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Several explanations for the Royal African Company’s failure around the turn of the eighteenth century have been suggested. The paper argues that these reasons can be integrated into a more comprehensive account of the company’s failure through the introduction of a modified version of principal-agent theory. Instead of focusing on abstract, dyadic relationships, the paper proposes a model that accounts for the meaningful character of principal agent interactions and for the complex networks and multiple role identities of actors within those networks that comprised principal-agent relations within the company. On the basis of this model the failure of the company can be seen as a result of contradictions between its dual role as both agent and principal. The symbolic importance of inefficient trading practices helps to explain why the company was unable to pursue alternative strategies or otherwise benefit from its monopoly.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical historical analysis of the business (mis)behaviors and influencing factors that discourage enduring cooperation between principals and agents, to introduce strategies that embrace the social values, economic motivation and institutional designs historically adopted to curtail dishonest acts in international business and to inform an improved principal–agent theory that reflects principal–agent reciprocity as shaped by social, political, cultural, economic, strategic and ideological forces

The critical historical research method is used to analyze Chinese compradors and the foreign companies they served in pre-1949 China.

Business practitioners can extend orthodox principal–agent theory by scrutinizing the complex interactions between local agents and foreign companies. Instead of agents pursuing their economic interests exclusively, as posited by principal–agent theory, they also may pursue principal-shared interests (as suggested by stewardship theory) because of social norms and cultural values that can affect business-related choices and the social bonds built between principals and agents.

The behaviors of compradors and foreign companies in pre-1949 China suggest international business practices for shaping social bonds between principals and agents and foreign principals’ creative efforts to enhance shared interests with local agents.

Understanding principal–agent theory’s limitations can help international management scholars and practitioners mitigate transaction partners’ dishonest acts.

A critical historical analysis of intermediary businesspeople’s (mis)behavior in pre-1949 (1840–1949) China can inform the generalizability of principal–agent theory and contemporary business strategies for minimizing agents’ dishonest acts.

Principal agent theory has its roots in the economic theory of the firm, decision theory, sociology, organizational theory, and more recently political science. However, there are only limited applications of the theory in the arena of public budgeting. This paper considers principal agent theory as an alternative method for explaining budgetary outcomes through an examination of interactive relationships not adequately captured by traditional hierarchical-based models of public budgeting. Because implicit and explicit contractual relationships pervade the entire budget making process, principal agent theory can make a major contribution toward developing more inclusive and accurate models of most stages of public budgeting.

This paper aims to investigate, through the lens of the principal–agent problem, the relationship between payment of National Hockey League (NHL) salaries and player performance during the period of 2005-2011 and explore the inherent issues within the NHL player compensation and incentive structure.

The research adopts a pragmatic philosophy with deductive reasoning. This paper focuses on the NHL season 2005-2011 and undertake analysis of historical player contracts and performance data of 670 players across 29 clubs to undertake liner regression analysis.

This paper quantifies potential inefficiencies of NHL league contracts and defines the parameters of the principal–agent problem. It is identifies that player performance generally increases with salary, is higher in the first year of a contract and despite decreasing over the life of the contract, will usually peak again in the final year of the contract.

The research is based around figures from 2005-2011 and secondary statistical data. The study captures quantitative data but does not allow for an exploration of the qualitative perspective to the problem.

Entry-level or first contracts are good for all teams and players because they provide incentive to perform and a reduction of risk to the team should a player not perform to expectations. The same can be said for players at the other end of the spectrum. Although not typically used much, performance bonuses for players over the age of 35 allow clubs to “take a chance” on a player and the player can benefit by reaching attainable bonuses. These findings therefore provide contributions to the practicing managers and coaches of NHL teams who can consider the results to help shape their approach to management of players and the planning of teams and succession planning for talent.

The paper presents a comprehensive and current perspective of the principal–agent problem in NHL and extends the work of Purcell (2009) and Gannon (2009) in understanding player performance enhancement.

This paper attempts to study the impact of changing incentive strategies on enterprises' energy saving effort level and to construct an effective principal‐agent mechanism to achieve Pareto improvement of energy‐saving control.

Starting from the benefit relations between government and enterprises as well as their game strategies in energy conservation management, the impact of changing incentive strategies on enterprises' energy saving effort level and the asymmetric information situation of the players are studied taking into consideration the angle of strategies evolving in local government. Also, an effective principal‐agent mechanism to achieve Pareto improvement of energy‐saving control is constructed.

The results are convincing: interests of both the principal and agent had consistency under the principal‐agent mechanism, and the principal‐agent model was a mechanism with rich efficiency that could substantially arouse the enthusiasm of enterprises in energy saving. The comprehensive supervision of local governments over enterprises could effectually eliminate ill effects on energy‐saving management caused by information asymmetry under certain circumstances.

It is good for locating the balance of interest of game players by building a government energy saving mechanism based on principal‐agent theory. Through solving a game stable strategy, it is beneficial to seize a key point of regulation and control policies.

The paper succeeds in analyzing decision behaviours of government and enterprises through the basic idea of cooperative game theory so as to make actions of enterprises at all levels agree to government determined solving of energy issues.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the range of benchmarking applications that can be used in a principal‐agent relationship setting often found in the public sector.

Collection and critical analysis of secondary data from relevant publications addressing applications of benchmarking in the public sector. Extraction of knowledge from several research projects where the authors have been involved in studying and developing benchmarking approaches for different public sector organizations. Induction of new theory about the use of benchmarking in principal‐agent relationships in the public sector, grounded through empirical evidence from case studies.

A number of new approaches to benchmarking in the public sector have been identified and described, some of which are already used in real life cases, others which need further development before being implemented. All of these can introduce benefits to both principals and agents involved in such benchmarking efforts.

The paper explores benchmarking applications that are almost exclusively relevant in a public sector setting, although some of them might be adapted to certain private sector conditions.

Whereas most work on benchmarking in the public sector tend to view only improvement‐oriented, voluntary benchmarking as relevant and useful, this paper demonstrates how many different imposed benchmarking schemes with other purposes can be useful.

The moral hazard problem which obstructs external equity financing of farm businesses is studied using the principal‐agent framework. We assume that the supplier of external equity capital (the principal) cannot directly observe the farmer’s (agent’s) effort, but can observe the random outcome of the effort. We solve for the optimal farm income‐sharing rule that includes an extra share to the agent. The extra share is dependent on the random outcome and is provided to induce optimal effort from the agent. Results show a farmer’s effort is inversely related to the level of risk aversion and the riskiness of the project. Thus, an investor must share more income when a farmer is more risk averse or a project is more risky.

The purpose of the paper is to investigate the inter‐ and intra‐organisational relationships in the commissioning of secondary care by primary care trusts in England, using a principal‐agent framework.

The methodology is a qualitative study of three case studies. A total of 13 commissioning‐related meetings were observed. In total, 21 managers and six consultant surgeons were interviewed.

There are a number of different levels at which contractual and managerial control take place. Different strengths of control at one level can affect willingness to comply with agreements at other levels. Agreements at one level do not necessarily result in appropriate or expected action at another.

The system for commissioning in the National Health Service (NHS) has changed with the introduction of payment by results and practice‐based commissioning. However, the dynamics of the inter‐ and intra‐organisational relationships studied remain.

Incentives within organisations are as important as those between organisations. Within a chain of principal‐agent relations, it is important that a strong link in the chain does not result in the exploitation of weaknesses in other links. If government targets and frameworks are to be met through commissioning, it may be advantageous to concentrate efforts on developing incentives that align clinician with NHS trust objectives as well as NHS trust with primary care trust (PCT) and government objectives.

This paper is based on original empirical work. It uses a principal‐agent framework to understand the relationships between PCTs and NHS trusts and highlights the importance of internal NHS trust governance systems in the fulfilment of commissioning agreements.

Theories develop over time and are influenced by both events and people. Looking primarily at the applications between contracting principal-agent relationships, the purpose of this paper is to explore how agency theory emerged from a number of economic and social developments. In doing so, the authors explain how this once dominant theory comes up short regarding varying realms of entrepreneurship as well as with multiple modern business phenomena.

The authors first present a brief overview of agency theory. Second, the authors identify major events and people and address how they impacted the development of agency theory. Third, the authors provide insights on agency theory across three contexts (strategic entrepreneurship, social entrepreneurship, and family business). Implications, limitations, and future research directions are then offered.

The authors provide a deeper understanding of agency theory, thus broadening its underpinnings and enabling readers to more readily understand why agency theory is limited in its explanation of certain and modern business phenomena. The authors find that some of the seminal influences to agency theory are quite dated which has limited its explanatory power in terms of the modern day business and with more recent disciplines such as entrepreneurship.

The authors are limited by their choices of major events that influenced agency theory at the expense of not being able to include everything that may have impacted the theory over time. These limitations, however, are offset by the research implications. As the authors highlight the underpinning of agency theory, the authors subsequently provide scholars and practitioners with five primary boundary conditions, each of which are in need of attention for agency theory to maintain relevant explanatory power.

A deeper understanding of agency theory can be gained by looking at its underpinnings. By presenting numerous principal-agent conflicts and demonstrating areas in which it has fallen short (i.e. entrepreneurship and more recent business phenomenon), we shed light on the obstacles agency theory must overcome in order to maintain its position as a prominent theory.

Most analyses of the relationship between the internal distribution of formal organizational power, generally manifested in ownership and governance rights, and innovation efforts apply a principal-agent framework. The key implication of this framework is that firms with distributed formal power are more likely to engage in labor-intensive innovation because external capital providers are unwilling to entrust their investments to a worker controlled firm. In this paper, we critique the principal-agent framework and propose an alternative institutionalist approach, where the type of innovation pursued by firms with distributed formal power is contingent on the norms advanced by the innovation and the alignment of external stakeholders with those norms. After presenting this alternative framework, we illustrate its application with positive and negative cases of capital and labor-intensive innovation at the MONDRAGON cooperatives, a network of worker cooperatives in the Basque region of Spain. We conclude with a set of propositions to guide future research.