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Although many library patrons seek information on the activities and earnings of corporations, some librarians have difficulty identifying the documents appropriate for such research. Aubrey W. Kendrick advises on selecting and obtaining corporate reports.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent to which the transition from self-regulation to heteronomy has changed the gap in audit quality between Big Four and non-Big Four auditors.

This study analyzes publicly held companies in the USA between 1999 and 2012 using univariate analysis, multivariate analysis and quantile regression analysis. Audit quality is measured with discretionary accruals.

This study shows an insignificant difference in audit quality between the clients of Big Four and non-Big Four auditors after Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (hereafter, PCAOB) began its operations. In the analysis of the effects of PCAOB inspections on the audit quality of audit firms that are inspected annually and triennially, the findings show that the inspections have more positive effects when carried out annually. This suggests that the frequency of inspection is positively associated with audit quality. Overall, these results provide evidence that recent improvements in audit quality have been caused by changes in regulatory standards.

The paper provides three major original contributions. First, the authors add to the literature on audit quality by further demonstrating a reduced gap in audit quality between Big Four and non-Big Four audit firms due to heteronomy. Secondly, this study contributes to the debate as to whether independent inspections on audit firms are beneficial or not and suggests that the PCAOB inspections help increase audit quality. Finally, the results of this work contribute to the growing literature examining discretionary accruals.

The Beringer Wine Estates Company has been expanding its market share in the premium segment of the wine industry in the 1990's. After operating as a wholly owned subsidiary of the giant Nestlé food company for almost a quarter of a century, the firm was sold in 1996 to new owners, in a leveraged buyout. For the next year and a half, management and the new owners restructured the firm and expanded through internal growth and strategic acquisitions. With a heavy debt load from the LBO, it seemed prudent for management to consider a significant rebalancing of its capital structure. By paying off a portion of its debt and enhancing the equity account, the firm would achieve greater financial flexibility which could enhance its growth rate and business options. Finally, a publicly held common stock would provide management with another “currency” to be used for enhancing its growth rate and overall corporate valuation. With the equity markets in turmoil, significant strategic decisions had to be made quickly. Should the IPO be completed, with the district possibility of a less than successful after market price performance and these implications for pursuing external growth initiatives? A variety of alternative courses of action and their implications for the financial health of the Beringer Company and the financial wealth of Beringer stockholders are integral components of this case.

The conflict between “serving” and “supervising” an owner manager is an important reason for the role difficulties faced by directors of private companies. Explores the conflicting motivations of owners who establish boards of directors; discusses the role of both owner‐manager entrepreneurs and directors in making private company boards work; and gives guidelines for reducing conflict and increasing board effectiveness. It is based on a survey of 25 directors of private and public company boards.

The purpose of this article is to provide a practical overview of the personal liabilities (criminal, civil and other) that a governor of a French company may incur, to consider the chances that a corporate governor will actually incur personal liability, and to explain the forms of protection available.

This article is based on an analysis of French legal provisions and case law, as well as on both French and English‐language commentary. It is written from the perspective of a governor of a French company and, especially, of a privately‐held French subsidiary of a foreign parent. This article analyzes in a general manner the entire spectrum of possible liabilities that a corporate governor may incur.

There exist particularities of French law which often come as a surprise to foreigners. The corporate governors involved in an LBO of a French target must structure the acquisition carefully in order to avoid violating French criminal law. There has been an increasing trend in France to make corporate governors accountable, and French case law is full of examples of corporate governors being held liable by reason of their position, on the basis of many types of violations. A corporate governor may be at least partially protected from personal liability with insurance, with increased cash compensation, and/or with one or more delegations of powers.

Enables both foreign multinationals and those they appoint to positions of governance of French companies to obtain a full understanding of the legal issues involved.

First English‐language analysis of the legal issues involved in serving as a governor of a French company, from the perspective of a governor. This article is useful for both foreign parent companies who seek to fill a position of corporate governance of their French subsidiaries, and those who contemplate filling such a position.

Punitive damages is a controversial topic in the legal profession and in the field of economics. This chapter explores the economics of punitive damages as they relates to corporate defendants. The economic difference between large corporations and other potential defendants, such as individuals or smaller closely held companies, causes the effects of a punitive award to be different. In some circumstances, these differences raise significant questions as to the appropriateness of punitive damages when imposed on large corporations.

Do female CEOs face a compensation gap? The purpose of this paper is to examine whether gender affects the total compensation of today’s CEOs, and whether it moderates ten factors influencing their total compensation.

Taking the 54 female CEOs cited in the US 2014 Fortune’s 1000 report, a matched sample of male CEOs was selected, matched according to the crosstab of age by education and by the sizes of the companies directed by these female CEOs.

Using four years’ worth of Fortune reports, between 2013 and 2016, this matched sample indicates that female CEOs are not discriminated against in terms of total compensation. However, eight factors do show a significant effect on total compensation. Using moderation analysis, the present study reveals how gender interacts with company size, sector, membership of outside boards and nature of previous experience.

This paper addresses an important and under-researched gap, with contradictory findings in the existing literature, by compiling and testing the characteristics of male and female CEOs which are not cited in Fortune 1000 reports.

Arguably, this is therefore one of the first papers to study gender differences in total compensation among Fortune 1000 CEOs using a matched sample technique, based on a larger number of female CEOs and a larger number of years than any previous research.

Professional accounting associations in various countries and governmental and other quasi‐official bodies have played an important role not only in the evolution of internal control reporting on a global scale, but also in educating management, investors, financial institutions, accountants, auditors, and other interested parties highlighting the pervasiveness of the effects of a sound internal control structure in corporate reporting as well as other aspects of an organization′s success. These associations include the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the General Accounting Office (GAO), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Cadbury Committee, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales (ICAEW), the Scottish Institute of Chartered Accountants (SICA), the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA), and others. Business failures, management fraud, corporate misconduct, international bribery, and notorious business scandals in all sectors of business have prompted the US government to take drastic action on internal control reporting to safeguard public interest. Several professional and government committees were formed to study this precarious situation: the Treadway Commission, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) of the Treadway Commission, the Packard Commission, the Cohen Commission, the Adams Commission in Canada, the Cadbury Committee in the UK, and others. The principal motivation for the changing dynamics has been growing public pressure for greater corporate accountability. The government′s pressure on the accounting profession and management of public corporations has been pivotal in spearheading internal control reporting. Examines the role of professional associations, governmental agencies, and others in promulgating standards for internal control reporting, and the impact of legislation on this aspect of internal auditing in the USA and worldwide.

Publicly-held companies collectively allocate tens of millions of dollars each year to investor relations, yet little research has been conducted into how investor relations officers (IROs) try to determine the effectiveness of this investment. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the above issues.

This exploratory study is based on a survey (n=384) of IROs who are members of the National Investor Relations Institute (NIRI), the world's largest professional investor relations association.

Respondents strongly rebuked using share price as a valid measure of investor relations performance. A factor analysis revealed that IROs use four factors to measure program success (listed in order of stated importance): first, international C-suite assessment; second, relationship assessment; third, outreach assessment; and fourth, external assessment. IROs at large-cap companies place significantly more importance on both C-suite assessment and relationship assessment than their peers at small-caps.

These results may not be generalizable to IROs who are non-NIRI members or investor relations consultants. Cross-cultural studies on this topic are needed.

The evaluative factors that emerged in this study may be used by IROs to develop and refine their evaluation metrics relative to their peers.

This is one of the first and largest studies to specifically examine program measurement and evaluation in the context of investor relations. These findings help set the stage for future work in this area.