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Purpose: This chapter examines how two basic rights, freedom of expression, and the right to equality based on one’s dignity, reputation, and honor, were balanced in a case involving a stand-up comedian and an adolescent suffering from Treacher Collins syndrome. Methodology/Approach: The case is contrasted with Jürgen Habermas’ concept of the public sphere and with the intrinsic and utilitarian values that Canadian courts have attributed to free speech. Findings: Because the case was dealt with first in a human rights tribunal and then by a court of appeal, a number of considerations were overlooked in court proceedings: how laughter occurs; the broadening of Ward’s audience and its consequences; and Ward’s publicity strategy. These aspects are explored here to give a more complete picture of the case beyond the court decisions. Originality/Value: In Canada, freedom of expression is usually dealt with ordinary courts. A whole new avenue for dealing with this right is human rights bodies and tribunals. Contesting free speech in the name of defamation is being replaced by rights entrenched in human rights charters, such as the right to equality based on the preservation of one’s dignity, reputation, and honor.

The meaning of justice and dignity have changed over time, as has the idea of a normative or moral ‘foundation’. Given that justice and dignity are commonly ascribed foundational roles in practical philosophy, this chapter charts important changes in these concepts and changes in how they have interacted. The ideas of rights and status capture the most persistent points of interaction between justice and dignity. However, because rights and status are themselves unstable concepts, and because both rely upon contextual theories of freedom and the state for their meaning, no simple reconciliation between justice and dignity as foundations is possible. In sum, we cannot treat justice and dignity as equally foundational if foundational is taken to mean the final determinant of our obligations.

The central thesis developed during this study is the idea that human dignity must be understood as the right to be recognised as a participant in the institutional practice of human and fundamental rights. This form of association between human dignity and human rights is a response to the various barbarities of the twentieth century, whether by fascist, Nazi, and socialist regimes in Europe, either by South African apartheid or by military dictatorships in Latin America. Human dignity after Auschwitz is the foundation for the construction of a post-metaphysical institutional morality, independent of an idealised concept of rational subjective personality and closer to the historical and material conditions to guarantee the political personality of every human being. In order to defend this thesis, the study is conducted in two steps. First, two conceptions of dignity will be discussed, namely dignity of man and human dignity. Second, it is intended to discuss how the modern conception was incorporated into the practice of human rights after Auschwitz as a way of responding to a crisis in the modern model of the practice of rights.

Human dignity is perceived dually, as active dignity when people dare in pursuit of a life worth to live, and as passive dignity because they are human beings. A human is regarded as “a being interrelated with”, not as an individual, in Japan. Person, human rights, body, and life are in reality supports of human dignity. Traditional Japanese could compensate for such ignorance of the essential concepts in their own ways. One must live in between “a being interrelated with” and an individual, being aware of one's own responsibility. Here lies the basis of human dignity.

Discussions about the dignity of human beings often focus on violations of a person’s dignity that are performed by other persons. However, human beings can also violate their own dignity or at least they can expose it to a violation by others thoughtlessly or intentionally. In his Metaphysics of Morals, Kant states that ‘[o]ne who makes himself a worm cannot complain afterwards if people step on him’. Kant presupposes that persons can infringe or even forfeit their own dignity – for instance through servile behaviour – and that violating one’s own dignity is a violation of a duty towards oneself. Starting from the tension between dignity in terms of honour and worth in current debates and in Kant’s own thinking, as well as between understanding dignity as absolute or relational, I develop a comprehensive account of dignity as a duty to oneself. The author argues for a twofold obligation towards oneself to respect one’s own dignity: (i) a duty (as the necessity of an action done out of respect for the moral law) to respect one’s authority as an autonomous person in the Kantian sense; and (ii) beyond the Kantian framework – an obligation arising from the practical necessity that follows from one’s self-understanding as a self-determined, self-expressive individual personality in a socio-cultural context. Finally, the author outlines the consequences of the idea of ‘making oneself a worm’ for the concept of dignity in the realm of rights by discussing why, even though persons can behave like worms, others ought not to step on them.