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The purpose of this paper is to extend research on contemporary forms of oversight surrounding professional work in an era characterized by increased skepticism regarding professional claims and the rise of independent regulatory authorities. The authors investigate the interplay between key actors as well as the shifting role boundaries in a distinct regulatory space, following the introduction of a new public oversight framework.

The analysis draws on the notions of regulatory space and boundary work to better understand the development of independent audit oversight in France. The authors adopted an interpretive approach to conduct a longitudinal case study based on 33 interviews and documentary data produced from 2003 to 2012.

The study provides a narrative of the boundary work carried out by the French audit profession as it tried to reinvent its role in the new regulatory order. In the case, boundary work engendered a hybrid regulatory pattern, named “co-regulation,” reflecting both the logic of independent regulation and the logic of self-regulation. The main consequence of this is that zones of mutual involvement were constructed – thereby suggesting that to become a reality, independent oversight of professional work needs to accept some operational dependence from professionals.

The study illustrates the elusiveness of boundaries surrounding actors’ role within contemporary forms of professional regulation. More generally, hybrid development suggests that professions are proactive and, to some extent, successful when it comes to developing alliances and manipulating changes within their regulatory space.

While the world-wide adoption of international financial reporting standards (IFRS) aims to eliminate differences in national accounting standards between countries, the socio-political institutions surrounding financial reporting practices remain localised. This paper aims to penetrate and reveal the manner in which local national context, stakeholder intentions and financial reporting practices can moderate the compliance with IFRS in a developing country.

An interview-based qualitative research framework was used to analyse the experience and attitudes of accountants, auditors and financial reporting regulators during a passage of accounting reform initiatives.

This paper provides a critical analysis of the financial reporting practices of a developing country that has ostensibly implemented accounting reforms prescribed by the World Bank. It has revealed the key firm- and field-level logics that are experienced and managed by regulators and corporate managers in their approaches to financial reporting and accountability. The World Bank-led accounting reform can be constrained by a complex mix of institutional logics originating from market and corporate structures, networks of institutionalised family and political relationships, professional and regulatory structure and resourcing limitations and cultural business conventions. This paper provides evidence of firm- and field-level logics that contest and influence the emergence of a financial reporting oversight body and lead to highly variable compliance with international accounting standards.

This paper aims to extend our knowledge beyond broad national-level elements of institutional orders. It presents a more penetrating examination of the existence and contestation of logics originating from various local and global actors and interests. It presents a theoretical mapping of institutional logics, which operate in international and local settings and also encompass firm- and field-level imperatives. Any effort to understand and improve accounting practices of a developing country need to consider the power, contestation and influence of multiple logics operating in its institutional environment.

To examine whether the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in its recent rule changes has provided the appropriate separation between its supervisory authority and the management of the Exchange.

Describes the regulatory and governance structure proposed by the NYSE in connection with its public offering; discusses policy objections the security industry has made to the proposal, reviews responses by the NYSE and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to those objections; and discusses what steps might be on the horizon to better rationalize the regulatory and business side of the new for‐profit NYSE.

The NYSE's proposal should provide for regulatory consolidation with the NASD. The proposal heightens the conflict between a for‐profit exchange and its regulatory function. The proposal governance structure ignores the fact that NYSE LLC is the Exchange and has plenary authority over NYSE regulation. The proposal does not provide fair representation for members. The proposal does not provide appropriate treatment of market data.

Provides a comprehensive view of recent changes to the NYSE's regulatory and governance structure and issues raised by the securities industry in response to those changes.

Using the case of the Deepwater Horizon blowout in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, I argue that the catastrophe was less an example of a low probability-high catastrophe event than an instance of socially produced risks and insecurities associated with deepwater oil and gas production during the neoliberal period after 1980. The disaster exposes the deadly intersection of the aggressive enclosure of a new technologically risky resource frontier (the deepwater continental shelf) with what I call a frontier of neoliberalized risk, a lethal product of cut-throat corporate cost-cutting, the collapse of government oversight and regulatory authority and the deepening financialization and securitization of the oil market. These two local pockets of socially produced risk and wrecklessness have come to exceed the capabilities of what passes as risk management and energy security. In this sense, the Deepwater Horizon disaster was produced by a set of structural conditions, a sort of rogue capitalism, not unlike those which precipitated the financial meltdown of 2008. The forms of accumulation unleashed in the Gulf of Mexico over three decades rendered a high-risk enterprise yet more risky, all the while accumulating insecurities and radical uncertainties which made the likelihood of a Deepwater Horizon type disaster highly overdetermined.

Most governments would profess either to having a model regulatory system for their markets or at least to having a proposal for a model regulatory system. The leading international grouping of securities market regulators, the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), which comprises the regulatory bodies of almost 100 countries with day‐to‐day responsibility for securities regulation and the administration of securities laws, has devised a benchmark standard of regulatory best practice against which regulators around the world can reliably measure their operations' effectiveness.

On December 17, 2003 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved an overhaul of the New York Stock Exchange’s (NYSE’s) system of corporate governance. After questions arose concerning the NYSE’s ability to discharge its self‐regulatory functions following the resignation of former Chairman and CEO Richard Grasso, Interim Chairman John Reed proposed new governance architecture including a newly independent Board of Directors and a separate Board of Executives designed to represent the NYSE’s various constituencies. The new architecture reflects an effort to strike a balance between an independent board of directors and the desire for input from the industry, i.e., self‐regulation. This new structure should not be seen as the SEC’s determination of the future of self‐regulation, but simply as the most recent step in refining and improving the self‐regulatory process at the NYSE and other marketplaces as well.

To discuss the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) likely preparation of new rules to increase the monitoring and oversight of various asset funds, including hedge funds and alternative mutual funds, and recommends protective measure for fund managers to take.

Discusses the SEC’s increasing concerns about risks related to the asset management industry and how those concerns may lead to additional scrutiny and regulation. Recommends four steps for alternative mutual fund managers to take at this time to protect their interests.

The SEC’s potential regulatory action is in response to apparent increasing concern that the multitrillion-dollar asset management industry could create substantial instability to the financial system with the occurrence of a significant event, such as a sudden change in interest rates or widespread investor redemptions. It has been suggested that the proposed sweep of alternative mutual funds is part of a larger strategy by the SEC to bring the alternative mutual funds, and similarly situated entities such as asset managers and hedge funds, under the same regulatory umbrella imposed upon large banks and similarly situated financial institutions in response to the 2008 recession.

Preparation will go a long way in dealing with what appears to be a developing mine field of new regulations, and potential enforcement actions, from the federal government.

Knowing that increasing SEC scrutiny, such as inquiries and subpoenas, may be just around the corner, the precautionary measures outlined in this article will help alternative mutual fund managers protect their interests.

“Cargo tariffs are agreed through the IATA machinery, and in theory approved by governments….the IATA Tarff Coordination Conferences still agree cargo tariffs on over 200,000 separate routes. But these tariffs bear little relevance to what is actually charged in the marketplace.” (Doganis, 2002)

“The stipulations ICAO standards contain never supersede the primacy of national regulatory requirements. It is always the local, national regulations which are enforced in, and by, sovereign states, and which must be legally adhered to by air operators making use of applicable airspace and airports……ICAO is therefore not an international aviation regulator, just as INTERPOL is not an international police force. We cannot arbitrarily close or restrict a country's airspace, shut down routes, or condemn airports or airlines for poor safety performance or customer service. Should a country transgress a given international standard adopted through our organization, ICAO's function in such circumstances…….is to help countries conduct any discussions, condemnations, sanctions, etc., they may wish to pursue, consistent with the Chicago Convention and the Articles and Annexes it contains under international law.” (ICAO, 2021)

In spite of being a growing liberalized global industry served by many firms, much of the international air cargo sector operated as an admitted cartel from 1999 through 2006. Partly due to the way the cartel was discovered, it seems very little empirical analysis to date has been done about the case. We use publicly available airline data to examine whether a diligent antitrust authority could have identified cartel/collusive behavior using established empirical methods. Our findings point to a regulatory failure in an industry whose long-standing business practices effectively “slipped through the cracks,” failing to protect the many shippers of air cargo.

This paper aims to explore the important role boundaries play in back-office framing of environmental engagement. This is of particular interest because it is not clear how organizations in an industry without standardized environmental reporting navigate their boundaries behind the scenes and why they engage with the environment the way they do. This element of their environmental identity offers important insights into the emergence of sustainability reporting.

Guided by Miles and Ringham (2019) the authors conduct an ethnography of the Montana ski industry. The ethnography includes extensive on-site observations at nine Montana ski areas and interviews with 16 ski area executives, two regulators and a land development executive.

The authors find three key boundaries – accountability structure, degree of regulatory burden and impact measurement approach – that shape the back-office economic and environmental framing of ski executives (Goffman, 1959, 1974). From these back-office frames the authors identify four front-office cultural performances – community ecosystem, quantitative ownership, approval seeking and advocacy platform – that represent the environmental engagement strategies at these resorts.

Understanding the relationships between boundaries and environmental engagement is an important step in developing appropriate industry-wide environmental accountability and sustainability expectations. The study’s findings extend to other industries that are both highly dependent on the environment and are in the early stages of developing environmental reporting standards.

Ski resorts operate in an industry that is impacted by changes in the natural environment. The authors chronicle the process by which boundaries lead to framing which leads to environmental engagement in this weather-dependent industry. The authors explain the process of environmental identity building, the result of which both precedes environmental reporting and puts such reporting into context. In this sense, the authors show how boundaries are set and maintained in the ski resort industry, and how fundamental these boundaries are to the development of individual companies' environmental engagement strategies.

Regulatory authority officials in Korea have been considerably strong enough to affect citizen’s intentions and alter their incentives to take new challenges. But, from the result of steady regulation reform, absurd bureaucratic interventions have been sharply reduced. Corruption in the process of rent seeking has decreased too. It is impossible to exercise regulatory authority that infringes on the essence of the freedom of the people because people who live in a democratic society would not accept these absurd practices.

This chapter introduces some key features of the regulatory management system in South Korea as well as the challenges that need to be overcome. In particular, the bureaucracy has worked hard to chip away at past regulations that produce rents for various private interest groups but provide little to society at large. Regulatory quality is tied closely to democracy as maintaining a fair and even playing field for entrepreneurs is a key freedom. Introducing checks and balances into the regulatory system can be an important way to facilitate this goal. The Regulatory Reform Committee (RRC) facilitated to strengthen the logic of regulatory necessity and the logic of improving regulation which increased the level of its institutionalization.