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Compares Stackelberg’s Grundlagen der theoretischen Volkswirtschaftslehre with a standard modern micro‐economic textbook. Reveals some confusing shortcomings in the English translation. Focuses on unique peculiarities of Stackelberg’s analysis of the price formation on imperfect markets. Suggests that it might be an effective approach in a course on micro‐economics to combine a modern textbook with Grundlagen since they would complement each other in a number of aspects: at least, but very important, in the different emphasis of the time aspect. Finds that in general the English translation of Grundlagen by A.T. Peacock is of an outstanding quality. Mistakes are rare and hardly ever confusing, with the exceptions related to the perfect market and pure competition concepts. So, if one uses the English translation of Grundlagen as a supplement in a course on micro‐economics one may devote some attention to these concepts. It is quite possible that Stackelberg, at least in Grundlagen, is not convinced of the potential compatibility of Chamberlin’s theory of monopolistic competition and the Edgeworth‐Bertrand oligopoly theory with the method he proposes to derive at “peculiarities of price formation in the imperfect market”. Hence the absence of any reference in Grundlagen to these theories may not be at all accidental.

Resource‐advantage theory is an interdisciplinary, evolutionary, process theory of competition that is proving to be extraordinarily provocative. A General Theory of Competition: Resources, Competences, Productivity, Economic Growth pulls together many of the articles that develop the theory. This article provides a brief overview of resource‐advantage theory, reports on two queries that have been raised by the theory’s critics, responds to the two queries, and extends an invitation to readers.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a personal retrospective on six of the key events/experiences that influenced the development of the structure, foundational premises, and models of the resource‐advantage theory of competition.

The paper uses a personal retrospective approach.

The paper finds that six key events influenced the development of resource‐advantage theory: B.J. “Bud” LaLonde emphasizes the works of Alderson; Rob Morgan suggests an article on the resource‐based theory of the firm; Roy Howell suggests a presentation on R‐A theory; Randy Sparks shows a “socialist calculation” article; Kim Boal suggests the Journal of Management Inquiry as a publication outlet; and Bob Phillips discusses his work on “firm effects vs industry effects”. The paper then relates each of the six events to the paths, routes, or procedures that are often proposed as (or reported to be) likely to lead to the development of theories.

By providing the evolutionary history of resource‐advantage theory, the paper provides implications for developing marketing theories.

We contribute to the emerging literature on strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR) and its antecedents by undertaking a systematic analysis of the effect of rivalry on firm and industry CSR. We deal with the codetermination of competition and CSR by using instrumental variables in the firm-level analysis and by modeling it directly in the industry-level analysis. We find that higher intensity of rivalry and CSR of competitors increase firm CSR, ceteris paribus; however, in a more dynamic setting when firms can change their production output, more competition in fact decreases aggregate industry CSR. While seemingly contradictory, these findings suggest interesting implications for both managers and public policy makers.

This chapter explores the origins of the theme of competitive advantage in 19th and early 20th century economics. This theme, which forms the core of modern Strategic Management, was a battleground for debates about the value of abstract theory versus observations about real-life events. Intellectual genealogies, citations, and other sources show the central roles played by the University of Vienna and Harvard University. These two institutions strongly influenced the theory of monopolistic competition as well as all three modern views of competitive advantage – the industrial as expressed by Porter, the resource-based as expressed by Penrose, and the evolutionary as expressed by Schumpeter.

Competition and cooperation in tourism is a complex and broad subject. It contains manifold and different problems. It is my task to deal with general aspects only. My first idea was to base my considerations on empirical facts. However, I was not very successful in finding reliable and sufficient statistical data on competition and cooperation in tourism. Of course, we have literature enough on special problems, for instance on the competition between railway and road transport or on the cooperation among the airline corporations. However, I have found that all these publications only indirectly touch tourism.

The paper presents a simple method of valuation that can sit beside ideology of a unitary economics, which seeks a synergy between materialistic and non‐materialistic aspects of welfare. The non‐materialistic item considered here is environmental stewardship, the lack of which is widespread among neoclassical economists. This is due to the belief that technology could always offset the problems of resource scarcity. The paper uses the basic tools of neoclassical economics to illustrate that resource scarcity is a real issue and that an improved sense of environmental stewardship is warranted. This illustration involves the valuation of environmental capital from the statement of national accounts. Scarcity indicators are defined in terms of the price of environmental capital. This price, which consists of an interest rate and a cost of depreciation, is empirically estimated for Australia.

The Coase theorem is associated with Stigler because Stigler coined the term. The object of this paper is to show that Stigler’s Coase theorem is Stiglerian for deeper – namely, methodological – reasons. We argue that, convinced as he was by the importance of Coase’s message, Stigler also believed that this message – such as presented in “The Federal Communications Commission” (1959) or “The Problem of Social Cost” (1962) – was not scientific. Hence, he had to transform it into a theorem to give it a scientific dimension. This is what we try to show by presenting Stigler’s methodology and by confronting it to the methodology used in Coase’s articles.