in France.

This article represents the first examination of work‐family reconciliation policy in France under President Sarkozy and emphasises the importance of incorporating employment‐related frames of reference in explaining work‐family reconciliation policy in the country.

This paper aims to explore right wing populist government responses to the coronavirus pandemic.

This paper is a narrative overview of right-wing populist policies and strategies, which is loosely structured around fascistic themes set out in Albert Camus’ allegorical novel, The Plague.

Although individual responses to the coronavirus pandemic among right-wing populists differ, they appear to coalesce around four central themes: initial denial and then mismanagement of the pandemic; the disease being framed as primarily an economic rather than a public health crisis; a contempt for scientific and professional expertise; and the “othering” of marginal groups for political ends. Populist responses to the pandemic have given rise to increased levels of xenophobia, the violation of human rights and the denigration of scientific expertise.

This is a narrative overview from a personal viewpoint.

Drawing on themes in Camus' novel The Plague, this is a personal perspective on right wing populist government responses to the coronavirus pandemic. Populist responses to the pandemic have given rise to increased levels of intolerance and xenophobia and the violation of human rights and civil liberties.

Welfare state retrenchment in advanced industrialized countries seeks to expand market-like logics in public services, based on the assumption that public services benefit from non-state initiative and competition. This logic gained a stronghold in policymaking, but its implementation nevertheless struggled to find acceptance. Public university tuition is one such case where policymakers aimed to increase investment in human capital through cost sharing. While students in some countries accept them as a necessary evil, opposition arises in others. Students in Germany and Turkey took to the streets in support of tuition-free higher education. Despite differences in their political contexts and the differential mediating role political culture plays, student mobilization reversed right-wing parties' policies. This article focuses on how opposition to tuition policies is covered by the news in both countries. Using a mixed-methods approach combining topic modeling with qualitative analysis, I show that student protests and tuition policy discussions are reported separately. In both countries, student protests involving confrontation were highlighted whereas reports on institutional actors dominated policy discussions. However, when movements pressure political parties to “own” an issue in their platform, party endorsement subsequently amplifies issue salience even if movement organizations and parties are not covered together by the media. This indicates an indirect effect of movements' collective action on news coverage. Political party endorsements mediate the amount of coverage movement issues receive. This finding provides insights into how opposition to welfare state retrenchment might navigate difficulties in closed media cultures that heavily favor institutional actors.