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The inadequate consideration of how forms of the state variously structure politics is identified as a significant flaw in political opportunity theory. This deficiency leads to conceptual “stretching” and frustrating contradictions between research findings in the social movement literature. For political opportunities to be correctly specified, differences in the mobilization contexts across democracies and non-democracies must be explicitly addressed. This article suggests how the institutional differences between democracies and non-democracies influence the prospect, form, and impact of social mobilization against the state. It also suggests the crucial role of social networks for mobilization in non-democracies. A reformulation of the research problem and a set of sensitizing propositions based on the theoretical reconceptualization are offered.

Social movements experience periods of intense activity and periods of abeyance, when collective action is very weak because of an inhospitable political climate. Non-democracies are extreme cases of hostile political environments for social movements. Drawing on a case study of the women’s movement in Franco’s Spain (mid-1930s to 1975) based on an analysis of published documents and 17 interviews, this paper argues that some non-democracies force social movements that existed prior to dictatorships into a period of abeyance and shape collective organizing in terms of location, goals, and repertoire of activities. Some social movements under prolonged non-democratic rule manage to link and transmit the aims, repertoire of activities, and collective identity of pre-dictatorship activists to those of post-dictatorship activists. This occurs mainly through cultural activities.

This study aims to reconcile conflicting empirical results from prior studies on the association between political connections (PCs) and firms’ performance. Furthermore, it investigates whether the contradictory findings were moderated by the different types of both PCs and firms’ performance measures. This study also makes a cross-country comparison of the empirical evidence to provide more insight.

This study used meta-analysis to integrate the previous studies’ findings on the association between PCs and firms’ performance and further investigated the moderators of such association.

The findings show that PCs have a positive association with firms’ performance. This result is apparent for both democratic and authoritarian countries, which suggests PCs’ beneficial consequences toward firms’ performance should not be disregarded in both contexts. This study also finds PCs and firms’ performance measures moderate the association between PCs and firms’ performance.

This study contributes to the stream of research that investigates the association between PCs and firms’ performance. To the best of our knowledge, it is among the first to implement statistical meta-analysis on the aforementioned literature while incorporating a cross-country comparison.

Despite the burgeoning literature dealing with the democratic peace theory, there seems to be surprisingly little research done in actually analyzing how and why democracies cause peace. There is even less research done in empirically analyzing the “how” part of the normative aspects of the democratic peace theory. The purpose of this paper is to explain the theoretical assumptions and how interpersonal trust is linked to a country's preferences to go to war. In addition, a direct comparison is made between democratic and non‐democratic states to ascertain more clearly the effect of trust on decisions to go to war.

This study quantitatively examines the period from 1980 to 2001 and considers 62 democratic countries and 30 non‐democratic countries in their choices to engage in conflict.

The research project finds that interpersonal trust is strongly correlated with states' decisions to go to war.

This is the first time that a study has examined the role of interpersonal trust on a state's decision to go to war, as no scholarly work has been done in applying the study of interpersonal trust to studying the theory of democratic peace.

This study takes a broad approach to the relationship between political risk resolution through democracy and stock market development. Specifically, it examines the empirical relationship between the degree of democracy (ranging from non-democracies or autocracies to well-established “mature” democracies) and stock market size and liquidity. Using the random effects Generalized Least Squares methodology on a sample of 22 African countries and spanning the period 1985–2011, this study finds (i) the greater the degree of democracy, the greater the liquidity of the stock market but the impact on the size of the market is insignificant; (ii) the relationship between military leadership and stock market development is statistically insignificant; (iii) having constitutional limits on the number of years a chief executive is allowed to serve promotes stock market development; and (iv) a higher degree of political competitiveness has a significantly positive impact on both stock market size and liquidity.

This study aims to examine the effects of institutions on private investment (PI) using panel data analysis, where the sample countries consist of 100 countries around the world and the time period is covering from 2007 to 2016. The system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator, introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991) and further developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) is used to analyze the data sets.

This study uses the panel data approach to estimate the empirical model due to the panel nature of the data. In particular, due to the presence of lagged dependent variables and the ability to capture individual country-specific effects, the system GMM estimator, introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991) and further developed by Blundell and Bond (1998), is adopted to analyze the roles of institutions in PI. The system GMM is developed specifically to solve the problems of weak instruments and persistency (Blundell and Bond, 1998). Jointly, they suggest to adopt additional moment conditions where lagged difference of the dependent variable is orthogonal to the level form of the disturbances. The system GMM estimator is able to combine the moment conditions for the different models, as well as the level model, thereby (is capable of) generate consistent and efficient parameters. Due to the dynamic nature of the data, this study uses one-step and two-step system GMM to investigate the roles of institutions in PI.

The empirical results based on the two-step system GMM demonstrate that the quality of institutions plays an important role in stimulating PI. The finding is reinforced by the analysis of the institutional sub-components’ effects on PI.

This study is unique as its measurement of institutions is multi-dimensional (including law and order, rules and regulation, government stability, bureaucratic quality, control of corruption, socio-economic condition, etc.), and hence are more comprehensive. Second, it is different than the previous studies as its sample of countries includes both democracies and non-democracies, as well as both developed and non-developed economies in which policy implications are widely acceptable. Third, this study contributes to the policymakers especially those in the debt-ridden economies where governments are budget-tightening (limited capacity for public investment), as to which practical direction should be focused on so as to attract PI and eventually sustainable growth can take place.

Building on the steps to war model, this paper seeks to examine the impact that territorial Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) have on the time it takes a dyad to go to war after it experiences its first MID.

A model common to epidemiological research, the hazard model, is employed to examine the dyadic relationship from the time of the first MID forward. This is an improvement to dyadic analysis, as most research examines the characteristics of individual MIDs in isolation.

Dyads with a history of territorial MIDs go to war much more quickly than dyads without a history of territorial MIDs. Future research should explore the relationship between territory, war, and power status to test the assertion that minor power states engage in power politics behavior less frequently.

Conflict resolution measures need to be employed more quickly when states have unresolved territorial issues. Mediation generally does not occur quickly, which may explain why territorial issues are less likely to be referred to mediators and less successfully mediated. The results presented herein highlight the need for flexible, quick responses to certain crises and the need to settle borders and other territorial disputes permanently to avoid war.

The paper tests a critical component of the steps to war model and examines the assertion that the historical relationship between states affects conflict decisions.

Many functionalist models of international cooperation rely on punishment by states to enforce cooperation. However, the empirical record suggests that such state-based accounts offer an incomplete explanation of international trade cooperation. We argue that when theoretical approaches are adjusted to incorporate aspects of domestic politics and institutions, two key insights emerge. First, political pressure from domestic industries can be key in creating demand for violations of trade agreements. Since such pressure is affected by stochastic shocks, the temptation of leaders to commit trade violations can vary over time. The presence of a dispute settlement procedure (DSP) provides flexibility that allows leaders to respond to such pressure by occasionally committing violations and then compensating their trading partners, if the DSP finds that the violation was not subject to exceptions in the trading agreement. This flexibility enhances the willingness of leaders to sign cooperative agreements in the first place. Second, domestic politics can function as an enforcement mechanism for ensuring compliance with international trade agreements and DSP rulings. Voters can condition their electoral decisions on whether their leader complies with socially beneficial trade agreements. The DSP plays an important role in this account as an information-provider. For voters to hold their leaders accountable, they need information about what choices their leader has made and whether his actions constitute compliance with an international agreement. The DSP provides transparency and reduces uncertainty about these factors.