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The venture capital syndication brings in various resources for the portfolio firms, which positively affects those firms’ performance, while conflicts within syndicates also have negative impact on the portfolio firms’ performance. This study aims to explore the two opposite effects of the venture capital syndication on the portfolio firms’ operations. Drawing on Ma et al.’s (2013) power source match perspective, the authors examine the effect of (mis)match of power source between ownership and status on the portfolio firms’ performance.

The study uses panel data from two professional databases containing information about the venture capital-backed firms in China. The fixed effect model is applied to analyze the data.

This study found that power source match in the venture capital syndicates works positively on the portfolio firms’ performance. This positive relationship is weakened when there is ownership-dominated power source mismatch present.

This study suggests that when new ventures search for venture capital, it is better to allocate greater ownership to the venture capital providers with high-status power, so that ownership power and status power can have a proper match to increase the coordination among venture capital providers, thereby helping portfolio firms perform better.

This study looks into the performance of a portfolio firm when there is power a (mis)match in a venture capital syndication, extending the current literature in this area where only the performance of the venture syndications is examined.

We examine the influence of ownership structure on a blockholder’s power in a firm. We first describe the presence and ownership stakes of blockholders in a comprehensive sample of US firms. We develop a measure of the influence of the ownership structure on a blockholder’s power and show that an average blockholder loses 12% of her potential power due to the presence and size of the ownership stakes of other blockholders. Further, the influence of ownership structure varies systematically with a blockholder’s rank and identity, with the second and nonfamily manager blockholders experiencing the largest loss of power.

This chapter is about child labour as slavery in modern and modernizing societies in an era of rapid globalization.

For the most part, child slavery in modern societies is hidden from view and cloaked in social customs, this being convenient for economic exploitation purposes.

The aim of this chapter is to bring children's ‘modern slavery’ out of the shadows, and thereby to help clarify and shape relevant social discourse and theory, social policies and practices, slavery-related legislation and instruments at all levels, and above all children's everyday lives, relationships and experiences.

The main focus is on issues surrounding (i) the concept of ‘slavery’; (ii) the types of slavery in the world today; (iii) and ‘child labour’ as a type, or basis, of slavery.

There is an in-depth examination of the implications of the notion of ‘slavery’ within international law for child labour, and especially that performed through schooling.

According to one influential approach, ‘slavery’ is a state marked by the loss of free will where a person is forced through violence or the threat of violence to give up the ability to sell freely his or her own labour power. If so, then hundreds of millions of children in modern and modernizing societies qualify as slaves by virtue of the labour they are forced – compulsorily and statutorily required – to perform within schools, whereby they, their labour and their labour power are controlled and exploited for economic purposes.

Under globalization, such enslavement has almost reached global saturation point.

This study aims to investigate the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) power and the level of tax avoidance of Tunisian listed companies. It also examines the moderating role of institutional ownership in this association.

The sample comprises 306 firm-year observations of companies listed on the Tunis Stock Exchange during the 2013–2020 period.

The results indicate that CEO power reduces tax avoidance levels. Moreover, the relationship between CEO power and tax avoidance is more pronounced in the presence of institutional ownership, suggesting that CEOs act less opportunistically when monitored by institutional investors, which results in a reduction in tax avoidance.

This study suggests that CEO power and institutional shareholders’ influence are important factors in determining firms’ avoidance behavior. This study has significant implications for shareholders and regulatory bodies. Indeed, shareholders apprehend the impact of appointing a powerful CEO on tax avoidance practices. This study may also provide regulators with new insights into the influence of CEO power dimensions and institutional ownership on tax aggressiveness.

This study fills the gap in the accounting literature by investigating how CEO power may impact tax avoidance behavior and provides empirical evidence on the moderating impact of institutional ownership on this relationship in an emerging economy context characterized by a weakly protected investor setting.

This study examines whether CEO power influences the book-based and market-based performance of Russian companies when it is restricted by the presence of essential shareholders, namely, state and influential businessmen.

Managerial power is divided into structural, ownership, expert and prestige. The proposed power metrics include not only CEOs but also the board of directors' characteristics that may restrict or enhance CEO power. The empirical analysis is based on the sample of 90 large traded Russian firms, which shares are included in the Moscow Stock Exchange Broad Market Index (MICEX BMI), observed from 2012 to 2019.

Panel data analysis suggests that higher board ownership and tenure may restrict CEO power, which in turn would be beneficial for corporate performance. the authors also see that in companies owned by influential businessmen, CEO power influence on M/B value is more negative, while state ownership does not moderate it. CEO power metrics, based on political experience and tenure, affect corporate performance differently in companies affiliated with extractive industries.

First, the authors consider two channels through which a company in emerging markets may get additional resources: CEOs and influential owners. Second, the authors develop power metrics based on Finkelstein's managerial power classification (1992) and the idea of relative power proposed by Bebchuk et al. (2011). It allows identifying whether the board of directors' may constrain or enhance CEO power to raise corporate performance. Third, the authors analyze developing Russian markets that represent a good ground for testing the question, whereas empirical research on Russia is relatively scarce (Grosman and Leiponen, 2018). Fourth, the authors pay particular attention to the CEO power in the extractive industry, strategically important for the Russian economy.

本研究擬探討行政總裁的權力，若因有不可或缺的股東 - 即國家和具影響力的實業家 - 的存在而受到約束時，其權力會否影響俄羅斯公司以賬簿為基礎和以市場為基礎的表現

管理權分為結構性的、所有權的、專家的和聲望的。提出的權力指標不但包括行政總裁，也涵蓋或會限制或增加行政總裁權力的董事會特徵。本研究的實證分析法是基於90間股份被納入莫斯科股票交易廣泛市場指數的大型俄羅斯上市公司樣本，觀察期由2012年至2019年

面板數據分析顯示、較高的董事會所有權和較長的任期或會限制行政總裁的權力，這因此有利於提升企業績效。我們亦看到，在具影響力的企業家擁有的公司裡，行政總裁權力對市價淨值的影響是較負面的，而國有制沒有把它減低。就隸屬採掘業的公司而言，基於政治經驗和任期的行政總裁權力指標，會對企業績效帶來不同的影響

(一) 我們考慮在新興市場公司可取得額外資源的兩個途徑：行政總裁和具影響力的所有者。(二) 我們基於芬克爾斯坦 (Finkelstein, 1992) 的管理權分類，以及 Bebchuk et al. (2011) 所提出相對功率的學說，建立了權力指標。憑著這權力指標，我們可鑑定董事會會限制、抑或增強行政總裁提升企業績效的權力。(三) 我們分析發展中的俄羅斯市場，其為測試我們問題的良好地方，而探討俄羅斯的實證研究較為稀有 (Grosman and Leiponen, 2018) 。(四) 我們特別關注在採掘業的行政總裁權力，而採掘業對俄羅斯經濟來說、是具有重要戰略意義的

This study aims to investigate the relations between CEO gender, power and bank performance. First, this study examines the relation between CEO gender and power. Do female CEOs possess less power than male CEOs? As women reach the top, do they hold similar or even higher levels of power as men? Second, this study investigates the relation between the CEO gender and bank performance. How do female CEOs perform? Is the relation between gender and performance subject to CEO power?

This study uses the following three performance measures: ROA, pre-tax ROA and pre-provision profit over assets. This study follows Finkelstein’s (1992) classifications and adopt five variables to measure the four dimensions of CEO power: duality and compensation share measure structural power; ownership captures ownership power; number of functional areas measures the power of expertise; and elite education captures prestige power. Logit model, ordinary least squares regression and quantile regression methods are used in the analysis.

In a sample of Chinese banks, female CEOs are found to have similar power and performance as male CEOs. As women reach the top, they hold higher ownership and greater prestige power than men. Female CEOs even outperform male CEOs in non-state dominated banks. Female CEOs show their impact through their power: those with higher compensation shares or greater power are positively related to bank performance.

Overall, the results show that as women reach the top, they hold a higher level of power than men. As females break through the glass ceiling, they perform better than males. Moreover, female CEOs show their impact through their power. Female CEOs who overcome the barriers are less traditional and more self-directed than their peers.

The purpose of the research is to study how Chief Executive Officer’s (CEO’s) ownership, CEO’s structural and expertise power and underwriters’ reputation affect the initial public offering (IPO) lockup period.

The study uses the multivariate regression method to test the hypothesis on a sample of 1,071 US IPOs, which comprise 80 per cent of the total population of IPOs over the 1998-2002 period.

It was found that CEO equity ownership had a direct positive impact and two indicators of CEO positional power (CEO duality, founder status) and underwriter reputation had a direct negative impact on the length of the lockup period that results from IPO negotiations between the issuing firm and the underwriter. It was also found that underwriter reputation negatively moderates the impact of equity ownership (likely due to a substitution effect) and positively moderates the impact of CEO duality on lockup period length (by offsetting the impact of CEO positional power).

Previous studies have exclusively studied the affect of economic factors on IPO lockup. This paper extends the extant literature by studying the insider’s characteristics like CEO’s power and underwriter’s reputation on IPO lockup periods.

The M&A literature lacks coherence and consistency when explaining the role of CEO power in influencing post-acquisition firm performance in both theoretical and empirical terms. This study uses meta-analytic techniques to quantitatively synthesize and evaluate the impact of 11 CEO power constructs (CEO duality; compensation; ownership; founder CEO; acquisition experience; functional area experience; outside directorship; elite education; CEO celebrity; age; and tenure) on acquiring firms’ post-acquisition performance. Results of 85 independent studies show that CEO ownership, functional area experience, and tenure are significantly positive predictors for better acquisition performance. At the same time, CEO duality and CEO elite education are significantly negative predictors of different measures of acquisition performance. These findings indicate the importance of integrating different theories to enhance our understanding of the nature of strategic leadership in acquisition performance.

This study explores the effect of CEO power on earnings quality. If powerful CEOs make the information environment more opaque, they can easily conceal information to hide self-dealing behavior through earnings manipulation. Conversely, if powerful CEOs who are well-protected create a transparent information environment, they will provide better quality earnings.

The author constructs a composite index for CEO power by combining seven CEO characteristics and employs two variables including discretionary accruals and earnings response coefficient as proxies for earnings quality.

The author’s main results show a significant negative relation between CEO power and the firm's earnings quality. In addition, CEOs with stronger structural power and expert power are more likely to generate lower earnings quality, while those with stronger ownership power are more likely to provide higher earnings quality.

The findings suggest that CEO power reduces the firm's earnings quality because CEOs with structural power or expert power may destroy governance monitoring mechanisms.

This paper aims to investigate whether a powerful chief executive officer (CEO) impacts corporate risk taking in the distinctive institutional and market setting of China? Second, in case such relationship exists, the paper further aims to investigate whether the presence of large shareholders affects it, and finally, whether this effect of large shareholders varies in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs).

The authors have used a sample of 1,502 Chinese firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Sample period is 2008-2013. Besides conventional fixed-effect regression, dynamic panel data estimation (generalized method of moments) is applied to address the potential endogeneity.

The results show that CEO power is negatively related with corporate risk taking in two risk proxies, i.e. total risk and idiosyncratic risk. Second, the presence of large shareholders significantly affects this relationship, but does not change the primary negative relationship between CEO power and corporate risk taking. Finally, the results show that the relationship between CEO power and corporate risk taking is different in SOEs and NSOEs. The findings of this paper contend the organizational and behavioral theory viewpoint that individual decisions are more extreme.

This study provides useful implication for policymakers and suggests that while evaluating CEO’s performance, institutional and market settings should be considered.

This study provides new insights on the impact of CEO power on corporate risk taking under the two distinctive features in a developing country, i.e. presence of large shareholders and state-owned enterprises.