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The study utilises unique survey data gathered from 12,427 party members. The dependent variable measures party members’ in-party commitment and is based on willingness to donate money, to contribute effort, the feeling of belonging in the party network and social trust in the party network.

In this article, we study how different extra-parliamentary online and offline activities are associated with in-party commitment amongst political party members from the six largest Finnish parties. We especially delve into the differences between members of the Finnish parties.

We found that extra-parliamentary political activity, including connective action through social media networks and collective action through civic organisations, is highly associated with members’ in-party commitment. Additionally, members of the newer identity parties more effectively utilised social media networks, whilst the traditional interest parties were still more linked to traditional forms of extra-parliamentary political action.

By employing the sociological network theory perspective, the study contributes to ongoing discussions surrounding the impact of social media on political participation amongst party members, both within and beyond the confines of political parties.

This paper attempts to explain the phenomenon that Macau has a parliament (Legislative Assembly) and mass suffrage but no political parties.

This paper reviews the development process of “parliament – mass suffrage – political party” in Hong Kong and Macau and tries to explain why Macau does not have a party using comparative research methods.

The political party development of Hong Kong and Macau was influenced by both the (former) colonial power and China, and whether there were political parties in these two regions was the result of the game between China and the (former) colonial power. China hoped to limit the development of party politics in the two regions. Since Britain felt reluctant to cooperate with China, political parties in Hong Kong developed. At the same time, Portugal chose to defer to China, which led Macau not to have a political party.

Existing studies have yet to explain why there are no political parties in Macau, and this paper is the first attempt to do so.

Comprehensive political marketing informs how parties determine their policies and organisation, not just how they campaign. This article applies the marketing concepts of product, sales and market orientation, combined with tools such as market intelligence, to party behaviour as a whole. Producing a comprehensive theoretical framework, it explores how a product, sales and market‐oriented party would behave and go through a marketing process. This framework is used to analyse the British Labour Party, showing how Labour moved from a product‐oriented approach in 1983, through to a sales orientation in 1987, finally achieving a market orientation – and electoral success – in 1997. This demonstrates the potential of political marketing to deepen our understanding of a wide range of political behaviour.

Years after the 2011 uprising Egypt, it seems that the country’s non-Islamist parties are still included in the political game. After significant alterations in their political sphere by mid-2013 at the advent of the Muslim Brother exclusion and the subsequent discrediting of Salafi al-Nour party, non-Islamist parties took clear part in the mobilization for presidential elections (2014, 2018) and competed for legislative seats in 2015. Nonetheless, it is difficult to expect them to turn into long-term key political players with clear-cut ideological postures, unique platforms and strong grass root mobilization. With the exception of the electoral gains scored by numbered parties like Free Egyptians’ party and Nation’s Future in 2015 legislative elections, these parties seem to be lagging behind esp. in terms of their popular base; who became winners at the advent of the radical exclusion of the MB from July 2013 onwards.

This paper is based on archival research and guided by basic assumptions of rational choice institutionalism, mainly game-theoretic versions of the approach. It is divided into four sections, three of them are chronological and the last one is thematic.

Egypt’s non-Islamists engaged in the post-2011 political sphere, with strong Islamist rivals crippling their political chances in the first two years following the 2011 uprising. They surely capitalized on the exclusion and discrediting of the latter, but they suffered lack of ideological clarity and fragmentation from 2011 onwards with no enough evidence these weaknesses were surpassed after Islamists were “out of their way”. The only strand of non-Islamist parties which came out as “game winners” were those possessing the resources and enjoying overt “friendly” relations with al-Sisi regime. Nonetheless, internal conflicts inside key secularist parties shed light on their capacity to turn into long-term players in Egypt’s political sphere.

Very few papers were published on Egypt’s secularists parties after the 2011 uprising from the perspective of the alteration that occurred in their political environment affecting their political weight and gains. More generally, literature on non-ruling parties in authoritarian contexts mostly reduce these parties to secondary roles allocated by ruling regimes. The paper seeks to overcome both shortages.

Although information technology has been at the centre of attention of political branding for some time, research has traditionally focused mainly on its role in the facilitation of communication. This paper aims to unpack the role of information technology in the emergence of new cyber political brands.

This research uses a dual case study approach that focuses on the relationship between branding, politics and information technology. The analysis focuses on two successful political cyber brands: the Italian Five Star Movement and the Czech Pirate Party. Data collection covering the time frame between their emergence and their political success occurs through netnographic methods.

Cyber political brands emerge and materialize in different forms. The present analysis allows for a delineation of three conceptual elements that characterize the constitutive interrelationship of information technology in the emergence of cyber political brands. The first conceptual element, organization, refers to how political brands become structured around linked activities. The second conceptual element, orientation, describes how the activities of a political brand are directed to build a specific path and legitimize courses of action. The third conceptual element, operation, delineates the processes that anchor and stabilize the political brands in its “own” culture, establishing specific base activities.

Information technology and the techno-culture emerging around the two cyber party brands can be seen as the possible delineations of new “cleavages” in the form of “information technology-culture” which enables potential electoral success.

The present study by offering the conceptualization of the cyber political brand shows how political brands can reflect a type of performative cultural branding where they become able, as a networked-medium, to assemble a specific techno-culture. In terms of political brand development, the current analysis offers a framework that allows us to consider the process of political party development in a new fashion.

In this article, the author discusses the influence of technological development on the survival of European parties since the Second World War.

The database comprises more than 200 parties and the political forces observed in 20 countries.

The author find that Internet users as a proportion of the population and a higher value of secure servers in an economy tend to strengthen the duration of parties since their first electoral participation.

This is the first paper discussing parties' survival in democratic regimens as depending on the technological development.

The connections between political parties, the electorate (individual voters) and society at large, that may be achieved through applying marketing is an important area in need of research. Understanding such connections is vitally important for effective and efficient use of marketing in politics and also for improvement in the delivery of the political offering to society. This paper presents the findings of an exploratory research project carried out in Australia on the philosophical basis and operationalisation of marketing in politics. A survey and in‐depth interviews were undertaken to explore issues related to the application of market orientation and its relationship to the marketing concept in political marketing. The results highlight unique dimensions and relationships of marketing in politics.

This study aims to examine whether companies’ donations to political parties can impact product experience, specifically taste.

Research design consists of four studies; three online, one in person. Participants were shown a cookie (Studies 1-3) or cereal (Study 4) and told that the producing company donated to either the Republican Party or the Democratic Party (Studies 1-3) or an unspecified party (Study 4).

Participants rated food products as less tasty if told they came from a company that donated to a party they object to. These effects were shown to be mediated by moral disgust (Study 3). Effects were restricted to taste and willingness to buy (Study 4), with no effects on other positive product dimensions.

The studies provide a first piece of evidence that political donations by companies can negatively impact product experience. This can translate to purchase decisions through an emotional, rather than calculated, route.

Companies should be careful about making donations some of their consumers may find objectionable. This might impact both purchase and consumption decisions, as well as post-consumption word-of-mouth.

Companies’ political involvement can negatively impact subjective product experience, even though such information has no bearing on product quality. The current findings demonstrate that alterations in subjective product quality may underlie alterations in consumer decision-making because of ideologically tinged information, and reveals moral disgust as the mechanism underlying these effects. In this, it provides a first demonstration that even mild ideological information that is not globally bad or inherently immoral can generate moral disgust, and that such effects depend on consumers’ own attitudes.

Refers to the argument that examining political and electoral processes from a marketing perspective offers new insights into the behaviour of political parties. However, research into the marketing activities of political parties is still growing at this stage, and very few papers address the marketing orientation of political parties, while none address the marketing concept. Presents the findings of an exploratory research project carried out in Queensland. The results indicate that key political marketing decision makers within the party examined often have a limited understanding of the marketing concept. The researcher’s redefinition of the marketing concept into political terms received a high level of acceptance from certain groups of respondents within the study. Shows that the marketing concept with its customer centred orientation created a major concern from the perspective of the state executive decision‐making category interviewed in this study. This was so primarily because this key decision‐making category indicated the role and significance of the voter (customer) in developing the political product is negligible.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of media exposure and political party orientation on public satisfaction with and trust in the police in Taiwan.

Survey data were collected from more than 2,000 respondents in three large metropolises and two rural counties in Taiwan in 2011. Multivariate regression was used to assess the effects of media exposure and political party affiliation on public satisfaction with and trust in the police, controlling for crime experience, neighborhood conditions, background characteristics, and locality.

Taiwanese who were exposed to media reports of police misconduct and believed in the authenticity of such reports were more likely to have lower levels of satisfaction with national police and trust in the police. Though it varied somewhat by whether it was satisfaction with national or local police, the Taiwanese respondents who identified themselves as supporters of the opposition party, or politically neutral, showed lower levels of satisfaction with and trust in the police than supporters for the ruling party. Respondents who shared the same political party orientation expressed higher levels of satisfaction with local police.

The measures of media influence, while classic and straightforward, were relatively simple and future research should not only quantify the links between media use and public trust, but also develop a qualitative cultural understanding of the communicative roles that the media play in shaping public perceptions of the police. In addition, while this study relied on a scientific sampling procedure, the sample cannot completely represent the general population in Taiwan.

It is important for police departments to cultivate good relations with the news media and to adopt a balanced role between law enforcers who are capable of curbing crime and reducing fear of crime, and moral guardians who are willing to uphold community social cohesion and value structures.

Despite a growing number of studies on public assessments in the police in Taiwan, empirical research on the impact of media and political orientation on satisfaction with and trust in the police remains very limited. This study represents one of the first attempts to assess factors related to media and political party orientation in Taiwan.