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This paper seeks to contribute to a more effective co‐ordination of humanitarian operations by military and civilian organizations involved in a peace support mission in response to a complex emergency.

The information processing view, in particular Galbraith's typology of generic mechanisms for achieving co‐ordination, is taken as the theoretical framework. This framework is subsequently applied to the co‐ordination of humanitarian operations by military and civilian organizations. Empirical data are derived from a set of expert interviews with both military and civilian respondents in The Netherlands and a four week visit to Kabul and Baghlan, a province in northern Afghanistan. During this visit 40 military respondents have been interviewed and over 60 meetings have been held with local authorities, humanitarian organizations, small entrepreneurs, refugees and local villagers. Finally, conclusions are drawn and recommendations are provided with regard to a more effective co‐ordination of humanitarian operations in a peace support mission.

The article's main finding is that “self‐contained tasks” in combination with lateral relations are the dominant co‐ordination mechanisms. “Slack resources”, though observed in practice, is not considered a viable co‐ordination mechanism since this implies an excess, and thus waste, of scarce resources. “Information systems” are, unfortunately, not well‐developed leading to mismatches between policy and practice. Keeping “self‐contained tasks” as the major co‐ordination mechanism, the main recommendation is to develop and implement innovative “information systems”, that can also be used to support “lateral relations”, in particular those between military and civil actors.

The paper applies the information processing perspective to a unique and important subject, namely co‐ordination between military and humanitarian organizations in peace support missions.

Peace engineering and compassionate operations can unlock the potential of emerging technologies for social good. This work aims to investigate the integration of peace engineering and compassionate operations by proposing an integrative framework and identifying the main drivers regarding social good, considering the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) landscape.

The authors used a two-stage methodology by employing a narrative literature review in the first stage to identify the relationships and drivers and propose an original framework. In the second stage, the authors utilized an expert panel to validate the framework’s drivers.

The authors identified five main categories related to peace engineering and compassionate operations, which were then used to support the categorization of the drivers. In the second stage, the authors validated the drivers with a panel of academicians and experienced industry practitioners.

The proposed framework can provide insightful directions for practitioners and governments to develop strategies and projects in different contexts, including humanitarian logistics, climate change crises, supply chain disruptions, etc.

This work makes unique contributions by reinvigorating an amalgamation of the peace engineering and compassionate operations arenas and their integration with the SDGs to enable enhanced social good, supported by cutting-edge technologies. Thus, this framework’s contributions encompass essential theoretical, managerial, and social implications.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the need for and develop a framework for research on the effects UN peace operation infrastructure has on a host nation. Mission infrastructure serves primarily to sustain a mission. As the mission terminates, infrastructure is often transferred to the host nation. The mission infrastructures could have both positive and negative implications for the host nation and for local communities.

Exploratory approach to develop a foundation for a research agenda in an area with little existing research. Identify theoretical contributions related to infrastructures, combine with primary data from one peace operation, secondary data from five other peace operations and from the UN repositories.

This study proposes a research agenda. As such our findings relate to the identification and classification of different infrastructures and their interdependencies.

This framework would contribute to new ways of exploring and analysing both the effectiveness of peace operations and the impact a mission has on the development in the host nation.

This study proposes a framework for research. As such, it will have implications primarily for researchers.

Understanding the interdependencies between mission infrastructures and the material and social infrastructures of a host nation would help understanding what value mission infrastructure brings to a host nation and the local communities.

Analysing the logistics in peace support operations as networks of infrastructures bring new perspectives into humanitarian logistics.

During the past two decades, both West Africa and Central Africa have suffered a large number of intertwined wars. In both regions, these ‘webs of war’ have included interstate conflicts and rivalry, as well as wars over the control of many of the involved states. Existing perspectives tend to reduce these intertwined wars to a series of parallel civil wars within each of the various states. They see states as operating at the regional level, whereas the armed opposition to those states operates only at the national level. This chapter argues that many armed, non-state groups in West Africa and Central Africa should be seen as regional actors, and thus that conventional two-level analysis does not catch the complexity of conflict in those regions. Although major violence continues in Central Africa, it has largely been contained in West Africa. This needs to be seen in relation to the level of institutionalization of security and military cooperation in the two regions. In both regions, regional organizations carried out military operations that were highly controversial among their member-states. In West Africa, a series of interventions strengthened both regional cooperation and cooperation with external partners, whereas in Central Africa this was not the case. In West Africa, peace support operations have increasingly been carried out within a regional perspective. Not so in Central Africa. The chapter concludes with an examination of efforts to build a capacity for peace support operations within the African Union, based on subregional organizations but with strong involvement by external actors.

Slovenia has joined the club of peacekeepers in 1997. The decision was made under pressure of foreign expectations that a country which strives for NATO membership should prove its willingness to co-operate in common defence efforts. First military units, sent to UN-led peacekeeping operations, comprised volunteers on an ad hoc basis and were very small (platoon level). There were also a few policemen who joined missions abroad, first under WEU leadership in Albania. The governmental need ‘to show the flag’ in many operations increased the number of soldiers needed for peace operations and the number of policemen. Currently, there are around 200 soldiers and 30 policemen in different operations abroad. In the period 1997–2001 all soldiers and policemen entered the missions on a voluntary basis. In 2002, there was the first contingent of Slovenian SFOR soldiers that used its home military structure (infantry motorised company) in a peace mission. It marked the end of ad hoc units, comprised to serve the goals of the mission only, and the start of more organised, and also more ordered co-operation of soldiers in missions. They could still refuse participation in the mission, but that would have led to risks of losing unit cohesion. In the transition from voluntary peacekeepers to peacekeepers on duty, or by order, the Slovenian Army realised the need to understand what helps soldiers to fully accept the terms of operations abroad.

Peace support operations and the role of the United Nations is getting important in changing the global power system. But generally peace support missions are creating new problems while trying to solve the original ones. In this presentation I will try to examine the relative effectiveness of the UN in the military observer missions, which is the most common type of UN peace support operations. The UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) is used to show their relative effectiveness in the current world system by means of differentiating the problems they are facing. After showing the common problems, I will give special emphasis to the genuine problems of UNOMIG. First of all we have to take a brief look at the origins of military observer missions. During the long Cold War, the UN had to engage in conflict resolution/management in a world widely divided between two superpowers. The Security Council (SC) suffered lots of problems to handle conflicts without jeopardising the interests of the superpowers. So in most of the cases (except Korea and Congo) the SC did not authorise the necessary military forces to the conflict areas. Instead the SC preferred to send interpositional forces with light arms or military observers without arms after getting the consent of the conflicting parties. Currently we are calling this approach traditional peacekeeping. By experiences gained on the ground and in the SC it was understood that the best and easiest reaction is establishing a UN military observer mission (UNMOM) (Mackinlay, 1996, pp. 9–11; British Army, 1995, pp. 1–2/2–7). According to this limited and conservative logic this process must follow standard steps: First an armed conflict between two states; second a stalemate that nobody is able to defeat the other side completely; third conflicting states ask the UN to enforce a ceasefire; fourth the SC authorises neutral military observers to monitor a ceasefire and to achieve some other limited objectives, according their mandate; fifth conflicting states try to reach a peaceful solution by diplomatic negotiations with the help of the UN; sixth agreement is reached and end of UNMOM. In short, the duty of the military observers is to monitor the ceasefire and the restrictions agreed to by both parties in a geographically limited area for a limited time. But in reality, diplomatic negotiations often do not provide fast and lasting solutions. UNMOMs have remained and temporary missions turned into permanent ones. The answer to the question why is that they are economically cheap operations and politically easier to maintain than to remove. Most of the UNMOMs that were established in different continents are still going on without an end in sight (Brahimi et al., 2000, p. 3).

This Chapter is written in an era in which the United Nations (UN) routinely deploys Missions to environments that satisfy the armed conflict threshold. Such Missions often require personnel to employ significant levels of force, whether to safeguard mission and humanitarian personnel, to protect civilians, to neutralise violent armed groups or, in pure self-defence. But use as well as non-use of force can readily frustrate the very objectives these troops are deployed to uphold, in turn creating gaps between the Promises they make and the Outcomes they actually secure. On the other hand, current Missions such as MINUSMA in Mali have proven to be amongst the deadliest for UN troops in the entire history of UN Peacekeeping. The thin line between use and non-use of force must therefore be trodden with utmost care. This Chapter tries to find answers to this dilemma from a moral perspective and considers how the peculiar nature of the morality of resort to force by the UN influences that of its use of force. It assesses why the latter should be calibrated or adjusted to comply with the former, and how this can consequently channel UN troop conduct towards the objectives pursued through deployment. It is only where these realities are understood and addressed, the Chapter submits, that the aforementioned Gaps between Promises and Outcomes can be redressed and closed.

In their effort to rebuild the society of the host-nation, military organizations depend on collaboration and communication with other international contingents and the local population. Language understanding in this regard is of eminent importance. Linguistic skills and the intervention of interpreters could contribute to the inter-communicational process, and hence positively affect the general effectiveness of the mission as a whole. In this article theoretical concepts and notions are illustrated with empirical observations from everyday military practice during peace-support operations. The article concludes with avenues for future research.

The conclusion of the Cold War rivalry between the United States and former Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s created new areas of opportunity and concern for U.S. national security policy. No longer menaced by the threat of nuclear war from Soviet military might, the United States emerged from the Cold War as the world's preeminent military power. Successful developments such as this often produce elation in the pronouncements of U.S. officials as a recent Clinton administration declaration demonstrates:

Hungary has been part of NATO's peacekeeping project in Afghanistan since 2003 and currently has more than 240 soldiers in the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), NATO's first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Hungary officially took over the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Baghlan Province from October 2006, and currently we have the 5th rotation of the Hungarian PRT in Afghanistan. The Hungarian unit serves in conjunction with representatives of several other nations.

Hungarian participation in NATO's UN-mandated peace support operation in Afghanistan has raised many questions not only in the field of operations, but also at home (mainly in the context of civil–military relations). Many of the Hungarian PRT-related challenges seem to be connected to the difficulties of proper management of civil–military interface, civil–military partnership and cooperation process, and financial backing of the mission.

Well-coordinated, multidimensional proactive and reactive responses to the conflict, and a comprehensive security sector transformation and reform can be vital to consolidate peaceful relations in Afghanistan; may help to win the “hearts and minds” of the local population; can help to establish security and provide improvement to Bahlan province; and might contribute to the success of the whole peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building process in Afghanistan.