Search results

This chapter discusses differences and similarities between democracy and populism with regards to their definitions, main goals, types of actors, structures, and main constituencies. Special focus is devoted to the functions democracy and populism play in the politics of sovereign countries. As the chapter argues, democracy calls for the implementation of political freedoms, rights, and political inclusiveness. In contrast, the spontaneous actions of populism appeal to popular agendas and often use disfranchised populations to achieve political goals.

This chapter reviews the key obstacles to understanding the effects of populism on international business (IB) by focusing on one particular and well-studied facet of IB, firm market entry strategies. While populism has already had and potentially can have future serious repercussions for macroeconomic stability, talent sourcing, and value chain integration, a much more immediate effect of the current strain of anti-globalization populism can be to alter the incentives that a multinational enterprise (MNE) faces in its internationalization approaches and in the decision on where to invest. In practical terms, populist political environments may lead to outright restrictions on some modes of entry but are more likely to incentivize firms top utilize “safer” modes of market entry, which includes outright delays in foreign investment. The constrained space that populism may offer for entry modes may also ratchet up transaction costs to a point that firms will need to re-think their internationalization – not necessarily the strategy, but the planned location for foreign direct investment. In this sense, populists may get what they want, with a reduction of foreign business, and hence foreign influence, within their borders.

Populism is one of the main symptoms of the contemporary crisis in Europe. How can the rise of populism best be understood? Whereas existing analyses predominantly utilise rationalist and behaviouralist approaches and focus on political, economic and cultural interests, this contribution proposes a different approach. The author focusses on affects and emotions. The author shows that where other parties or political movements opt for rational and dispassionate debates on merits of political programmes, populists instead offer, invoke and respond to strong emotions across multiple political settings. Emotions feed and propel populism in its bid for power by forming collective identities through the clustering of love for ‘us’ and hate for the ‘other’.

Ontological Security Theory (OST) is used here as a framework for understanding populist behaviour in the sphere of security perception, identification and community-building. In recent debates, OST has been used because it allows the motives for certain behaviours to be located in the need to maintain or recreate positive identity constructed via biographical narratives. OST suggests that any lack of narrative continuity regarding the shape of the self-images for both individual and collective identities will therefore constitute a source of ontological threat; the lack of a sense of security. In this contribution, the author uses the examples of populist policies and discourses in Hungary and Poland that illustrate this dynamic to analyse the past- and future-oriented collective identifications underpinning the recent rise of populism in Europe.

This chapter argues that despite the proverbial claim that populism is ill-defined and has too broad a conceptual net, the literature on the subject tends to converge toward four core elements of populism that provides a conceptual and analytical unity. Furthermore, the conceptual core of populism explains why the concept has been able to encompass a wide range of populist manifestations without becoming an empty analytical shell. Also, the conceptual cores have helped provide the empirical basis that has given rise to a diverse and innovative literature that seeks to measure and compare cross-nationally populism.

Politics is ubiquitous in every crisis, and public health issues have always been weaponised to advance political mileage of leaders. This chapter first analyses the link between COVID-19 and populism in the Philippines and Malaysia. During the coronavirus pandemic, an exodus of opportunistic leaders in both countries took advantage of the health crisis to cement their control and maintain power. Strong and charismatic leadership helped Filipino populist politicians spread their influence with solid support from the people and less resistance from the opposition. Meanwhile, Islamist populism and ethnonationalism were utilised by Malaysian leaders to secure authority and earn people’s recognition. Then, it explores how generations of national issues, such as corruption, inequality, and instability, also contributed to the rise of populist leaders in the Philippines and Malaysia. Finally, the chapter argues that the future of populism in these countries will remain strong due to the vulnerability of the people. In one way or another, COVID-19 and populism affect global movements, not just political and social, considering their generational and historical developments. The chapter seeks to answer the following question: what factors contributed to the rise of populism, and what are the future of populism in both countries?

This chapter explores how scholars have conceptualized the relationship between Latin American populism and democracy. It analyzes different approaches to populism such as modernization and dependency theory, and current approaches that focus on discourse analysis and/or political strategies. The chapter focuses on the current wave of radical populism to explore the continuities and differences between “classical” populism of leaders such as Juan Perón, the “neopopulism” of Alberto Fujimori, and the radical populism of Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, and Rafael Correa.

Critiques of elites define populism, which conceives of power relations as a unified, conspiring elite exploiting the good people. Yet, populism itself is inherently elitist, calling for a strong leader to take power and channel the will of the people. Elite theory, surprisingly overlooked in scholarship on populism, can clarify this apparent paradox and elucidate the dimensions of populism and its risk of authoritarianism in new ways. In contrast to populist ideological conceptions of power relations in society, elite theory points to the possibility that several elites with diverging voices and interests exist. Furthermore, elite theorists argue that such elite pluralism is a necessary component of a well-functioning democracy. Much scholarship on populism, often aiming to understand its causes and focussing on Western Europe and North America, points to the similarities of populist movements. The focus on similarities strengthens the understanding of populism as a uniform phenomenon and populist elite critiques as homogeneous. However, broader comparative studies show that different populist movements target a range of various elite groups. Indeed, the empirical reality of populist elite critiques targeting diverse elite groups is more in line with elite theory than populist ideological conceptions of power relations in society. A key to grasping the democratic challenges posed by the power relations between elites and masses in both populist critiques and populist solutions is an understanding of the institutional conditions for elite integration versus elite pluralism. This central discussion in both classical and modern elite theory is applied to analyse populism in this contribution.

In this chapter, I examine the populism of the Northern League and Berlusconi. I attempt to provide an institutional explanation as to why Italy, more so than other Western European democracies, has experienced such diverse forms of populism. Stated in full, the thesis advanced is that the rise and persistence populism in Western European democracies, such as Italy, is an indication of an institutional crisis of representation.