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We examine personnel policies and careers in public agencies, particularly how wages and promotion standards can partially offset a fundamental contracting problem: the inability of public-sector workers to contract on performance, and the inability of political masters to contract on forbearance from meddling. Despite the dual contracting problem, properly constructed personnel policies can encourage intrinsically motivated public-sector employees to invest in expertise, seek promotion, remain in the public sector, and work hard. To do so requires internal personnel policies that sort “slackers” from “zealots.” Personnel policies that accomplish this task are quite different in agencies where acquired expertise has little value in the private sector, and agencies where acquired expertise commands a premium in the private sector. Even with well-designed personnel policies, an inescapable trade-off between political control and expertise acquisition remains.

The chapter furnishes empirical evidence about the extent and profiles of autonomy of EU agencies, the modalities whereby they are steered and controlled, and the interactions they have in EU policy networks. It thus provides the bases for a more complete picture of the EU multi-level administration.

The research is a survey-based design. A questionnaire was administered between July 2009 and April 2010 to 30 EU agencies included in the study population. The questionnaire was sent to the executive director of all the agencies included in the study. Questions were closed-ended, either in the form of multiple choices – with one answer or with check-all-that-apply and an option for ‘other’ to be filled – or in scale format. The resulting data set included ratio, interval, ordinal, and nominal scales. The reference model employed for the investigation relies on the analytical model developed within the framework of the research project COST Action IS0651 CRIPO (Comparative Research into Current Trends in Public Sector Organization – see also ‘Acknowledgements’) for the study of public agencies in Europe (Verhoest, Van Thiel, Bouckaert, & Lægreid, 2012).

EU agencies display a rather low level of managerial, especially financial, autonomy; conversely, they enjoy relatively high policy autonomy. As to the way in which multiple ‘parent’ administration steer EU agencies, it emerges a composite picture, in which the crossroads of steering and control by the parent administrations and accountability by the agency lies in the executive director. In terms of interactions within policy networks, EU agencies interact in a significant way with the European Commission, with national-level agencies in the pertinent policy field, and with specific technical bodies where they are part of the configuration of the policy sector, whilst interactions with national ministries as well as with other EU agencies are rare. No single model can capture in full the overall features of EU agencies, although the ‘community level institution’ model seems to capture a number of the profiles of these agencies.

Both the literature on EU multi-level administration and research agendas in public management can benefit from inclusion of – and in-depth empirical knowledge about – EU agencies. The chapter provides important empirical evidence to these purposes.

EU agencies are actors in European public policy-making, albeit to a varied extent depending on the sector. The extent of autonomy and the way in which they are held to account are crucial aspects for an enhanced understanding of their influence on European public policy-making, as is their location in European policy networks.

Research presented in this chapter is the first systematic empirical investigation of EU agencies encompassing networking, steering and control and autonomy of EU agencies, based on primary data.

A framework is offered that predicts when public organizations are susceptible to change. Many researchers interested in change focus on leadership. Such an approach overlooks structural factors that inhibit change and what leaders seeking to realize change can realistically hope to accomplish. The framework identifies organizational capacity, responsiveness, and constituencies as key structural factors that govern change feasibility. Capacity, responsiveness, and constituencies are knitted together in the framework to identify types of public organizations that are ready for change and those apt to resist change. Types of change are considered that range from strategic repositioning to transformation. Also discussed are guidelines for leaders seeking to strategically reposition or to transform a public organization. To realize a transformation requires a new kind of leader, called a Mutualist. The skills required by Mutualist leadership and Mutualist leaders are identified and compared to those identified in the transformational leadership literature. Research questions are formulated and a research program proposed to deal with research issues identified by the framework.

The purpose of this paper is to provide insights into the impact of agencification on the process of administrative reorganization in Greece. It is suggested that agencies tend to create a parallel administrative space that operates disjointly or even detached from the central bureaucracy. This hypothesis is tested and elaborated in relation to Greece's centralist administrative tradition.

The analysis identifies the critical junctures of the domestic agencification pattern and seeks to explain its evolution on the basis of historical-cultural factors, rational choice explanations and country-specific variables. The methodology combines quantitative and qualitative research. Along with a review of existing literature, data were collected through semi-structured interviews and the Registry of Entities and Agencies.

The findings show that agencification never became a coherent policy reform tool, while its outcomes were filtered by the centralist and politicized tradition of the Greek state. The effect of agencification was proved to be highly path-dependent and contingent upon the broader administrative tradition. The agencification policy does not follow a clear direction and has been shaped as a random combination of ad hoc decisions, external pressures and domestic politics.

The paper provides some generalizations of the agencification experience. However, they do not cover all specificities and particularities of agencies and their applicability varies. Further research could consider these variations.

A novelty of this study is that it links the agencification effect with three key aspects of the administrative reform process, namely, decentralization, debureaucratization and depoliticization. In addition, no single study exists regarding agencification in Greece; thus, the paper is the first to provide an overall view of the Greek arm's length bodies.

This article critically reviews the latest Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) guidelines and recommended sustainability topics for public agencies, and presents normative argument by using Gray’s (2006) ecological and eco-justice (EEJ) approach to produce public value inscriptions of sustainability to represent sustainable public value.

The study presents a critical analysis and discussion of the changes to the GRI G4 and sustainability topics for public agencies from a managerialistic and EEJ approach.

We observe that the GRI continues to evolve while paying scant attention to furthering the Sector Supplement for Public Sector Agencies as it remains in its pilot form since its inception in 2005. Changes to the GRI are somewhat enlightening because several of the changes do begin to address a more comprehensive view of how any organization, including public agencies, can contribute to an EEJ approach to sustainability.

In the future it is important to be aware that, as inscriptions, the GRI guidelines have the potential power to influence how managers in public agencies approach sustainability. As Dumay, Guthrie, and Farneti (2010) previously argued, if guidelines continue to approach sustainability from a ‘managerialistic’ approach then there is little hope of public sector agencies adopting EEJ practices. We argue that organizations should act referring to Gray’s EEJ approach.

This paper aims to investigate the disclosure of fraud-related activities in public sector organisations in Australia. Specifically, the study reviews and evaluates the level and nature of fraud control information in annual reports of Commonwealth agencies and bodies.

The study uses a qualitative approach with the aim of expanding the body of empirical literature on disclosure of fraud control information in annual reports. The study further uses the theory of accountability – an essential concept for organisations that exist for public interest.

The results show that there is some prima facie evidence of public accountability. However, these results suggest that current disclosures of fraud-related activities in annual reports are failing to ensure the public is aware of activities used to combat fraud and its implications for the public interest.

The results have important implications for developing a framework for good reporting of fraud control activities.

This research study adds to the limited body of knowledge regarding how public entities discharge their accountability in relation to their fraud control activities.

This paper analyzes how public servants who work with young people discursively cope with competing demands on their agency, defined as their orientation toward and capabilities to influence their clients. Previous studies revealed how public servants treat their clients when facing competing demands but paid less attention to how public servants define their agency.

Micro-level discourse analysis is applied to analyze how public servants represent their agency in client relationships, drawing on interviews with nine individuals in a Finnish city who work with young people lacking jobs or school placements.

Instead of describing their agency coherently, the interviewees applied several discourses to represent their agency differently in relation to different demands. This ability to navigate contradictory discourses is discussed as reflexive discursive coping strategy, which enables public servants to maintain a positive image of their agency despite tensions at work.

Although the method does not allow direct generalizations, it reveals discursive strategies likely to be found in many contemporary public organizations.

The study indicates a need to better acknowledge and nurture the multifaceted nature of agency to improve service quality.

The findings deepen the view on tensions in public servants' work and show that diverse discourses not only create anxiety but also help individuals dealing with contradictory work.

This paper aims to develop a theoretical framework based on transaction cost economics that identifies key factors shaping public agencies’ governance of supplier relationships and related performance implications.

The paper presents an extended transaction cost framework for research on public procurement (PP) with a corresponding set of propositions. Transaction cost theory and specific features of and challenges to the PP function identified in extant literature constitute the main elements of the framework.

This conceptual paper makes three sets of proposals. First, public agencies tend to rely on market governance of supplier relationships and when PP deploys non-market governance, such governance tends to be of a unilateral (vs bilateral) kind. Second, increases in purchasing competence and autonomy of PP and particularly if implemented in tandem, will reduce PP’s overreliance on market governance and increase PP’s use of non-market governance. Third, PP should perform better for less complex transactions – and when contracting complexity relates to safeguarding of specific assets rather than when complexity relates to environmental and behavioral uncertainty. Increases in competence and autonomy should increase PP’s performance, particularly for complex transactions.

Public agencies may be in a better position to align governance solutions with transaction complexities by developing their procurement competence, decentralizing procurement decisions and increasing the flexibility of national and international procurement regulations. Private companies selling to public agencies need to be aware of and able to adapt to PP practices such as extensive use of market governance and unilateral governance as the primary form of non-market governance.

The paper discusses how public agencies can improve procurement performance through better alignment of governance of supplier relationships with transaction attributes and thereby increase the quality of public services.

The paper relies on a well-established theoretical perspective, enabling identification (and, potentially, correction) of governance misalignment in the public sector.

To induce innovation in the public sector, Directive 2014/24/EU encourages internal and external consultation during the procurement process. However, little is known regarding the prominence of these practices. Determining the extent of knowledge sourcing in innovation procurement across 28 European countries, this paper presents an institutional cluster analysis, examining heterogeneity across knowledge sourcing activities, procurement areas, and tender innovation outcomes for 1,505 public procurers from 2008-2010. Building upon existing taxonomies, three types of procuring agencies are identified: Large collaborative agencies practicing public procurement of innovation (31%); supplier-focused pre-commercial procurers (20%); and direct procurers at the municipal level (49%). Validation supports this heterogeneity, using innovation outcomes and policy drivers. At the country level, Spain, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany and Poland are most represented in respective clusters. Findings enable predictions regarding impacts on agencies and innovation from the new public procurement directive's translation into national law by Member States.

This conceptual chapter explores communicating with transparency and secrecy in public affairs activities in Norway. The tension between transparency and secrecy is particularly interesting with regard to the question of impact of strategic communication on political policymaking processes. As a theoretical framework, we use a double lens to hold the concepts of both transparency and secrets in focus. First, we draw on Fung’s (2013) principles of democratic transparency: availability, proportionality, accessibility and actionability. Second, we use Horn’s (2011) three logics of political secrecy: arcanum, mysterium and secretum. By integrating Fung’s principles of openness and Horn’s logics of secrecy, we construct a model for analysis of a few public affairs activities and practices. Empirical examples of PR agencies’ communicative activities support our model, in addition to interviews with three executives in agencies. The empirical examples illustrate that communication activities rely on top-down controlled information diffusion in PR agencies’ communication activities, such as podcasts and web pages. They use information to develop group identities and to develop stronger relationships to their clients and customers. The social dimension of information in our examples suggests that the agencies are discrete, operate in the background and are careful about revealing their competence and privileged insights.