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Is the nuclear sky falling? It appears so. With the quantitative and qualificative improvements in nuclear stockpile, a proliferation-pessimism finds expression in metaphors about nuclear dominoes, chains etc. With a number of threshold states, the catch-phrase is ‘credible deterrence’. However, much of the zero-sum cold war thinking on strategic defence has now become anachronistic. A phased adaptive approach, leading to universal disarmament is necessary, especially in India’s strategic interest. A nuclear weapon-free world could ensure a safer regional security environment for India. It’s all the more imperative in view of China’s interest to emerge as the strategic leader in Asia, even well beyond Asia.

New START initiatives are positive developments in this regard. However, it is necessary to bring into this fold other nuclear powers. (China has rejected the US and Russian levels of nuclear ‘transparency’ as part of its defence calculus; it has already crossed the multiple warhead Rubicon. It may also install a National Missile Defence System by 2020.)

Though a Nuclear Weapon-Free World (NWFW) cannot emerge instantaneously, an NWFW can evolve, if the following measures are evolved:

• (i)

  Change the mind-set devaluing nuclear weapons by strategically displacing ‘disbelief’ with ‘faith’ in the efficacy of nuclear abolition.

• (ii)

  Change the perception of  the utility and prestige associated with nuclear weapons.

• (iii)

  Redraft nuclear doctrines to restrict their role and break the ‘feed-back paradigm of the need for nuclear deterrence’.

• (iv)

  Take measures to build confidence in multilateral initiation on NWFW.

• (v)

  Ensure universal acceptance of ‘no first use’ (NFU) through a legally binding, universally accepted agreement.

• (vi)

  Have agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

• (vii)

  Devise agreements for controlling the continuous qualitative upgradation.

• (viii)

  Establishment of a Safeguard Regime with thorough organizational and institutional mechanism.

• (ix)

  Use advanced surveillance and monitoring technology to ensure compliance.

• (x)

  Implement effective enforcement strategy to penalize delinquent.

Change the mind-set devaluing nuclear weapons by strategically displacing ‘disbelief’ with ‘faith’ in the efficacy of nuclear abolition.

Change the perception of  the utility and prestige associated with nuclear weapons.

Redraft nuclear doctrines to restrict their role and break the ‘feed-back paradigm of the need for nuclear deterrence’.

Take measures to build confidence in multilateral initiation on NWFW.

Ensure universal acceptance of ‘no first use’ (NFU) through a legally binding, universally accepted agreement.

Have agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Devise agreements for controlling the continuous qualitative upgradation.

Establishment of a Safeguard Regime with thorough organizational and institutional mechanism.

Use advanced surveillance and monitoring technology to ensure compliance.

Implement effective enforcement strategy to penalize delinquent.

It is in India’s interest to pursue universal disarmament with universal focus on economic and social cohesion for war prevention as the key to long-term security.

As the first Asian country to build a nuclear reactor, and as one among the handful of countries with full nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, India should strive to bring about universal disarmament of nuclear weapons so that world can meet spiralling demand for power through nuclear reactors, which pose no threat to the world peace.

This chapter justifies India’s acquisition of nuclear weapons on the basis of an ancient Roman dictum: Si vis pacem, para bellum, which means, ‘if you want peace, prepare for war’. However, Indian leaders were far more imbued with idealism than realism. Nehru’s successors were not able to overcome Nehru’s idealistic commitment to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes alone.

However, the government led by the BJP changed Indian nuclear policy by conducting five nuclear tests in May 1998 and declaring India as a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS). India also came out with its nuclear doctrine.

This chapter discusses the basic principles of the Indian nuclear doctrine. Though there are several principles of the doctrine, only such principles which have a bearing on the ultimate goal of achieving nuclear disarmament are discussed in this chapter. India has pledged not to use nuclear weapons ‘against states which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned’ with other NWS. India adheres to the concept of no first use (NFU) of nuclear weapons. This is the heart of the nuclear doctrine. The principle of NFU says that the nation would resort to the use of nuclear weapons only as a weapon of self-defence and only in a second strike.

India as a reluctant NWS has also committed its nuclear doctrine to ‘global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament’ as a national security objective. Indian nuclear doctrine is conducive in promoting nuclear disarmament. The chapter also proposes an international treaty around NFU as a first step towards nuclear disarmament.

The chapter describes the development of and rationale for the undeclared Israeli nuclear posture. It analyzes the relevance and irrelevance of the nuclear component in Israel’s overall deterrence posture and considers its contribution to Israel’s security. While Israel is assumed to be a nuclear power, its ambiguous nuclear posture makes her a special case. Moreover, the ambiguous posture is important diplomatically and also as an arms control measure. Israel’s position on nuclear arms control is presented and analyzed in this chapter. Israel supports the idea of a MEWMDFZ but insists that this could come about only after peace agreements are signed with all the regional states and a period of time elapses to assess the validity of these agreements. Beyond that, Israel is party to several other arms control agreements, which are described in this chapter.

The author then proceeds to raise several ideas about possible arms control measures that might enhance regional stability while not adversely affecting Israel’s security. These comprise the following: first, ratification of the CTBT which Israel signed but has not ratified. Second, Israeli acceptance of the FMCT if and when this treaty is internationally enacted. Several considerations are presented concerning the implications of this treaty, including – among others – the effect on Israel’s ambiguous nuclear posture. Third, adoption of a doctrine of “no first use.” The pro and con arguments on the advisability of such a step are assessed. These include – among others – the possible effects on different types of deterrence against Iran, if the latter becomes nuclear, as well as the overall stability of regional nuclear balances. The issue of Israeli deterrence against the use of other types of WMD is also assessed. Fourth, the article calls for the creation of a new forum for regional security in which regional states would participate, similar but not necessarily identical to ACRS.

The deal on civil nuclear cooperation between India and the United States had an immense global implication on account of its centrality to the contemporary concerns on nuclear proliferation. Much of the debate centered around four critical arguments: first, by amending US nonproliferation laws for India as an exception outside the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) framework, the deal would weaken the fundamental goal of US nonproliferation policy – to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five recognized nuclear weapon states (NWS) under the NPT. Second, why should other states stay in the treaty regime if a nonmember gets the benefits without much of responsibilities? Third, the problems of nuclear proliferation would multiply in the face of current challenges posed by North Korea and Iran. Lastly, the nonproliferation lobbyists were apprehensive that the US–India cooperation could prompt other suppliers, like China, to validate their nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. In view of these arguments it is important to assess whether these arguments are merely debating points or exaggerated concerns or do they hold any strong basis for contention.

This chapter analyses the linkage between disarmament and global security. Traditional notion of security has changed dramatically in the 21st century. The attention of the world community has shifted from the security of the state to the security of the people. When the idea of an independent Commission for Human Security was launched at the 2000 UN Millennium Summit, there was a general agreement on the importance of ensuring freedom from want and freedom from fear. There is a new breed of threats to human and ecological security in the form of terrorist attacks and they may acquire nuclear weapons. Nuclear terrorism is a grave threat to global security. There is also a fear that the existing UN mechanism to halt nuclear arms race and proliferation of nuclear weapons is inadequate as all countries have not signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the division between nuclear haves and nuclear have-nots is a major hurdle in the creation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Nuclear disarmament has been a matter of great policy concern for Russia as it was for the former Soviet Union. To recall briefly, super power rivalry between the former Soviet Union and the United States was deeply entrenched even in the field of nuclear issue for about five decades as a form of offensive and defensive policy instrument. Fully realizing and acknowledging the high risk involved in the event of a nuclear war for themselves and for the world as a whole, both the superpowers were sensible and responsible enough to avoid such an eventuality. As more countries joined the nuclear race subsequently, there was growing realization of the need to launch the campaign for nuclear disarmament on a global scale. In this background an effort has been made in this chapter to understand and analyze Russia’s perspectives and initiatives on the issue of nuclear disarmament.

The title of this chapter, “We're Losing the Fight against Nuclear Proliferation” is a quote from the keynote address of former Secretary of State James A. Baker, III, to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Workshop on “Policy Implications of Managing or Preventing Proliferation” that was held at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University in Houston, November 9–11, 2007. Dagobert L. Brito and I helped organize this conference on the 25th anniversary of the 1982 conference on “Strategies for Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Economic and Political Issues” held at Tulane University, which we had organized and that was published in a book with that title in 1983 edited by Dagobert L. Brito, Michael D. Intriligator, and Adele E. Wick (1983). My belief is that this observation of Secretary Baker was correct in 2007 and is even more correct today, although many government officials and policy analysts have not yet appreciated the truth of his observation.