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1 – 10 of 387
Book part
Publication date: 3 May 2016

Adam Fremeth, Brian Kelleher Richter and Brandon Schaufele

Campaign contributions are typically seen as a strategic investment for firms; recent empirical evidence, however, has shown few connections between firms’ contributions and…

Abstract

Campaign contributions are typically seen as a strategic investment for firms; recent empirical evidence, however, has shown few connections between firms’ contributions and regulatory or performance improvements, prompting researchers to explore agency-based explanations for corporate politics. By studying intrafirm campaign contributions of CEOs and political action committees (PACs), we investigate two hypotheses related to public politics and demonstrate that strategic and agency-based motivations may hold simultaneously. Exploiting transaction-level data, with over 6.8 million observations, we show that (i) when PACs give to specific candidates, executives give to the same candidates, especially those who are strategically important to the firm; and (ii) when executives give to candidates who are not strategically important, PACs give to the same candidates potentially due to agency problems within the firm.

Article
Publication date: 1 September 1999

Bert Chapman

Revelation of controversial fundraising practices by the Clinton‐Gore reelection campaign in 1996 and continuing controversy over proposed campaign finance reform legislation has…

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Abstract

Revelation of controversial fundraising practices by the Clinton‐Gore reelection campaign in 1996 and continuing controversy over proposed campaign finance reform legislation has brought this subject into public focus and discussion. This article provides an overview of key recent developments in campaign finance accompanied by coverage of literature and Web sites produced by scholars, government agencies, and participants in the ongoing debate over campaign finance and its role in the American political process.

Details

Reference Services Review, vol. 27 no. 3
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0090-7324

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Article
Publication date: 1 March 2007

Tracy Roof

Unions representing 40 percent of union membership broke away from the AFL-CIO in 2005 to form a rival federation, Change to Win (CTW). CTW leaders argued that the AFL-CIO placed…

Abstract

Unions representing 40 percent of union membership broke away from the AFL-CIO in 2005 to form a rival federation, Change to Win (CTW). CTW leaders argued that the AFL-CIO placed too much emphasis on politics and too little on organizing new workers. This study looks at the potential impact of the split on laborʼs political action in lobbying and electoral mobilization. It examines differences between Change to Win and AFL-CIO affiliates in their political action committee spending, their support of Democrats, and their overall political spending on lobbying and electoral mobilization and concludes that CTW unions are no less reliant on political action than AFL-CIO unions and are likely to continue their involvement in politics.

Details

International Journal of Organization Theory & Behavior, vol. 10 no. 2
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1093-4537

Book part
Publication date: 7 November 2022

Joseph N. Patten

During the 2020 election cycle, 2,276 super PACs spent over $2.1 billion in federal elections. This chapter argues that changes made to the US campaign finance system brought…

Abstract

During the 2020 election cycle, 2,276 super PACs spent over $2.1 billion in federal elections. This chapter argues that changes made to the US campaign finance system brought about by the Citizens United v. FEC (2010) and SpeechNow.org v. FEC (2010) cases have destabilized the American political system by fueling tensions between right-wing and left-wing populist factions and by contributing to congressional corruption. By moving away from the political corruption standard and toward the free speech standard in Citizens United, polarizing wealthy mega-donors and dark money sources have come to play a dominant role in congressional elections. These cases also helped to contribute to a two-tiered campaign finance regulatory structure that distinguishes between campaign contributions given directly to federal candidates and political money contributed to super PACs to support or oppose federal candidates. In the 2020 congressional elections, PACs and super PACS outspent both major party candidates combined in 35 House and Senate races. Super PACs are serving as “shadow parties” by targeting competitive races for the purpose of swaying partisan control of Congress. This study also shows that an exceedingly high percentage of super PAC money is spent on negative advertising that further divides rather than unifies the nation. This chapter also highlights the corrupting influence of congressional leadership PACs and examines how super PACs have enabled foreign and dark money sources to illegally influence congressional campaigns.

Book part
Publication date: 10 October 2006

Stuart Eimer

The Congress of Industrial Organizations’ (CIO) choice to build a labor party in New York was facilitated by an unusual institutional context that permitted unions to back a labor…

Abstract

The Congress of Industrial Organizations’ (CIO) choice to build a labor party in New York was facilitated by an unusual institutional context that permitted unions to back a labor party while simultaneously endorsing other party's candidates. Though the CIO–ALP (American Labor Party) became a major political force in New York, CIO links to the party were ultimately severed after factions in the CIO–ALP opted to back a third party presidential candidacy. The rise and fall of the CIO–ALP highlights the need to be attentive to institutional context when explaining organized labor's “exceptional” choice to forgo building a national labor party in the United States.

Details

Political Power and Social Theory
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-84950-437-9

Book part
Publication date: 3 May 2016

Rui J. P. de Figueiredo and Geoff Edwards

We show that, in the US telecommunications industry, market participants have a sophisticated understanding of the political process, and behave strategically in their allocation…

Abstract

We show that, in the US telecommunications industry, market participants have a sophisticated understanding of the political process, and behave strategically in their allocation of contributions to state legislators as if seeking to purchase influence over regulatory policy. We find that interests respond defensively to contributions from rivals, take into account the configuration of support available to them in both the legislature and the regulatory commission, and vary their contributions according to variations in relative costs for influence by different legislatures. This strategic behavior supports a theory that commercially motivated interests contribute campaign resources in order to mobilize legislators to influence the decisions of regulatory agencies. We also report evidence that restrictions on campaign finance do not affect all interests equally. The paper therefore provides positive evidence on the nature and effects of campaign contributions in regulated industries where interest group competition may be sharp.

Book part
Publication date: 16 December 2004

Diane Shust and Carrie Lewis

The NEA began its ascent as a political force slowly. In the early 1960s, NEA leaders had rejected efforts to create a political role for the Association. In fact, in 1960, NEA…

Abstract

The NEA began its ascent as a political force slowly. In the early 1960s, NEA leaders had rejected efforts to create a political role for the Association. In fact, in 1960, NEA leaders – sensitive to members’ desire for an organization focused on professionalism – summarily rejected a suggestion to adopt a theme of “Every Teacher a Politician” (Berube, 1988).

Details

Teacher Unions and Education Policy: Retrenchment of Reform?
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-84950-126-2

Book part
Publication date: 4 December 2009

Clayton D. Peoples

Power structure research examines core issues in the discipline of sociology; yet this important area of study is declining because of the conceptual, theoretical, and…

Abstract

Power structure research examines core issues in the discipline of sociology; yet this important area of study is declining because of the conceptual, theoretical, and methodological problems. In this paper, I address each of these problems and proposing solutions. I then test the validity of my proposed solutions by conducting empirical analyses examining how big business and labor political action committee (PAC) contributors influence U.S. House decision making. My findings vividly show significant big business influence on House decision making, but negligible labor influence. These findings carry considerable implications for power structure theorizing and research, and provide a solid foundation for future power structure work.

Details

Political Power and Social Theory
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-84950-667-0

Article
Publication date: 1 April 1986

Ian Maitland

The business community has greatly stepped up its political involvement. But the fragmented form of that involvement—in which each business interest lobbies separately for its own…

Abstract

The business community has greatly stepped up its political involvement. But the fragmented form of that involvement—in which each business interest lobbies separately for its own parochial goals—has meant a free‐for‐all in which business's collective interests have been the real loser. If it is to avoid the self‐defeating consequences of much of today's lobbying, business must find a way of strengthening its collective institutions, such as the Business Roundtable, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Business‐Industrial Political Action Committee, and the Committee on Economic Development.

Details

Journal of Business Strategy, vol. 7 no. 2
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0275-6668

Book part
Publication date: 24 October 2017

Benjamin Bricker

This chapter examines the role that Citizens United v. FEC (2010) has played in shaping the current system of election spending in the United States. In Citizens United, the Court…

Abstract

This chapter examines the role that Citizens United v. FEC (2010) has played in shaping the current system of election spending in the United States. In Citizens United, the Court determined that individual rights to speech and expression can flow into the corporate entities they join. This chapter argues that the Court’s holding serves to redirect the focus of accountability away from those who seek to sway election outcomes through massive election spending and toward any efforts by government to regulate that type of spending. The practical result has been to allow for the creation of new organizations that can take in unlimited amounts of money while also effectively hiding the source of funds from disclosure. By muddying the waters of disclosure, these new entities – Super PACs and dark money organizations – lower the ability of citizens to maintain accountability over the electoral system. Finally, this chapter examines ways to encourage greater disclosure and accountability in government after Citizens United.

Details

Corruption, Accountability and Discretion
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-78743-556-8

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