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Resistances of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO) to the construction of gendered religious nationalism are addressed. The implications of such resistances and redefinitions of gendered religious nationalism for the women’s movement in India and transnationally are also assessed.

Semi-structured interviews with leaders and/or key informants of purposively selected organizations in the state of Gujarat serve as the primary data for the chapter. Using a grounded theory approach, the study is a qualitative analysis of the interviews and a reading of major published documents, unpublished reports, and internal reports of the NGOs that were made available.

The analysis discerns three main frames deployed by NGOs in resisting attempts by the state to construct nationalism: Communal Harmony (Not Communal Violence), “Endangered” Woman and Gender Mainstreaming. The “communal harmony, not communal violence” frame views women as an ungendered part of their communities. Although women are made central to the religious violence and struggle, they are viewed as passive persons without rights. This passive frame is the “endangered woman” frame. But women’s groups and NGOs addressing the violence have actively sought to emphasize the gender aspect of all formal and informal political activities. This is the “gender mainstreaming” frame. However, the mere visibility of women in political discourse should not be confused with the feminist framing of women’s rights or mainstreaming women’s issues.

The analysis brings an organizational agency perspective to consider resistance to the gendered basis of the violence perpetrated and embedded in nationalism.

All religious activists appear to look alike, and indeed are treated by the news media as one in the same. However, many variations exist. On one level, different activists choose different tactics. Terrorism is only the most extreme (and the rarest) form of public action. Other activists utilize media campaigns, public intimidation and democratic choice (by putting forward candidates in elections). On a more basic level, great differences exist in the desired outcome of the struggle itself and in the degree to which religion is central to the conflict.

The monograph argues that American racism has two colours (white and black), not one; and that each racism dresses itself not in one clothing, but in four: (1) “Minimal” negative, when one race considers another race inferior to itself in degree, but not in nature; (2) “Maximal” negative, when one race regards another as inherently inferior; (3) “Minimal” positive, when one race elevates another race to a superior status in degree, but not in nature; and (4) “Maximal” positive, when one race believes that the other race is genetically superior. The monograph maintains that the needs of capitalism created black slavery; that black slavery produced white racism as a justification for black slavery; and that black racism is a backlash of white racism. The monograph concludes that the abolition of black slavery and the civil rights movement destroyed the social and political ground for white and black racism, while the modern development of capitalism is demolishing their economic and intellectual ground.

The purpose of this paper is to review the book, Why America's Top Pundits Are Wrong: Anthropologists Talk Back.

The author, himself an anthropologist, evaluates how a group of anthropologists responds to popular right‐of‐center pundits.

Why America's Top Pundits Are Wrong: Anthropologists Talk Back is just as instructive for what it reveals about the current condition of anthropology – and, for that matter, left academia – as for what it says about the lack of anthropological sophistication in popular books that purport to tell us what is right or wrong with the world and where it is heading. Freighted with postmodernism, the influence of Michel Foucault in particular, present‐day anthropology makes assumptions not unlike those of the Straussians of the far right. Thus, our left‐of‐center anthropologists have trouble locating what is so objectionable about reactionary conservatism and, at the same time, difficulties in assessing social conditions, both at home and abroad. The author ends with sketching an anthropology that would pay more attention to the psychological and environmental costs of globalization.

Notes that the 12 contributions dispense with academic jargon and try to reestablish a public presence for anthropology – a format which may reach a wider public.

The purpose of this paper is to apply five models of conflict negotiation (power‐based, interests‐based, needs‐based, dignity model and comprehensive systemic) to Hindu‐Muslim religious conflict in Ahmedabad city, India and assess their relative applicability.

The general principles of each of the five models of conflict negotiation are first laid out from literature review. The principles are then hypothetically applied to resolve the contextual particularities of the Hindu‐Muslim conflict that occurred in 2002 in Ahmedabad city, India.

The comprehensive systemic approach is a good model to be used as a diagnostic tool for assessing the Ahmedabad conflict. Following that diagnosis, however, a combination of the need‐based and dignity model is useful in effectively negotiating the conflict.

This article creates awareness about the advantages and drawbacks of popular models of negotiation; this will enable negotiators to adopt a more realistic approach while negotiating conflicts in the field. The paper recommends that, while trauma, emotions and fears are real, so are destruction of property, livelihood and resources – peace cannot be long‐term unless negotiation addresses questions of subjective as well as material violations by raising questions of distributive justice.

This article indicates that conflicts are complex processes rooted in particular places and hence negotiation should be contextual and experiential. Through a comparative evaluation of different approaches the paper provides a tool kit. However, it also elucidates how reality may require negotiators to be more spontaneous and hence adopt mix‐models.

In 1967, Robert N. Bellah famously argued that there existed an “American Civil Religion,” which was distinct from churchly religion and captured the “transcendental” dimension of the American project. In this chapter, I revisit the civil religion concept and reconstruct it along more Weberian lines. Specifically, I argue that the civil religion tradition is one of three competing traditions for thinking about the proper relationship between religion and politics in America; the other two are religious nationalism and liberal secularism. Whereas liberal secularism envisions a complete separation of the religious and political value spheres, and religious nationalism longs for their (re)unification, civil religion aims for a mediating position of partial separation and productive tension. Following Bellah, I argue that the two central strands of the civil religion tradition have been covenant theology and civic republicanism. The body of the chapter sketches out the development of the tradition across a series of national foundings and refoundings, focusing on the writings of leading civil theologians from John Winthrop and John Adams through Abraham Lincoln and John Dewey to Martin King and Barack Obama. The conclusion advances a normative argument for American civil religion – and against liberal secularism and religious nationalism. I contend that liberalism is highly inclusive but insufficiently solidaristic; that religious nationalism is highly solidaristic but insufficiently inclusive; and that only civil religion strikes a proper balance between individual autonomy and the common good.

This chapter provides a cross-cultural look at the intersection of religion and the state with a focus on social control, social movements, political authority, and legitimacy. To better understand the complexities of governance, this chapter examines state social control of religion with a specific focus on the effects of that control on society. State leaders often seek to control and use the power of religion to gain legitimacy, authority, and control over citizens. Conversely, religious leaders sometimes seek to engage and even control the power of the state. This chapter highlights some of what happens when religious leaders directly engage in politics and challenge the social control mechanisms of political authority.

At times religious majorities seek not only to participate in the public square, to make policy, but also to exercise complete control of political and cultural institutions. In many nations, from Christians in the United States to Buddhists in Myanmar, some religious and government leaders share the goal of complete religious control over their societies. What happens to the religions and to the society when these religious and government leaders are successful? What happens to the religion when a state controls, supports, and promotes that religion? This chapter uses the case histories of the repression of the Muslim minority by the Buddhists nationalists in Myanmar and the desires of the United States Christian Dominionists goals to illustrate and highlight the way that the twin powers of the state and religion serve as direct agents of social control by transmitting values of each institution through law, policy, and by punishing those who deviate.

This conceptual paper aims to contribute to the growing literature around the “politics of heritage” by focusing on India which has a multifaceted society with several layers of religious culture and history.

The work is based on an extensive review of the literature and philosophical discussions relating to the politics of heritage tourism and the political dimensions of nationalism and ethnicity from an interdisciplinary perspective.

The main purpose of this conceptual paper is to develop hypotheses. Hence, the study asks: How does postcolonial India reconstruct its past and how are religions represented as part of the national image and for the purpose of tourism promotion? How tourism and religious heritage support a broader secular dreamscape of harmonious cultural nationalism in India? Considering all allegations for supporting the Hindutva movement (who considers Hinduism to be the source of India’s “essential” identity and believes it alone can provide national cohesiveness) by the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government in India, it is worth examining if there are any subtle changes to the tourism agenda created by the new government and the ambivalence surrounding it. Is there any place for the “foreigners” (Muslims and Christians) in Hindutva political ideology? Future scholars can analyze how tourism promotional material represents three major religions in the country by the current Indian Government (i.e. BJP) in its official tourism website: www.incredibleindia.org. This will take “politics of heritage” studies to a different trajectory, as analysis of web media has emerged as a critical medium in understanding numerous social processes.

The paper draws on a wide range of seminal work by scholars of nationalism and ethnicity over the past few decades, but it cannot be comprehensive.

The paper’s originality lies in its novel approach to an understudied aspect in tourism studies (i.e. politics of heritage) and providing suggestions for future research.

In 1967, Robert N. Bellah famously argued that there existed an “American Civil Religion,” which was distinct from churchly religion and captured the “transcendental” dimension of the American project. In this chapter, I revisit the civil religion concept and reconstruct it along more Weberian lines. Specifically, I argue that the civil religion tradition is one of three competing traditions for thinking about the proper relationship between religion and politics in America; the other two are religious nationalism and liberal secularism. Whereas liberal secularism envisions a complete separation of the religious and political value spheres, and religious nationalism longs for their (re)unification, civil religion aims for a mediating position of partial separation and productive tension. Following Bellah, I argue that the two central strands of the civil religion tradition have been covenant theology and civic republicanism. The body of the chapter sketches out the development of the tradition across a series of national foundings and refoundings, focusing on the writings of leading civil theologians from John Winthrop and John Adams through Abraham Lincoln and John Dewey to Martin King and Barack Obama. The conclusion advances a normative argument for American civil religion – and against liberal secularism and religious nationalism. I contend that liberalism is highly inclusive but insufficiently solidaristic; that religious nationalism is highly solidaristic but insufficiently inclusive; and that only civil religion strikes a proper balance between individual autonomy and the common good.