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Around 2006, dissensus became predominant in the Hungarian elite concerning internal affairs. Regarding evaluations of the European integration, however, there were no considerable differences between elite groups at that time. The Hungarian political elite supported the integration process and trusted in EU institutions. The present chapter addresses the issue to what extent the elite attitudes regarding European integration prevailed following the economic crisis of 2008. After a brief overview of the Hungarian context, the authors discuss political elites’ (national MPs’) trust in supranational institutions in 2007 and 2014 in the European countries. Our analyses find that the Hungarian political elite became one of the most sceptical elites towards the EU.

Next, the supranational trust of political elite and other (economic, administrative and media) elite groups within Hungary is compared. Results reveal that among Hungarian elite segments there is a hidden tension: political elites are critical towards the EU, while economic and media elites are not.

Finally, turning to the international stage again, the elite–population opinion gap is investigated. It is usually the case that elites are more pro-European than the public. Recently, however, in some respects the Hungarian political elite has shown less trust in EU institutions than the population.

This chapter reviews three analytical perspectives – ‘structural’, ‘network’ and ‘cultural’ – on the study of power and their implications for theorizing elites. It builds on this initial theoretical review by developing a critical realist approach to the study of organizational elites out of the structurally based perspective identified in the first section of the chapter. The explanatory potential of this critical realist approach is then illustrated through two case studies of ruling elites embedded in contrasting historical, political and social contexts. The final section of the chapter provides a discussion of the wider implications of these case study analyses for understanding and explaining the ‘new feudalism’ which is emerging in advanced political economies and societies.

This study aims to identify the features and characteristics of feminist elites as well as their circulation rate in official political positions. The study questions include the role of a profession, educational level, and class of origin in the recruitment of feminist elites. It stems from the hypothesis that a direct correlation exists between the mechanism of recruiting feminist elites and their characteristics, according to the criterion of class differentiation based on social status and financial wealth. The study used a complex combination of scientific methodologies, including the elite approach, which is especially important as a result of its ability to convert arguments into measurable variables, and a comparative approach was used to compare the features and characteristics of feminist elites in two reigns. From the study, it was observed that feminist elites are characterized by caste and wealth, higher educational degree, and in addition obtaining degrees from Western universities, prevailed. This result demonstrates the higher value of Western universities. The study also found that the circulation rate of political feminist elites dramatically increased in the reign of King Abdullah compared with the appointed feminist elites in the reign of King Hussein.

Given the growing interest in social movements as policy agenda setters, this paper investigates the contexts within which movement groups and actors work with political elites to promote their common goals for policy change. In asking how and why so-called outsiders gain access to elites and to the policymaking process, I address several contemporary theoretical and empirical concerns associated with policy change as a social movement goal. I examine the claim that movements use a multipronged, long-term strategy by working with and targeting policymakers and political institutions on the one hand, while shaping public preferences – hearts and minds – on the other; that these efforts are not mutually exclusive. In addition, I look at how social movement organizations and actors are critical in expanding issue conflict outside narrow policy networks, often encouraged to do so by political elites with similar policy objectives. And, I discuss actors’ mobility in transitioning from institutional activists to movement and organizational leaders, and even to protesters, and vice versa. The interchangeability of roles among actors promoting social change in strategic action fields points to the porous and fluid boundaries between state and nonstate actors and organizations.

In spite of unprecedented levels of social, economic and political development, Chinese politics is characterized by increasingly salient social contradictions, conflicts and even protests. As for the various measures taken by all levels of governments to maintain social stability in changing times, the effect is not obvious, and all kinds of social conflicts are still on the rise. The purpose of this paper is to find out the relationship between political elites and social conflicts and give advice on the adjustment of the governance mode of social conflicts in current China.

This paper attempts to conduct a detailed analysis of the case of Tang Hui re-education through labour to explore how social conflicts arise, upgrade and dissolve within the intention of political elites to maintain social stability in current China.

Political elites who are subject to the pressure of maintaining social stability cannot rely on public interests and civil rights as the full justification for their actions. Above all, they must place social stability first. In this sense, political elites are constructing the network of maintaining social stability and shaping social protests. Social elites use the media or the internet platform to exert public opinion influence and try to push social protests to final solutions. In this way, social elites deconstruct political elites’ network of maintaining social stability. However, the forces that enable social conflicts and protests to be resolved remain to be the network of maintaining social stability itself.

The case of Tang Hui re-education through labour is believed to have hastened the abolition of the system of re-education through labour. As it completely interprets the whole process of the generation, evolution and resolution of social conflicts in current China, this typical case can be considered as an ideal lens through which we can see the unique relationship between political elites and social conflicts, as well as the governance mode of social conflicts in current China.

Critiques of elites define populism, which conceives of power relations as a unified, conspiring elite exploiting the good people. Yet, populism itself is inherently elitist, calling for a strong leader to take power and channel the will of the people. Elite theory, surprisingly overlooked in scholarship on populism, can clarify this apparent paradox and elucidate the dimensions of populism and its risk of authoritarianism in new ways. In contrast to populist ideological conceptions of power relations in society, elite theory points to the possibility that several elites with diverging voices and interests exist. Furthermore, elite theorists argue that such elite pluralism is a necessary component of a well-functioning democracy. Much scholarship on populism, often aiming to understand its causes and focussing on Western Europe and North America, points to the similarities of populist movements. The focus on similarities strengthens the understanding of populism as a uniform phenomenon and populist elite critiques as homogeneous. However, broader comparative studies show that different populist movements target a range of various elite groups. Indeed, the empirical reality of populist elite critiques targeting diverse elite groups is more in line with elite theory than populist ideological conceptions of power relations in society. A key to grasping the democratic challenges posed by the power relations between elites and masses in both populist critiques and populist solutions is an understanding of the institutional conditions for elite integration versus elite pluralism. This central discussion in both classical and modern elite theory is applied to analyse populism in this contribution.

This paper aims, through the specific example of the plenipotentiary envoys – a.k.a. the polpredy, at questioning Law as a legitimate knowledge of the political elite in post-Soviet Russia. The term legitimate has to be understood as both a legitimated and a legitimating knowledge.

A new level of administration was set by Vladimir Putin right after his election in May 2000 and has become a symbol of the militarization of political elites in Russia, concretized by a massive recruitment of people from the so-called power ministries. Beyond this, in the context of a closed institutional game and the power’s will to neutralize a whole bunch of the political game’s rules, law also becomes a ground on which to build a control of the political and administrative elites’ recruitment. Our approach blends a critical overview of the literature and a prosopographical study of more than 20 members of Russian top political elites between 2000 and 2012, corresponding to Putin’s three first mandates as the head of the Russian state – two as President and a third one as Prime Minister under Dmitri Medvedev’s Presidency.

Our study led us to the conclusion that, not only should we regard Law as esteemed but also, and above all, as invested with an instrumental function by the power in place, but also those who long to be in power.

Theories concerning the recruitment of the political elite traditionally view the composition of parliament as a result of a multi-phased process, as a kind of an elimination race (Norris, 1997; cf. also Best & Cotta, 2000). In each phase, the candidates who best fulfil the demands of the gatekeepers are selected. Who is selected is the outcome of the interplay of the supply and demand factors, meaning that it depends on the characteristics of the candidates and the priorities of the gatekeepers. Comparative studies reveal that this process varies among countries, meaning that the composition of parliaments also varies. New institutionalism (Ostrom, 1986; Norris, 1997) accounts for this variation in terms of the differences in the national recruitment systems, which create differences in supply and demand.

The descriptions of economic policy reforms and performance in the Baltic States and Russia are based on adapted statistical material collected by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

This qualitative interview study compares public value prioritizations of ministers, members of parliament and senior public managers in the Netherlands. This article aims to answer the following central research question: how do Dutch political elites and administrative elites differ in their interpretation and prioritization of public values?

Based on coding and categorization of 65 interviews this article shows how government elites in advanced western democracies interpret and assess four crucial public values: responsiveness, expertise, lawfulness and transparency.

Political elites and administrative elites in the Netherlands are more similar than different in their prioritization and perceptions of public values. Differences are strongly related to role conceptions and institutional responsibilities, which are more traditional than most recent literature on politico-administrative dynamics would suggest.

Our qualitative findings are hard to generalize to larger populations of politicians and public managers in the Netherlands, let alone beyond the Netherlands. However, the testable research hypotheses we derive from our explorative study merit future testing among larger populations of respondents in different countries through survey research.

Experienced values differences between both groups are smaller than their mutual perceptions would suggest.

Most research on public values is quantitative in nature and focuses exclusively on public managers. By adding the politician to the equation we improve our understanding of how public values are enacted in real life and set the tone for a more inclusive research agenda on public values.