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This chapter studies the negative signals associated with nonpromotion. I first show theoretically that, when workers' productivity rises little with additional years on…
This chapter studies the negative signals associated with nonpromotion. I first show theoretically that, when workers' productivity rises little with additional years on the same job level, the negative signal associated with nonpromotion leads to wage decreases. On the other hand, when additional job-level tenure leads to a sizable increase in productivity, workers' wages increase. I then test my model's predictions using the personnel records from a large US firm from 1970–1988. I find a clear hump-shaped wage-job-tenure profile for workers who stay at the same job level, which supports my model's prediction.
We examine personnel policies and careers in public agencies, particularly how wages and promotion standards can partially offset a fundamental contracting problem: the…
We examine personnel policies and careers in public agencies, particularly how wages and promotion standards can partially offset a fundamental contracting problem: the inability of public-sector workers to contract on performance, and the inability of political masters to contract on forbearance from meddling. Despite the dual contracting problem, properly constructed personnel policies can encourage intrinsically motivated public-sector employees to invest in expertise, seek promotion, remain in the public sector, and work hard. To do so requires internal personnel policies that sort “slackers” from “zealots.” Personnel policies that accomplish this task are quite different in agencies where acquired expertise has little value in the private sector, and agencies where acquired expertise commands a premium in the private sector. Even with well-designed personnel policies, an inescapable trade-off between political control and expertise acquisition remains.
Examines the exercise of market power in vertical channels. Reviews the development of food systems over the past century. Presents neoclassical models arising from the…
Examines the exercise of market power in vertical channels. Reviews the development of food systems over the past century. Presents neoclassical models arising from the work of Adam Smith, George Stigler, Harold Demsetz and John Spengler that are in juxtaposition to the more commonly advanced agency theoretic explanation of vertical organization and performance. Develops a structural model of price transmission in a channel that has differentiated product oligopolies at two stages. Increasing concentration at successive stages creates a problem of double marginalization. Vertical trading partners reduce it by avoiding vertical Nash (arms length) pricing via the use of trade promotions and other coordination methods such as private label. Finally, the rise in retail‐buyer concentration (six supermarket chains now control 52.6 percent of supermarket sales in the USA) portends a possible shift to the European model in which food retailers develop and promote their own brands.
This chapter studies the consequences of firm delayering on wages and the wage distribution inside firms. I consider a market-based tournament model with asymmetric information to endogenize firms’ delayering decisions. My model predicts that when the CEO becomes more productive, firms grow in size. When the CEO becomes sufficiently productive, firms delayer. After delayering, wages at all levels rise and the wage gap between the CEO and the laborers widens. These predictions capture the dynamic process of firms’ structure and size changes and match a set of empirical findings in recent studies that are not well explained by existing theories.
During the past decade, amid the current context emphasizing educational standards and accountability, the practice of grade retention has increased. The call for an end…
During the past decade, amid the current context emphasizing educational standards and accountability, the practice of grade retention has increased. The call for an end to social promotion has generated a variety of recommendations and legislation regarding promotion policies. This context has served as a catalyst for numerous debates regarding the use of grade retention and social promotion. In an era emphasizing evidence-based interventions, research indicates that neither grade retention nor social promotion is a successful strategy for improving educational success. Meta-analyses of studies during the past 100 years reveal deleterious outcomes associated with grade retention. Moreover, research also reveals prevention and intervention strategies that are likely to promote the social or academic competence of students at-risk of poor school performance. It is essential that educational professionals are familiar with the research when implementing interventions to promote student success. This chapter provides a brief synthesis of contemporary concerns and empirical studies examining student outcomes associated with grade retention, and also describes alternatives to grade retention. Particular consideration is given to implications for students with learning and behavioral disabilities, and the importance of focusing empirically supported strategies to promote student social and cognitive competence. Overall, educational professionals are encouraged to incorporate evidence-based programs and policies to facilitate the success of all students.
Analyses the strategy of ingredient branding and its implicationson the distribution channel members, in addition to its potential foraiding product introduction and…
Analyses the strategy of ingredient branding and its implications on the distribution channel members, in addition to its potential for aiding product introduction and adoption. Considers the benefits and the drawbacks for the supplier, manufacturer, retailer and consumer. Concludes that the appropriateness of ingredient branding depends on manufacturer‐supplier relationship, the need to differentiate the brand, and the ability to implement the new branding strategy.