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When post-secondary education (PSE) in Africa is viewed in terms of growth rather than total enrolment the region tops the list of impressive trends. Between the years 1985 and 2005 the countries of sub-Saharan Africa experienced the largest growth of PSE involvement of any region with total enrolment increasing fourfold. The insatiable student demand is being met by a proliferation of large-scale and small-scale religious denominations establishing post-secondary education. The current chapter provides a categorical, multi-levelled analysis of the growth of religious providers in sub-Saharan Africa. Particular attention is given to the activities and rationales of stakeholders who play a part in the establishment and continued operations of religious PSE. Using Marginson and Rhoades’s (2002) glonacal agency heuristic, the networks between stakeholders and their varying degrees of influence on regional PSE are described and discussed. The findings suggest that PSE in the region is being widely provided by small-scale denominations establishing religious training institutions. But the influence of this PSE is mainly limited to local communities.

The purpose of this paper is to use international survey data to investigate the effects of religiosity, religious denomination, communist heritage, and socio-economic development on work values.

First, religiosity and work values are conceptualized. Next, the relationships among these concepts are discussed and the hypotheses, variables, and data are presented. Finally, the results of the empirical tests are presented and the theoretical and managerial implications, as well as avenues for future research, are discussed.

It is found that socio-economic development negatively, whereas religiosity and communist heritage positively, influence extrinsic work values. Further analysis reveals that religiosity has a quadratic relationship with intrinsic work values. Conspicuously, after controlling for the effects of religiosity, no significant association is found between religious denominations and work values.

The current analysis relies only on national/societal level data and overlooks the effects of independent variables (religiosity and communist heritage) at the individual level. Furthermore, the methodologies and measurements of religiosity and work values are of a limited scope. Thus, future studies may look into the effects of religiosity on work values at the individual level and apply other conceptualizations and measures to test the validity of the results.

Based on the findings of this study, it can be suggested that the use of intrinsic rewards might be less appropriate in the societies marked by communist heritage or high religiosity. On the contrary, these societies may embrace more extrinsic work values associated with direct, restrictive, and tangible aspects of work.

This study contributes to the literature by conceptualizing, measuring, and incorporating various variables into the research design and by providing original insights into the influence of religion on work values. Furthermore, this study suggests that, at least with regard to work values, religiosity (the strength of one’s conviction for their religion) is more important than religious denomination (Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam, Orthodox Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism).

The purpose of this paper is to analyse to what extent religious beliefs, understood as part of an individual ' s cultural background, can explain an individual ' s willingness to work. In particular the paper links individuals’ willingness to increase their working time with their religious denomination and their religious commitment. This relationship is studied in six European countries that have different religious structures: two countries with two significant religious groups (Germany and France), two Catholic countries (Ireland and Poland) and finally, two Lutheran states (Norway and Sweden).

Using data provided by the International Social Survey Programme 2007 – “Leisure Time and Sports” module [ISSP-2007], the paper estimates ordered probit models for each country separately.

The paper finds that there is not a unique link between religious beliefs and habits and the self-declared inclination to devote more time to paid work. First, the paper finds a positive association between religious involvement and an individual ' s self-declared willingness to work in Catholic-dominated countries. Second, this relationship is less pronounced in Protestant countries, where non-religious people are less inclined towards paid work than Protestants. Third, in France, Catholics are the most inclined towards paid work, especially those with high levels of religious involvement. Finally, the paper does not find any significant difference between Catholics and Protestants in Germany.

The role of religion has been largely ignored in economics for decades. This paper adds to the growing literature on the effects of religious beliefs and behaviour on economic outcomes.

The anonymity of the Internet supports an increasing number of deviant behaviors such as secret affairs. This paper aims to investigate whether religiosity has a negative relationship with the incidence of secret affairs in cyberspace and how it moderates the substitution effect between the use of online and off-line channels for such deviant behaviors.

The authors constructed a cross-sectional county-level dataset containing data on US religious adherents' ratios and actual expenditures on a social website related to extramarital affairs. The data were analyzed by ordinary least squares and two-stage least squares regression models.

In general, religiosity has a negative relationship with secret affairs in cyberspace. It also moderates the relationship between using online (secret affairs websites) and off-line (entertainment facilities) channels for extramarital affairs. The deterrent effect of religiosity is weakened in religious communities with diversified religious teachings/structures and stricter requirements.

This work enriches the understanding of the role of religiosity in online deviant behaviors and provides essential insights for policymakers (e.g. in relation to spillover effects of social norms in cyberspace).

The purpose of this paper is to examine wealth dynamics through the Great Recession along a dimension previously not studied, religious affiliation. Specifically, this paper analyzes wealth differentials and relative wealth losses among religious groups at the mean and along the wealth distribution before and after the Great Recession.

Drawing on data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and including a wide array of control variables, the paper analyzes the impact of religious affiliation groups on wealth pre- and post-Recession, using OLS, generalized least squares and quantile regression models.

The findings show that wealth differentials among religious groups exist both before and after the Recession and that wealth disparities are greater for people at the low end of the wealth distribution, who lost disproportionately more wealth across religious groups.

The results suggest that the Great Recession further increased wealth inequality yet along another dimension, religious affiliation. These findings imply that in order to decrease wealth inequality and minimize other harmful effects of adverse macroeconomic events, religious institutions may provide education on financial management strategies, especially to those at the low end of the wealth distribution.

This paper is the first of its kind to build upon two bodies of literature: the research on religion and wealth and the research on wealth losses and the Great Recession. It is also the first paper to explore the religion–wealth relationship after the Great Recession and along the wealth distribution.

The study aims to establish that religiosity has a positive link with government trust, making the secularization trend all the more likely to further erode this already fragile resource.

Through the use of data from the World Values Survey and European Social Survey the link between religiosity and trust in government is examined.

Religiosity and trust in government are positively linked in aggregate data.

The analysis is based on aggregated data, not individual countries, and religiosity is a complex concept to measure.

Secularization will have a long-term negative effect on government trust. Low levels of trust in government in the West are likely here to stay, or even worsen, as populations continue to secularize.

With less trust in government, it will be more difficult to govern effectively.

The author has not yet seen a full test on how secularization will impact trust in government. In fact, this study makes clear that the trend goes a long way explaining why trust in government has been falling in the developed world for decades.

In a constantly changing and increasingly globalized world, religion still plays a significant role in influencing social and consumer behavior. This study will analyze what influence religion and intensity of belief has on attitudes towards the advertising of particular controversial products and services. A questionnaire was distributed to 1,393 people across six different countries and resulting in samples of four main religious groups. The results indicated some statistically significant differences between the groups, which can have important implications for global marketers.

This article explores how social actors negotiate the competing logics they face as a result of their work in organizations subject to institutional complexity. In particular, I theoretically focus on the unique characteristics associated with societal institutional logics, such as religion, family, and the state. Empirically, I analyze religious mutual funds (Catholic, Muslim, and Protestant) in the United States that dwell at the intersection of the competing logics of religion and finance. Through interviews with 31 people who work at religious mutual funds (or fund producers) and content analysis of religious mutual fund material, I focus on the symbolic boundary work that religious fund producers engage in. I find examples of boundary blurring and boundary building and suggest institutional complexity that involves at least one societal logic is especially likely to foster both modes of boundary work. This, I propose, leads to an increased likelihood of enduring institutional complexity.

Sociology of religion is the study of the relationship between religion and culture. Sociologists focus on the nature and structure of religious organizations and movements, leadership, the effect of religious commitment on individuals and social process or social change. Central to the discipline is the search for an adequate definition of religion and for a coherent explanation of the distinction between religious myth and social reality.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the prestige of the Doctor of Ministry (DMin) among Roman Catholics in leadership positions, who may be a potential market for this degree.

In a mail survey employing a comparative rating scale, respondents rated the prestige of the DMin relative to six other doctorates: PhD, EdD, PsyD, DBA, MD, and JD.

Ratings were provided by 184 priests, 73 deacons, and 95 directors of religious education (69 lay, 26 sisters). The DMin carried the least prestige with priests and the most with religious educators, particularly the sisters. In all groups, the DMin fared best on prestige when compared to the professional doctorates (DBA, EdD, PsyD) and worst relative to the traditional degrees (MD, JD, and PhD). When submitted to a cluster analysis, three groups emerged, corresponding to negative (46 percent), neutral (38 percent), and positive (16 percent) impressions of the prestige of the DMin. The majority of the priests (44 percent) were in the negative cluster whereas the largest proportion of deacons (45 percent) and most lay religious educators (71 percent) fell into the neutral cluster. In contrast, the largest proportion of the religious educators who were sisters by background went into the positive cluster (40 percent). With the exception of the sisters, the percentage of each group falling into the positive cluster was quite small and approximately the same size across the remaining three groups (16 percent, 15 percent, and 13 percent). A discriminant analysis of the clusters identified two discriminating functions; the primary function involved perceptions of the DMin relative to the traditional degrees (MD, JD, and PhD), whereas the very minor second function involved how the DMin is perceived in comparison to the newer practice doctorates (EdD, DBA, and PsyD).

The response rate was low.

Currently, owing to its low prestige, the DMin probably does not have a sizable potential market among Roman Catholic priests, but it may appeal more to religious educators.

The DMin may be subject to the same concerns and prejudices as raised about other professional doctorates.

Roman Catholics are a non‐traditional audience for the DMin. This degree's perceived prestige was not previously studied in this emerging market.