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This paper aims to synthesize the diverse literature on nomination and remuneration committees and provide avenues for future research.

This study provides a comprehensive literature review of theoretical and empirical studies published in reputable international journals indexed by Scopus.

The literature review reveals several aspects of the nomination and remuneration committee. These aspects have been classified into the definition of the nomination and remuneration committee, dimensions of the nomination and remuneration committee, measurement and research review results, reasons for conflict empirical findings, company dynamics and research on moderators, as well as recommending future research.

Our literature review shows that nomination and remuneration committees play a role in improving board performance and company performance, reducing agency conflicts and improving corporate governance to provide implications for companies, regulators and investors and pave the way for future research.

This paper identifies issues related to nomination and remuneration committees, their theoretical and practical implications and avenues for future research.

The authors investigate the adoption of nomination committees in Australia and identify the managerial power perspective as one explanation for firms not establishing nomination committees. A positive outcome of establishing a nomination committee from the perspective of board diversity is also examined.

The authors adopt an archival approach by collecting data for firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) during the period 2010 to 2018. The authors establish the prevalence of nomination committees for small medium and large Australian firms. Regression analyses are used to determine whether the power of the chief executive officer (CEO) influences the adoption of a nomination committee. The association between having nomination committee and board diversity is also analyzed using regression analyses.

Less than half of firms adopt a nomination committee. Larger firms are more likely to adopt a nomination committee than medium and smaller sized firms. Firms with less powerful CEOs are more likely to adopt a nomination committee. Adoption of a nomination committee is also associated with greater board tenure dispersion and board gender diversity in medium and smaller sized firms.

Evidence on nomination committees provides original research that extends previous research focusing on the audit, risk and remuneration committees and samples restricted to large firms. The nomination committee has an important role to play in the appointment of directors yet limited evidence exists of the adoption rate, explanation for non-adoption and benefits of adoption. The authors add to this evidence.

The purpose of this paper is to ascertain the relative impact of different Tony Award nominations and wins on the financial success of a Broadway theater production, as defined by the length of the production’s run.

Cox hazard regression was used to identify the impact of Tony Award nominations and wins (time-varying covariates), while controlling for several time-invariant covariates: type of production (play or musical, revival or original Broadway production), production costs (operationalized via the cast size), the month and year of opening, and initial marketing success (defined as the percentage of first full week’s tickets sold).

The award with the strongest relationship with production longevity was the Tony Award for Best Musical (nomination OR=0.566, p=0.110; win OR=0.323, p=0.020). Several other awards had a relationship with production longevity, but most were not statistically significant.

The limitations include the low statistical power for many time-varying covariates and the cumulative impact of multiple awards was not investigated. Future researchers interested in the Broadway industry should not combine Tony Awards because of the varying impact on economic outcomes for a production.

This study is the first to investigate all 22 Tony Award nominations and wins and their individual impact on an economic outcome. This paper includes the study’s raw data and SPSS syntax to comply with open science practices. The author encourages readers to replicate the analysis.

Several mechanisms exist to address the low levels of gender and race diversity in boardrooms, including mandatory quotas, voluntary targets and investor activism. Based on the similarity-attraction theory, the authors investigated whether nomination committees of companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) could serve as an internal change mechanism to promote board gender and race diversity.

Panel data on the gender and race diversity of the nomination committees and boards of the 40 largest listed companies (the JSE Top 40) were analysed over the period 2011- 2016. Panel regressions were conducted to investigate four hypothesised associations.

More diverse boards had significantly more diverse nomination committees in terms of both gender and race. A significant positive association was furthermore reported between the race diversity of nomination committees and the appointment of new directors of colour. The latter finding could partly be attributed to legislation to enhance black representation in all spheres of the South African economy.

South Africa offers a unique socio-political setting in which to conduct board diversity research. In line with the similarity-attraction theory, it is shown that diverse nomination committees have an essential role in setting and achieving board gender and race diversity targets.

The aim of the current study was to develop and assess a method for obtaining peer‐, selfand teacher‐nominations of the participant roles in peer victimisation appropriate for use with children between the ages of five and eight years. Sixty‐eight five‐year‐olds and 69 eight‐year‐olds and their teachers took part. Peer‐nominations (including self‐nominations) were obtained from five‐ and eight‐year‐olds for participant roles of aggressor, reinforcer, assistant, defender, outsider, passive and provocative victim; and similar nominations from their teachers. At both ages, children were able to nominate for all the roles, and consistent gender differences were found. Test‐retest reliability (over an interval of one week) was moderate to high for all roles in eight‐year‐olds, but only for aggressor and provocative victim in five‐year‐olds. There was evidence for role discrimination, but five‐year‐olds gave similar nominations for aggressor and provocative victim. Within‐class pupil agreement was significant for aggressor and provocative victim at both ages, and for passive victim and defender at eight years. Peer‐ and teacher‐ratings showed better agreement with each other than with self‐nominations. The findings are discussed in relation to children's developing abilities to identify and report various roles, as well as developmental changes in the nature of peer‐aggression.

To explore the importance of the board of director nomination process (that is, who nominates a given director for a position on the firm’s board) for the voting outcomes, disciplining of management, and overall monitoring quality of the board of directors.

We exploit a recent regulation passed by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requiring disclosure of the board nomination process. In particular, we focus on firms’ use of executive search firms versus allowing internal members (often simply the CEO) to nominate new directors to serve on the board of directors.

We show that companies that use search firms to find board members pay their CEOs significantly higher salaries and significantly higher total compensations. Further, companies with search firm-identified independent directors are significantly less likely to fire their CEOs following negative performance. In addition, companies with search firm-identified independent directors are significantly more likely to engage in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and see abnormally low returns from this M&A activity. We instrument the endogenous choice of using an executive search through the varying geographic distance of companies to executive search firms. Using this instrumental variable framework, we show search firm-identified independent directors’ negative impact on firm performance, consistent with firm behavior and governance consequences we document.

Given the recent law passage, we are the first to directly analyze the nomination process, and show a surprisingly large predictive effect of seemingly arm’s-length nominations. This has clear implications for thinking carefully through how independence is defined in the director nomination process.

Purpose – Institutional investors are facing increased pressure and threats of legislation from the European Union to abandon passive ownership strategies. This chapter investigates the legal prerequisites for active ownership among institutional investors in two Scandinavian countries to highlight differences in the legal framework that potentially account for apparent dissimilarities in the practice of shareholder activism.

Design/methodology/approach – Data on shareholder proposals from Danish and Swedish annual general meetings from 2006 throughout 2010 suggest that institutional investors are approximately a thousand times more active in Sweden than in Denmark.

Findings – The comparative study of the legal framework for shareholder activism shows diminutive legal distance in general, however, we find that the shareholder-based nomination committee employed in Sweden constitutes an exception. This is relevant, as such a setup transfers power from the board of directors to the owners. Presumably, this reduces the impact of free-rider and collective action problems, and increases the shareholders’ inclination to make proposals, which is also what we find. Moreover, we find other differences in the legal framework that support the transfer of power to the owners.

Research implications – We contribute to literature by investigating the importance of local governance mechanisms created by the legal framework – an area where research is scarce. The chapter discusses how two classical theoretical dilemmas – free-rider problems and collective action problems among shareholders – can be reduced by the implementation of local corporate governance elements.

Originality/value – The chapter outlines the actual practice of shareholder activism, in terms of proposals, in Denmark and Sweden, and highlights divergent legal elements which theoretically transfer power to the shareholders. Thus, regulators should be aware of the impact by local governance mechanisms, and how shareholders react under different legal prerequisites.

The premise that the U.S. Supreme Court never veers too far off from the dominant national political coalition (Dahl, 1957) has become widely accepted among social scientists today. To fulfill that promise, however, the confirmation process for justices must serve as a plebiscite through which the public can ratify or reject future justices based on their views. Unfortunately, modern confirmation hearings have become an exercise in obfuscation, providing little meaningful dialogue on important issues. Because conservative Republican presidents have made the lion's share of appointments in recent times, social conservatives have most often benefited from a process that has severed the link between Supreme Court nominees and the polity they must serve.

A family takaful certificate is subscribed by a takaful participant for the purpose of preparing financial support for his dependants after his death. The takaful benefits could then be made payable to a nominee named as the beneficiary under conditional hibah (gift). In this respect, the participant is free to decide to whom the benefits are to be given since the law is silent as to the criteria of the beneficiary. This situation gives rise to the issue on whether such a practice fulfils the objectives of Sharīʿah, especially when the nominated beneficiary is not the sole dependant of the deceased participant. Therefore, this research aims to evaluate the status of family takaful benefits, analyse the rules of conditional hibah from the Sharīʿah perspective and propose solutions whenever necessary. The research adopts doctrinal analysis by examining existing primary and secondary materials including statutory provisions and other legal and non-legal literatures. The study predicates that the application of conditional hibah to the whole benefits does not reflect the objectives of Sharīʿah if determination on the status of the benefits is solely based on the nomination made by the participant. It is observed that takaful benefits payable from the Participant’s Account should be considered as the deceased’s estate and must be distributed according to fara’id or Islamic law of inheritance. Conversely, the sum covered payable from the Participant’s Special Account may be paid to the deceased’s dependants whose criteria are determined by the Sharīʿah Advisory Council as the highest authority in Islamic financial matters.

Indian Companies Act (2013) and revised clause 49 of Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) provides for a major overhaul of corporate governance norms to be adopted by firms in India. Some of the key provisions of the act pertain to board subcommittees. Given this background, the chapter seeks to analyze the role of overall board composition and board subcommittees (audit, nomination and remuneration and risk management committee) on firm performance. In addition, the relationship between ownership and firm performance is analyzed. The study documents that large listed companies in India that have constituted a nomination and remuneration committee have had positive influence on firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q (TQ). Board subcommittees’ (i.e., audit, nomination and remuneration and risk management committee) independence is positively associated with firm performance as measured by TQ. Overall, the board size is positively associated with firm performance. However, in the presence of a nomination and remuneration committee, board size is negatively associated with firm performance. This study offers insights for policymakers interested in analyzing corporate governance practices in terms of board subcommittees as evidenced from a developing economy such as India.